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This dissertation adopts an experimental approach to studying lie judgments. It focuses on lie 
judgments to different types of meaning within a pragmatic framework – namely bare linguistic 
meaning, explicature, and implicature – to study whether the (in)directness of communicated 
false content affects the extent to which an utterance is judged as a lie. In addition, it manipulates 
several contextual factors – namely the genre of discourse, pre-existing biases towards the 
speaker, the speaker’s intention to deceive, and the stakes of the situation – to investigate the 
extent to which these extralinguistic contextual factors affect lie judgments as well. Lastly, the 
project includes a reaction time experiment designed to investigate the mental representations of 
the categories of lie and mislead and how false explicatures and false implicatures are 
categorized. In exploring the variability in lie judgments, I gather evidence that support 
amendments to the discussion of lie judgments in the linguistic literature and additionally draw 
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This dissertation investigates the relationship between lying and utterance meaning. The 
role that linguistic meaning plays in what counts as a lie is explored while accounting for and 
examining contextual factors that may influence lie judgments. The central focus of this project 
is to investigate the level of linguistic meaning that is considered when determining if someone 
has lied. Take the following exchange as an example: 
  A: My father works for the United Nations. 
B: My father works for the FBI.1 
 Let’s say it is the case that B’s father works as a janitor in the FBI headquarters building. 
Does B lie? What if B is running for prominent political office and is speaking in public? What if 
B is on the witness stand? What if A and B are taken hostage and need to reach a high-ranking 
contact to discuss a ransom? What if B is intentionally and maliciously trying to make A believe 
their father is a high-ranking FBI official? What if B has a track record of lying to A and A does 
not like or trust B? 
 The meaning that B’s father works as an FBI agent or an official of some sort is 
communicated by B’s utterance but not said explicitly – this is an implicature. Whether false 
implicatures can be considered lies has been addressed by numerous authors, with opinions on 
both sides (e.g., Meibauer, 2005, 2011, 2014a; Saul, 2012). It may be the case that lie judgments 
vary across situations and individuals, complicating this inquiry. 
 The concept of linguistic meaning itself has been the center of contentious debate in the 
pragmatics literature; scholars in the field support a wide range of definitions of “basic-level 
meaning,” from minimal to maximal and everything in between. This project will adopt as a 
theoretical framework Mira Ariel’s Privileged Interactional Interpretation theory (Ariel, 2002b) 
with graded strength (Sternau et al., 2015), which posits that different levels of meaning could, in 
different scenarios, emerge as the Privileged Interactional Interpretation (PII); these rankings 
(bare linguistic meaning, explicature, implicature) correspond to levels from elsewhere in the 
                                                          
1 Example adapted from Meibauer (2005: 1388). 
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literature. Ariel’s theory, I argue, is well-suited to this data-driven task, as it is designed to 
capture the psychologically real aspects of meaning and the variation therein.  
 The thesis will address the following primary research questions: 
(1-1) What level of linguistic meaning (bare linguistic meaning, explicature, implicature) do
 judgers hold speakers accountable for in lie judgments? 
 Some theorists have claimed that intentionally false implicatures are lies (e.g., Meibauer, 
2005; 2011; 2014a), while most have said that falsely implicated content cannot be considered a 
lie (e.g., Horn, 2017; Saul, 2012). Previous experimental evidence has been split as well, with 
some results suggesting people consider intentionally false implicatures to be lies (Antomo et al., 
2018; Willemsen & Wiegmann, 2017) and other results suggesting they do not (Weissman & 
Terkourafi, 2019). This dissertation will adopt a rigorous experimental program to achieve a 
clearer picture of what naïve language users think. It is assumed in this project, based on the 
adopted theoretical framework, that lie judgments will track the meaning that the judger is taking 
the speaker to be committing themself to in each instance. If a judger considers B’s utterance 
above to be a lie, they are considering B to be committed to the implicated meaning that B’s 
father is an official or diplomat (i.e., not a janitor). If a judger considers B’s utterance to not be a 
lie, they are taking B to be committing themselves to only minimal meaning that B’s father 
works for the FBI in any capacity; they may still consider B to be providing false information, 
but not as a lie.  
 This investigation will adopt the Relevance-Theoretic explicature/implicature distinction; 
as such, it will investigate false explicatures as well as false implicatures. As it is assumed that 
lie judgments track judger uptake of speaker commitment, it is hypothesized that utterances with 
false explicatures, which involve a stronger level of linguistic meaning than implicatures (per 
Sternau et al., 2015), will be rated as more of a lie than utterances with false implicatures and 
less of a lie than straightforward, prototypical lies in which the false content is delivered more 
directly. 
(1-2) Do aspects of the surrounding context affect the answer to (1-1)? 
3 
 
 As it has been robustly demonstrated that context influences meaning in interaction, it 
may be the case that contextual aspects above and beyond the utterance itself influence lie 
judgments of false ex/implicatures as well. Experiments in this project will examine the effects 
of discourse genre, speaker-related biases, intention to deceive, and stakes of the scenario. Those 
who have theorized about false implicature lies and those who have collected data on the topic 
have for the most part left the context of the conversation unaddressed. Analytic philosophers 
may not need to concern themselves with the specifics of contextual influences on lie judgments, 
but their definitions should be able to account for the notion of contextual influence in some 
way; those who investigate lie judgments experimentally should certainly be concerned with 
context effects.  
(1-3) Do explicatures and implicatures behave uniformly or is there internal inconsistency
 among the different types of each? 
Recent findings (e.g., Doran et al., 2012; Sternau et al., 2015; Van Tiel et al., 2016) have 
called category uniformity into question, suggesting that the members of theoretically designated 
groupings such as explicatures and implicatures do not all behave alike. If these categories are 
not uniform, that does not necessarily pose a threat to the underlying theoretical notion, but 
theories that attempt to address the psychologically real manifestations of meaning should be 
able to (minimally) account for these differences and (ideally) predict them.  
 To address these three main questions, I will adopt an experimental methodology 
designed to gather judgments from naïve language users who nonetheless have intuitions about 
lie judgments. Four experiments will utilize an offline lie rating scale that presents participants 
with items to rate on a sliding scale that ranges from not a lie to lie. Results from these four 
experiments will constitute evidence to address the three primary research questions. Each 
experiment also targets a different contextual manipulation and will answer the following four 
specific research questions: 
(1-4) Does the genre in which an exchange occurs influence lie ratings of false ex/implicature
 utterances? 
(1-5) Do preconceived biases towards the speaker influence lie ratings of false ex/implicatures? 
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(1-6) Does an explicit intention to deceive on the part of the speaker influence lie ratings of
 false ex/implicature utterances? 
(1-7) Do differing situational stakes, operationalized in terms of consequences, influence lie
 ratings of false ex/implicature utterances? 
 Lastly, an online response time experiment will be utilized to explore the relationship 
between lying and misleading (e.g., Saul, 2012; Stokke, 2013, 2016) and the processing of 
judgments of false ex/implicatures. This experiment will address the following research 
questions:  
(1-8a) Are false ex/implicatures considered misleading? 
(1-8b) Is the proposed strength-based hierarchy of linguistic meaning preserved in binary
 lie/misleading judgments? 
(1-8c) Is there a difference in the time it takes to make a lie judgment versus a misleading
 judgment? 
 In its findings regarding all of the above research questions, this thesis contributes to 
several discussions. It contributes to the question of whether false ex/implicatures are lies by 
providing a robust dataset of participant judgments on a wide variety of stimuli. In so doing, it 
adds the notion of contextual influence to that discussion, making the exploration of variation in 
lie judgments a central objective instead of an overlooked component. The response time 
experiment provides evidence on the time course of lying and misleading judgments as well as 
on the relationship between those two terms with respect to the categorization of false 
ex/implicatures. By investigating lie judgments to several different implicatures and explicatures, 
this project also contributes to the broader ongoing discussion of linguistic meaning. While 
theoretical foundations of types of linguistic meaning are established, understanding how the 
proposed groupings and subgroupings of types map on to psychological reality is still a work in 
progress in the field; the results here contribute to the ongoing clarification of this picture.  
It is worth mentioning here why I believe an empirical approach is well-suited to handle 
these questions. Experimental pragmatics is a field that has exploded since the turn of the 
millennium, with increasingly advanced methods lending researchers new ways to better 
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understand long-discussed questions (see Noveck & Reboul, 2008). While a lion’s share of the 
work in this field has investigated scalar implicature, the principles of experimental pragmatics 
are suited to address other questions as well, such as what is considered a lie.  
 Lying as a phenomenon is a highly accessible and oft-referenced concept throughout 
society, yet scholars cannot agree on a full definition. Though much of the musings about lying 
and its “best” definition have historically been non-empirical, the role of the ordinary language 
user should not be forgotten in this discussion. Austin, whose work provides the impetus for the 
development of pragmatics as a field, notes: “our common stock of words embodies all the 
distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, 
in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, 
since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in 
all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our 
armchairs” (Austin, 1956: 8). Recently, the trend in lying research has been to incorporate more 
experimental methodologies (see e.g., Antomo et al., 2018; Arico & Fallis, 2013; Coleman & 
Kay, 1981; Hardin, 2010; Meibauer, 2016a; Turri & Turri, 2015; Viebahn et al., 2018; Weissman 
& Terkourafi, 2019; Willemsen & Wiegmann, 2017), and even the non-empirical works are 
making calls for experimental evidence to weigh in on the discussions at hand (Dynel, 2015: 
327; Meibauer, 2016a: 120). Arico & Fallis (2013) provide some perspective on this, talking 
specifically about bald-faced lies, proviso lies, and confused lies: “philosophers do not agree … 
there is reason to worry that the intuitions that these philosophers possess have been corrupted by 
their philosophical training or their theoretical commitments … in order to get at lying as it is 
normally understood, it is necessary to begin by determining what people typically mean when 
they use this term in ordinary language” (Arico & Fallis, 2013: 795). This study sets out to do 
just that.  
 Chapter 2 will review relevant literature, including theories of lying and linguistic 
meaning, and motivate the selection of Ariel’s PII theory as a working theoretical framework. 
Chapter 3 contains methodological details, including the experimental designs and data analyses 
to be used in the subsequent chapters. Chapters 4–7 present the offline lie rating experiments on 
discourse genre (Chapter 4), speaker-related biases (Chapter 5), speaker’s intent to deceive 
6 
 
(Chapter 6), and stakes of the situation (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 presents the response time 
experiment on lying and misleading. All five experimental chapters begin with a review of 
relevant literature and continue with results and local conclusions. The results from all five 
experiments are synthesized in Chapter 9, which also takes stock of the theories of lying and 
linguistic meaning discussed earlier and ends with a connection to natural instances of lie 






















2  Literature Review 
2.1 Lying  
Many researchers of lying (e.g., Arico & Fallis, 2013: 791; Mahon, 2008: 2; Williams, 
2002) refer to a three-pronged definition that can be traced back to the writings of Saint 
Augustine (395/1952), a version of which is also found in contemporary dictionaries. This 
definition can be summarized as follows: a speaker S asserts a proposition p to a hearer H, S 
believes p is false, and S asserts p with an intention to deceive H into believing that p, or at least 
believing that S believes p. Some versions include a criterion that p must actually be false. Not 
all cases are straightforward, however, and this definition may fall short of truly and fully 
encompassing what speakers consider to be a lie on different occasions. In the past 20 years 
especially, philosophers and linguists have offered alternative definitions that attempt to fully 
capture what it means to lie (see Meibauer [2018]) for a recent review of the linguistics of lying).  
Coleman & Kay’s (1981) prototype semantics study serves as the seminal example – and 
one that remained relatively unvisited for some 30 years – of an experiment asking participants 
for lie judgments. Their study asked English-speaking American subjects to assess on a 7-point 
scale if characters in various stories had lied. Their checklist for “lie” included three criteria: 1. A 
proposition p is false. 2. The speaker S believes p to be false. 3. S utters utterance U meaning 
proposition p with the intention to deceive. Vignettes were crafted with utterances that 
systematically met or lacked these criteria. The researchers hypothesized and found that a 
statement that fulfills all three criteria can be deemed the “prototypical lie,” but other statements 
might still be judged to be lies if they fulfill only one or two of the criteria. “Believe false” was 
the highest-ranking criterion, followed by “intent to deceive” and “actually false,” respectively. 
Every story that included “believe false” received an average rating of >4, indicating that all such 
stories were judged to be lies. One item in their study received a mean rating of 4.61, even 
though the only property it included was “believe false” – it was lacking “intent to deceive” and 
“actually false.” These findings reveal that a prototype checklist approach may well be the best 
way to characterize common perceptions of lies – the prototypical lie contains all the criteria, but 
other cases that are missing one or two of the criteria may still be considered lies.  
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Within the past decade, numerous researchers have begun to return to the lie judgment 
task as a way of gathering information about what non-philosophers consider to be lies (Antomo 
et al., 2018; Arico & Fallis, 2013; Hardin, 2010; Marsili, 2017; Meibauer, 2016a; Rutschmann & 
Wiegmann, 2017; Turri & Turri, 2015; Viebahn et al., 2018; Weissman & Terkourafi, 2019; 
Willemsen & Wiegmann, 2017). Theoretical work has seen a back-and-forth on the central 
issues, with scholars presenting plausible, contrasting theories. At this point, experimental 
evidence is called for to better understand perceptions of the phenomena under scrutiny. 
Elsewhere in the burgeoning field of experimental philosophy (e.g., Knobe & Nichols, 2013), 
there are several studies taken as evidence that philosophers’ intuitions are no more reliable than 
those of non-philosophers (e.g., Machery, 2011; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; Tobia et al., 
2013). 
In addition to definitional lines of work on lying, there are explorations of the concept in 
terms of morality. Eminent philosophers such as Aquinas and Kant have considered the moral 
consequences of lying throughout history. While this current investigation will not be focused on 
the moral implications of lying per se, the notions of lying and ethics are so tightly linked that 
the latter cannot truly be excluded in an investigation of the former. This study, grounded in 
linguistics, utilizes these ethical considerations as an independent variable that may affect lie 
judgments (see Chapters 6 and 7) rather than directly measuring whether utterances that may 
count as lies are viewed as immoral. 
Lying is tied closely to linguistic theory, since it deals with meaning, and thus a 
pragmatics-based approach can be of value to a study of lying. Most theorists hold that 
something must be “said” (or, for some, “asserted”) to be considered a lie, but determining what 
it means to be “said” is no simple concept (see Section 2.2). Lying is, as Meibauer puts it in the 
title of his 2014 manuscript, situated at “the semantics/pragmatics interface.” Other theoreticians 
of lying rely heavily on additional concepts from pragmatic theory to define lying, such as 
Marsili’s (2017) speech-act theoretic account. 
Some theorists (e.g., Dor, 2017; Reboul, 2017a) have even claimed that having different 
types of linguistic meaning, specifically the concept of implicit communication, is a concept that 
has evolved in language alongside deception. The notion at the core of this relationship is 
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epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010), which can be summarized as the mechanism by which 
we determine what to believe from interlocutors in communication. Without epistemic vigilance, 
we would believe everything that anyone tells us – epistemic vigilance allows us to use a variety 
of sources of information, including previous interactions with the speaker, the speaker’s 
reputation, and the immediate situational context, to make these judgments in real time. The 
authors present this as a core tenet of human communication: “it is not that we can generally be 
trustful and therefore need to be vigilant only in rare and special circumstances. We could not be 
mutually trustful unless we were mutually vigilant” (Sperber et al., 2010: 365). They also argue 
that the “disposition to be vigilant” is a significant part of the communicative evolutionary 
trajectory of humans, evolving alongside our abilities to use language in the ways that we do, 
including utilizing indirectness in pursuit of deception (see also Reboul, 2017a; 2017b). The 
notion of epistemic vigilance is not immediately relevant for participants in the experiments in 
this study (see rationale in Section 3.4.2) but is discussed further in the Discussion (Section 9.4). 
This chapter presents an overview of previous literature on lying and related concepts. 
Section 2.2 introduces the concept of a “false implicature,” the case that exemplifies the role 
pragmatics plays in lying, and the notion of misleading. Section 2.3 provides an overview of 
theories of linguistic meaning and concludes with selecting the theoretical linguistic framework 
that will be adopted in this dissertation.  
2.2 False Implicatures 
The following story presents an example of a false implicature:  
 
(2-1) The Story of the Mate and the Captain 
A captain and his mate have a long-term quarrel. The mate drinks more rum than is good 
for him, and the captain is determined not to tolerate this behaviour any longer. When the 
mate is drunk again, the captain writes in the logbook: Today, October 11th, the mate is 
drunk. When the mate reads this entry during his next watch, he is first getting angry, 
then, after a short moment of reflection, he writes into the logbook: Today, October 14th, 
the captain is not drunk.  
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(Meibauer, 2005: 1380; based on Posner, 1980) 
 
In this story, the mate’s asserting that the captain is not drunk can generate the conversational 
implicature that the captain is almost always drunk, and the fact that he is not drunk is an unusual 
and noteworthy occurrence by virtue of Grice’s (1975) first sub-maxim of Quantity (“Be as 
informative as is required”) and the maxim of Relation (“Be relevant”). The “my father works 
for the FBI” example from Chapter 1 is another illustration of a false implicature. Focusing on 
the fact that these false propositions are not explicitly uttered, some authors have characterized 
such examples as “indirect lies” (Vincent & Castelfranchi, 1981) or lies (without using the term 
“implicature” to describe them [Shibles, 1985: 82]). Others (and there are more in this camp) 
classify them as a type of deception (Adler, 1997; Dynel, 2011) or “merely misleading” (Saul, 
2012: 37, 118; Stokke, 2013a: 354), denying that they constitute lies at all (Fallis, 2009: 40; 
Horn, 2017: 50; Marsili, 2017: 87).  
Vigorously on the other side, Meibauer (2005, 2011, 2014a) argues that false 
implicatures are lies and should be accounted for in any definition of lying. If the captain in the 
story is, indeed, not drunk, and this is not such an unusual occurrence, then the assertion is true 
and the implicature is false. Meibauer claims that in this context, the mate has lied, even though 
technically his assertion is true; because implicatures “are intended by the speaker and are 
intended to be derived by the hearer … then it is of course possible to lie by intentionally using 
false implicatures” (2014: 114). This is captured in his extended definition of lying: 
 
(2-2)  S lied at time t by uttering the declarative sentence σ iff: 
1. S asserted at t that p.  
2a. S actively believed at t that not p. 
OR  
2b. S thereby conversationally implicated that q, but actively believed that not q. 
(Meibauer, 2014a: 102‒103) 
 
Meibauer operates within a Neo-Gricean framework that includes both Generalized and 
Particularized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs and PCIs) – he claims that both types can be 
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lies. GCIs are “default” implicatures of the expression that are licensed all else being equal 
(except in specific contexts), whereas PCIs are entirely context-dependent (see Section 2.4.1 for 
a more detailed explanation of the distinction). The story of the mate and the captain is an 
example of a PCI. A GCI example (via Stokke) is given in (2-3) below: 
 
(2-3) Jasper’s neighborhood recently put on a Community Week. People helped their neighbors 
out with various chores and tasks that needed doing. Selfishly, however, Jasper used 
Community Week to fix the roof on his own house, ignoring the neighbors. The 
following week Jasper is having dinner with Doris. Jasper is keen to give Doris a good 
impression of himself.  
Doris: So how did you help out during Community Week? 
Jasper: I fixed a roof. 
(Stokke, 2013b: 84) 
 
Jasper’s uttering of “a roof” in (3) above carries the implicature that he did not fix the roof, 
which is in turn strengthened to mean the roof of his own house (Levinson, 2000: 92). Thus, the 
implicature that Jasper fixed the roof of someone else’s house, under the pretense of Community 
Week, is licensed. Here the assertion is true, since he did fix a roof, but the GCI (alternatively, in 
other theories, the explicature) that the roof was not his own is false. According to Stokke, 
Jasper’s utterance is a lie. 
 Dynel (2018a) differentiates between “deceptively withholding information” and lying, 
arguing that the two are distinct. This is because, according to Dynel, while intentionally 
deceiving via withholding information results in a violation of the Gricean maxim of Quality, the 
violation is not through what is literally said, so it does not count as a lie. She does, however, 
interpret Grice to mean that deceptions involving under/overstatement – meiosis and hyperbole – 
are explicit violations of Quality through what is said (WIS), not (as most interpret it) violations 
of Quantity. Scalar implicatures used to intentionally deceive (e.g., saying “some” when all is 
true, saying someone is “upset” when they are absolutely devastated) are, to Dynel, lies (Dynel, 
2018a, 2018b). According to this account, departing from the speaker-perceived truth – for 
example, that someone is absolutely devastated – is a matter of saying something untrue as 
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opposed to implicitly conveying something untrue. Therefore, such utterances are lies no matter 
the direction; describing that person as “upset” is as much a lie as describing them as 
“overjoyed” (Dynel, 2018a: 11–12, 26).  
Saul (2012) explores both ethical and definitional aspects of lying, striving to elucidate a 
distinction between lying and misleading. According to her definition of lying (she does not 
provide a separate one for misleading), speakers lie if they are: 
 
(2-4)  not the victim of linguistic error/malapropism or using metaphor, hyperbole, or irony … 
[and] (1) they say that P; (2) they believe P to be false; (3) they take themself to be in a 
warranting context.  
(Saul, 2012: 3)  
 
Two aspects of this definition are worth highlighting. First, a warranting context refers to a 
situation in which one “promises or guarantees, either explicitly or implicitly, that what one says 
is true” (Carson, 2006: 294, cited in Saul, 2012: 10). This additional criterion means that acting 
in a play or telling a joke do not count as lying. Second, the precise notion of “saying” is 
important, since, according to Saul, a distinction between lying and misleading hinges precisely 
on what is technically “said” – here enters linguistic meaning (see Section 2.3 for more on this 
issue). 
Stokke (2013b) and Fallis (2014) agree with Saul’s appeal to technical “saying” as it 
relates to lying, and Horn (2017) takes a similar theoretical stance. Horn posits that what is 
implicated “never yields a lie” (50) and maintains that a lying-misleading distinction is quite an 
important one to keep. Horn uses numerous courtroom and literary encounters to highlight the 
importance of this distinction in the real world and argues that adopting a definition such as 
Meibauer’s risks losing it. In earlier work, Dynel (2011) also argues that lies concern only what 
is said (henceforth: WIS); if something untrue is communicated but it is not part of WIS, then 
this is deception without lying. These authors all agree that lying applies only to WIS, contrary to 




Michaelson (2016) takes this a step further in his Lying Test, claiming that what counts 
as WIS can be empirically defined by what participants will and will not consider to be lies. The 
underlying assumption here is that lies concern only WIS; if something is treated as a lie, that 
means it must have been said.  
Kisielewska-Krysiuk (2016) claims that only that which the speaker says explicitly can be 
a lie; on the surface, this seems to be compatible with e.g., Saul and Horn, but she adopts a 
Relevance Theoretic framework of linguistic meaning. What counts as “explicit” in this theory is 
different from and broader than what counts as WIS to Saul or Horn. To her, then, false 
implicatures cannot be lies but false explicatures can (see Section 2.4.1 for the distinction). 
Kisielewska-Krysiuk, then, is positioned in between Saul/Horn – who think only minimal WIS 
can be a lie – and Meibauer – who thinks both explicatures and implicatures can be a lie – in 
terms of what can count as a lie.  
 
2.3 Empirical Approaches in the Study of Lying 
 
In her review of Meibauer (2014a), Dynel (2015) mentions that the diversity of 
implicatures means that treating all of them as either lies or not-lies would be “a sweeping 
generalization” and concludes that this issue deserves a more fine-grained analysis (Dynel, 2015: 
327). In his response to Dynel’s review, Meibauer echoes this sentiment: “it seems important that 
more empirical data [regarding lying] be consulted on the basis of, for instance, experimental 
pragmatics/semantics” (Meibauer, 2016b: 120). 
The status of false implicatures as lies or not-lies surfaces in everyday interactions as 
well. One famous example often referred to in the false implicature literature is from Bronston v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973). The critical example from this case, discussed by Solan & 
Tiersma (2010), Asher & Lascarides (2013), and Horn (2017), among others, is the following: 
 
(2-5) Prosecutor: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston? 
Samuel Bronston: No, sir. 
P: Have you ever? 
SB: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.  
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(Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 1973) 
 
In the lines cited here, Bronston implies that he himself never had a Swiss bank account, 
which is false. He did, in fact, previously have one, though not at the time of questioning. 
Importantly, he never says this explicitly; this is what Fallis (2018) refers to as a deceptive 
omission. All that Bronston literally says in response to the two successive questions is (1) that 
he doesn’t have one now and (2) that the company had an account. Bronston was charged with 
perjury, a charge that was overturned by the Supreme Court because, in Chief Justice Warren 
Burger’s words, what Bronston said was “literally true” (U.S. 357–8: 409) despite his intent to 
mislead. This set an important legal precedent that was notably utilized during accusations of 
perjury against Bill Clinton in impeachment proceedings, a precedent that is at odds with 
Meibauer’s claims about false implicatures. The fact that a lower court found Bronston guilty of 
perjury and the Supreme Court overturned this ruling exemplifies the difference in opinion 
around the status of false implicatures as lies or not.  
 It is not just court cases, which seem to take exceptionally literal definitions of saying and 
lying (see Section 4.2.2), that house these sorts of debates; everyday conversations feature the 
false implicature lying/misleading debate prominently as well. The following is an excerpt from 
an interview between Dave Portnoy of Barstool Sports and his interviewee, Boston sports-radio 
personality Michael Felger. This excerpt comes 13 minutes into a broadcast conversation about 
“Deflategate,” the scandal in which the National Football League accused the New England 
Patriots and quarterback Tom Brady of deliberately deflating footballs to levels below the 
league’s permissible limit. Portnoy, supporting the Patriots, and Felger, upholding the NFL’s 
stance, are debating which side has been more deceptive and morally less upstanding in the 
ordeal. 
 
(2-6)  Dave Portnoy: Leaking information to the media; that’s false. 
Michael Felger: Bad, bad. 
DP: Not correcting it, false. 
MF: Bad. 
DP: Saying you have an independent investigation, false. 
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MF: Bad, bad. 
DP: Still following through on this … 
MF: Yeah, but don’t act like the Patriots have told the truth the whole way through 
this thing, they haven’t.  
DP: But, but, but, here’s what you’re missing … the Patriots are under attack. 
MF: So it’s OK for them to lie but not the league. 
DP: No, they’re not lying, but you’re not gonna help the people who’s framing you. 
MF: I’m just giving you a case where Brady was, ha, I don’t know if he’s lying [rolls
 eyes] but certainly less than genuine. 
(Barstool Sports, 2016) 
 
 This example highlights the fact that items like false implicatures may initially be treated 
as lies in passing, but upon further reflection, people may decide they are not technically lies. In 
passing, any sort of deceptive utterance might count as a lie, but when the attributes of a lie are 
specifically attended to, the set of utterances that are truly lies shrinks.  
The excerpt also points to another dimension of this false implicature argument: the 
moral one. Felger concedes here that maybe Brady did not lie, but the question of “did Brady 
lie?” is not the central issue of this debate; the central issue is which side was more deceitful and 
morally compromised. In cases like this, the definition of lying seems to be clouded, as 
evidenced by Felger’s initial claim of “lie” and subsequent backing off. Such an example 
motivates an investigation that examines the interaction between moral considerations and 
linguistic meaning in lie judgments. 
To date, most investigations of whether false implicatures are lies have been theoretical, 
not empirical. The empirical investigations tackling this question thus far are Weissman & 
Terkourafi (2019), Or, Ariel & Peleg (2017), Willemsen & Wiegmann (2017), and Antomo et al. 
(2018). Weissman & Terkourafi (2019) tested 15 different stories containing false GCIs and 
PCIs and found that for the most part, they were not considered to be lies; only two implicature 
types (both GCIs) were consistently rated as lies, and there are theoretical reasons to believe 
these two are not implicatures at all. Nine stories were consistently judged not to be lies, and four 
seemed to fall into a middle category – utterances that are not entirely true yet were not treated as 
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lies. There was no category-level difference between GCIs and PCIs in terms of lie ratings; 
rather, GCI and PCI lie ratings were interwoven in the results.  
Willemsen & Wiegmann (2017) tested “half-truths,” corresponding to false PCIs based 
on the Gricean Maxims of Quantity, Relation, and Manner. They found that all scenarios based 
on all three Maxims were rated as lies by participants and take this as evidence that a WIS-based 
definition of lying is not necessary. The following is an example used in this study, based on 
Coleman & Kay’s (1981: 31) Story VI: 
 
(2-7) “Peter and Jane have been a couple for a year now. They are very happy and just moved
 in together. Peter trusts Jane, but he knows about her ex-fiancé Steven who still tries to
 win Jane back. Thus, Peter is very jealous and does not like Jane meeting Steven. Jane is
 sometimes thinking about getting back together with Steven. As they work in the same
 company, they have coffee from time to time to talk about their joint projects. Today,
 Jane and Steven have coffee after lunch to finalize a cost calculation they are supposed to
 send to their client the next morning. After a few minutes, Steven asks Jane if they could
 talk about each other and getting back together. Jane tells Steven that they don’t have
 much time and need to focus on the project. Steven has been sick the whole week, but he
 has nevertheless been at work.   
In the evening, Peter and Jane have dinner. Peter asks Jane:  
“You told me about this project with your ex-fiancé. Did you see him today?”  
To avoid confirming that she saw Steven during lunch, Jane says:  
“Steven has been sick the whole week.”  
Just as Jane intended, Peter does not believe Jane met with Steven.”  
(Willemsen & Wiegmann, 2017: 3518) 
 
 A binary forced-choice task was given to participants here, in which 81% of people 
judged Jane’s utterance to be a lie.  




(2-8)  John and Mary have recently started dating. Gabe is Mary’s ex-boyfriend. Gabe has been 
sick with the flu for the past two weeks, but went on a date with Mary last night. 
John: “Have you seen Gabe this week?” 
Mary: “Gabe has been sick with the flu for two weeks.” 
(Weissman & Terkourafi, 2019: supplemental materials) 
 
This study used a different task, asking participants to rate whether Mary has lied on a 1–
7 scale (in which 1 = not a lie and 7 = lie). Despite the different task, the disparity in results is 
obvious: in this study, the mean rating for this story was a 2.8 out of 7, and only 10% of 
participants judged it to be a lie (a rating over 4). The utterance tested is more or less the same, 
so there must be some other task-related or stimulus-related difference driving the disparity in 
results. The striking divergence between the two is the amount of information conveyed in the 
story. Weissman & Terkourafi (2019) furnishes a minimal context and the dialogue, whereas 
Willemsen & Wiegmann (2017) provides a much more robust context, and, crucially, explicitly 
mentions the speaker’s intention and the interlocutor’s uptake of the utterance. In this story, the 
one judging knows that Jane’s utterance is intended to “avoid confirming that she saw Steven 
during lunch” and also that “just as Jane intended, Peter does not believe Jane met with Steven.” 
It is possible that the inclusion of this information in Willemsen & Wiegmann (2017) led to the 
utterance being judged as a lie; correspondingly, the exclusion of this information in Weissman 
& Terkourafi (2019) led to the utterance being judged as not a lie.  
Antomo et al. (2018) tested false GCIs and PCIs in populations of both adults and 
children. In this study, adults rated both types near the middle of their 1–5 scale, significantly 
lower than false assertions but nonetheless above the midpoint cutoff. In addition, there was no 
difference in overall average lie ratings between GCIs and PCIs (the authors do not provide by-
item metrics). Children (ages 5–6 and 8–9) rated PCIs similarly to adults as well. It is worth 
noting that the authors used a frowny-face/smiley-face scale in this experiment, raising the 
question of whether this experiment tracks participants’ attributions of wrongdoing as opposed to 
any nuanced definition of the notion of lying, especially for children.  
 The work of Or, Ariel, & Peleg (2017) is discussed in Section 2.3.2, as it has to do more 
with truth-conditional content than lying as its primary focus.  
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2.4 Linguistic Meaning 
 In this section, I will provide an overview of the concept of linguistic meaning, including 
the genesis of the concept and different theories that attempt to explain it. In its conclusion, I 
select Ariel’s (2002a,b) Privileged Interactional Interpretation as the framework of this 
dissertation and motivate that selection.   
2.4.1 Theoretical Approaches 
In Grice’s seminal works on linguistic meaning, he divides meaning into “what is said” 
(WIS) and “what is implicated.” The fullest definition of WIS that Grice provides (Grice, 
1969/1989: 87; Grice, 1975/1989: 25) is the following: 
(2-9) U (utterer) said that ‘p’ entails … U did something x (1) by which U meant that p; (2) 
which is an occurrence of an utterance type S (sentence) such that (3) S means ‘p’; (4) S 
consists of a sequence of elements (such as words) in a way licensed by a system of rules 
(syntactical rules); (5) S means ‘p’ in virtue of the particular meanings of the elements of 
S, their order, and their syntactical character.  
(Grice, 1969/1989: 87) 
Grice (1975/1989: 25) adds that assigning referents, knowledge of the time of utterance, 
and disambiguating any ambiguous expressions will also contribute to WIS. For Grice, these 
components make up the what is said by an utterance. When this utterance is delivered in a 
context, it may license the inference of other propositions that do not meet the above criteria (i.e., 
are not “said” in the technical sense); these are implicatures.  
Though Grice introduced the concept and ushered in all the discussion that has followed, 
it is difficult to find today an account that holds Grice’s intuitions as absolute doctrine; on the 
contrary, not dissimilar accounts have been forwarded as preferable alternatives for defining 
WIS and drawing dividing lines. Much of the post-Gricean debate has involved the positing of 
various processes undertaken to arrive at the proper definitions and divisions of linguistic 
meaning (see Terkourafi [2010] for a review). What counts as the level of basic linguistic content 
varies across the theories and ranges from minimal to enriched.  
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On the minimal extreme end, Bach (1994, 1999, 2001) suggests a very narrow sense of 
basic linguistic meaning. For him, WIS is restricted to only what is uttered within the sentence; 
the only additions allowed are appended to make the sentence syntactically complete and to 
resolve indexicals. In Bach’s theory, then, it is possible for the basic linguistic meaning not to 
express a complete proposition. Further enrichment that constitutes the truth conditional 
proposition meant in context, namely expansion and completion, make up the impliciture. For 
Bach, the WIS of “You aren’t going to die” is that the addressee of that utterance is immortal. 
Expanding that proposition to include something like “in the next hours” or “from that wound” is 
impliciture, not part of WIS (Bach, 1994: 2–7). 
Saul (2012) also espouses a minimal level of basic linguistic meaning, crucial for her 
definition of lying. For Saul, in contrast to Bach, minimal contextual contributions are allowed 
such that WIS is truth-evaluable. Her test for this is as follows: 
(2-10) A putative contextual contribution to what is said is a part of what is said only if without 
this contextually supplied material, S[entence] would not have a truth-evaluable semantic 
content in C[ontext].  
(Saul, 2012: 66) 
While this definition is not strictly Gricean, as it allows for completion and some contextual 
variation, it does capture the essence of Grice’s WIS as it must be (minimally) truth-evaluable 
and, in Saul’s mind, maps onto that which is intuitive to non-theoreticians as well (Saul, 2012: 
68).  
On the other extreme are various camps of contextualists, who, with differing mechanics, 
support a more fully enriched conception of WIS. Perhaps the most maximal of these approaches 
is from Recanati (1989, 2001, 2004), who stresses the pragmatic aspects of WIS. Recanati asserts 
that enriched forms are (1) intuitive and (2) necessary to compute further implicatures. His 
Availability Principle captures this formulation: WIS “must be analyzed in conformity with the 
intuitions shared by those who fully understand the utterance – typically the speaker and hearer, 
in a normal conversational setting” (Recanati, 2001: 80). This means that “primary processes” 
like saturation and free enrichment go into WIS; without these, there is no way for secondary 
inferential processes (like particularized conversational implicatures) to be realized. Recanati 
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continues Bach’s “You aren’t going to die” example to illustrate: if a parent says this to a child 
who just got a cut, the WIS must equal “you aren’t going to die from that cut” in order for the 
(intuitive) secondary meaning – that the cut is not serious – to be generated (Recanati, 2001: 
79).2  
Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995), another hypothesis on the maximal 
end of the spectrum, abandons the term WIS altogether. Sperber & Wilson instead introduce the 
notion of explicature, defined in the following way: 
(2-11) An assumption communicated by an utterance U is EXPLICIT [hence an “explicature”] if 
and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U.  
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 182) 
This level comes by way of decoding and inference; implicatures, on the other hand, rely 
solely on inference: “an assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is implicit” (ibid.). 
Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) claims that, to reach a propositional form, the sentence (made 
of semantic representations) must not only be disambiguated and have its references assigned, 
but also enriched according to the principle of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 188–
189). Carston (1998, 2002) operates in and elaborates on the RT framework as well, noting that 
WIS does not feature as a term in RT (2002: 1) and that the important distinction discussed in RT 
terms does not map onto that Gricean distinction. In this framework, Gricean WIS falls 
somewhere between the underdetermined linguistically encoded meaning and the enriched (by 
decoding and inferencing) meaning of the utterance. Indeed, Carston decries the necessity of 
having WIS, on the grounds of skepticism that such a notion, whether it be sub-propositional or 
minimally propositional, has any cognitive reality (2002: 27). 
In the middle, following an approach similar to that of Grice himself, are the Neo-
Griceans (e.g., Horn, Levinson). An essential notion of these theories is Grice’s division between 
generalized and particularized conversational implicature (GCIs and PCIs). GCIs are 
characterized by their “defaultness”; the implicatures of this class arise “in the absence of special 
                                                          
2 Bach, of course, does not deny the possibility that this secondary meaning cannot be generated; he claims that it is 
an implicature calculated based on the impliciture. Whether content must be explicit to spark further meaning-
generation is a point of contention between the two theories.  
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circumstances” (Grice, 1989: 37). In contrast, PCIs arise “on a particular occasion in virtue of 
special features of the context” (ibid.). Examples (2-12 and 2-13) below demonstrate the 
difference. 
(2-12) X: “I broke a finger yesterday.”  
GCI: the finger is the speaker’s  
(Grice, 1989: 38) 
(2-13) Y: “I’m out of petrol.” 
 Z: “There is a garage round the corner.” 
 PCI: Y can get petrol at that garage now   
  (Grice, 1989: 32) 
 Saying “I broke a finger yesterday” will, by default, trigger the implicature that the finger 
is the speaker’s own. Only under special circumstances (for example, two torturers talking about 
their recent torturing exploits) would that implicature not be generated. PCIs are more context-
sensitive; the above PCI arises from Z’s utterance in this scenario but would not necessarily arise 
from this utterance in any other scenario.  
Recently, other multiplist accounts have advanced the idea that not only can meaning 
vary based on context but the formulation of meaning can vary across contexts, too, establishing 
the idea that minimal contents and enriched contents potentially could surface as the “main” 
meaning of a given utterance, depending on context. These theories reject the idea that one level 
of enrichment (or lack thereof) applies to every utterance in every scenario, unlike theories 
previously discussed (e.g., Bach’s, which is minimal in all cases, or Recanati’s, which is 
maximal in all cases).  
Jaszczolt’s (2005, 2012) alternative, Default Semantics, affords a major role to speaker 
intentions, which are used to guide hearers toward the default/primary interpretation of any 
utterance. According to this account, the pragmatically developed “primary meaning” of an 
utterance, intended by the Model Speaker and received by the Model Addressee, is informed by 
five sources of information: world knowledge, word meaning and sentence structure, situation of 
discourse, properties of the human inferential system, and stereotypes and presumptions about 
22 
 
society and culture.3 Processing utterances according to these guidelines may wind up producing 
a primary meaning that looks like a logical form, but Jaszczolt maintains there is no 
psychological reality of a logical form level interpretation in cases when the so-called explicated 
or implicated content makes up the primary meaning (Jaszczolt, 2005: 12–21).  
Ariel (2002a) proposes that there are actually multiple levels of so-called “minimal 
meaning” that may all be available: Literal1, the bare (linguistic) meaning, Literal2, the most 
salient meaning (psycholinguistically), and Literal3, the ‘basic content’ meaning taken as binding 
the speaker (Ariel, 2002a: 391–396). Literal3, which she deems the “privileged interactional 
interpretation” (henceforth PII), is necessarily grounded in context and, as such, may vary across 
scenarios. Ariel is clear that the PII works as a description, not a definition (Ariel, 2002a: 396), 
meaning this framework describes the notion that the PII may vary across different individuals 
rather than defining one specific PII for each utterance. She posits that any of bare linguistic 
meaning, explicature, and conversational implicature can, in certain contexts, be taken as the 
PII.4 As an example, she describes the interpretation of cardinal numbers. A number, such as 
five, has the linguistic meaning of “five – in general,” the salient meaning of “exactly five,” and 
the PII of any understanding among “exactly five;” “about five;” “at least five;” “at most five” 
(Ariel, 2002a: 397)5. Even in the same context, two interlocutors may well have different PIIs of 
the same utterance (Ariel, 2002b). This theory may cause discord among some scholars who 
wish to have one context-independent definition for WIS in an utterance, but being adaptable to 
any situation may be an advantage to those wishing to describe meaning as a psychological 
reality in interaction. 
Ariel’s theory is expanded further in Sternau et al. (2015), which propounds a graded 
scale of interpretation strength, similar to those presented elsewhere in the literature in terms of 
commitment strength (Mazzarella et al., 2018; Moeschler, 2013; Sperber & Wilson, 1987/1995). 
This scale ranges from strong to weak: 
                                                          
3 See Leezenberg (2001) for an argument that situation-specific power relations should be incorporated into theories 
of meaning and the semantics-pragmatics division, an argument that should be satisfied by approaches such as 
Default Semantics. 
4 She does note that the PII will more often than not equate to the level of RT explicature (Ariel 2002b: 1003). 
5 This is similar to accounts of the underspecification of cardinal numbers (e.g., Carston, 1998); Ariel extends the 
notion beyond just cardinals and applies it to other linguistic expressions as well. 
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bare linguistic meaning > explicature > implicature (strong) > implicature (weak)6 
Stronger representations are more likely to count as the PII in a given scenario. Ariel (2008: 292; 
table reproduced from Sternau et al., 2015: 88) provides the following graphic to characterize the 
difference between these levels. 
 
Figure 2-1 – Properties of the different levels of meaning that may arise as the PII (from Sternau 
et al., 2015: 88) 
Bare linguistic meaning, the strongest level on this scale, is not included in the table but 
has the following properties: Explicit (+), Cancelable (-), Indeterminate (-), Direct (+), 
Interactionally Necessary7 (+), Truth-conditional (±) (Ariel, personal communication, 2018). 
The authors define “strength,” a notion which underlies their scale, as the following: 
(2-14) (a) A has a higher propensity than B to be confirmed by interlocutors as the PII. 
(b) Confirming A as the PII is made with a higher degree of confidence than confirming 
B as the PII. 
(c) A is more difficult to deny than B.  
(Sternau et al., 2015: 89)  
Their ordering is backed experimentally by a series of tests run on naïve participants.   
                                                          
6 Weak implicatures were excluded from the present study because, as seen in Ariel’s chart, they are not truth-
conditional. Sperber & Wilson (2008) write: “the speaker’s intention to convey [weak implicatures] is not strongly 
manifest.” Therefore, false content weakly implied, even under these contextualist accounts, would never cause an 
utterance to be a lie. The tripartite taxonomy of bare linguistic meaning > explicature > [strong] implicature was 
utilized. 
7 Ariel (2008: 92) describes “interactionally necessary” as meaning that “the utterance cannot not be seen as 
relevant” without its contribution. 
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This theory, then, allows for elements of both RT and Gricean/minimalist principles – a 
more-than-minimal proposition (i.e., explicated or implicated meaning) may be reached 
immediately and taken as the utterance’s contribution, but the theory does not deny the 
possibility that minimal logical forms, as long as they are propositional,8 may surface as the 
overall meaning as well.  
2.4.2 Experimental Approaches 
Experimental evidence has entered into the discussion about WIS within the past 20 years 
as a way of providing real-world corroboration to support or undermine the established theories 
(e.g., minimalism, Neo-Griceanism, RT, contextualism) based on intuition. The results of these 
experimental investigations have been largely a mixed bag (see Chemla & Singh, 2014a, b; 
Katsos & Cummins, 2010; Noveck & Reboul, 2008 for reviews), and studies presenting 
experimental evidence that pertains to the levels and constitution of meaning are too plentiful to 
present an exhaustive list. I will focus on two especially relevant studies that have made headway 
regarding participants’ abilities to determine a said-implicated distinction. 
One set of studies crucial to the present investigation is the “Literal Lucy” paradigm 
(Doran et al., 2012; Larson et al., 2009). In these studies, participants were asked to offer 
true/false judgments after being given a dialogue and a background fact. Each dialogue contained 
an utterance with a GCI. An example is given below in (2-15): 
(2-15) Irene: I heard something big happened in the art studio yesterday. 
Sam: Yeah! In a fit of rage, Rachel picked up a hammer and broke a statue. 
FACT: After grabbing a hammer, Rachel angrily kicked a statue, 
causing it to fall over and break. 
Is the underlined portion true or false? 
 (Doran et al., 2012: 134) 
                                                          
8 By minimal forms, Ariel does not refer to e.g., Bach’s propositional radicals, for which she sees “no discourse 
function” (2002a: 384–385). 
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Surveys were run with three different across-participant instructions, who were: (1) asked 
to judge without any special instruction (baseline), (2) asked to judge “literally,” or (3) asked to 
judge from the perspective of a character named Literal Lucy, demonstrated in a pre-experiment 
tutorial to be someone who makes judgments extremely literally. The major findings were 
twofold: (A) participants were significantly more literal with their T/F judgments in the Literal 
Lucy condition and (B) judgments on their stimuli spanned a wide range. These findings are 
taken to mean that people are capable of selecting both enriched and minimal interpretations of 
utterances under the right circumstances. Even though these are all theoretically grouped 
together as GCIs in the Neo-Gricean framework, it was not the case that all GCIs had the same 
tendencies regarding the proportion of true/false responses in this experiment. Additionally, the 
interpretation selected can vary among individuals and, in this case, experimental manipulations 
of perspective.  
Or, Ariel, & Peleg (2017) present the results of a similar experimental study, this time 
grounded in Ariel’s PII framework. In an offline test, they presented participants with utterances 
in two contexts: one that rendered them true, and one that led to their generating false 
implicatures. Participants in this study were given a 1–7 agreement scale on which to rate either 
“the speaker told the truth” or “the speaker lied” and a second 1–7 scale on which participants 
rated their confidence. The mean “truth” rating for false implicature stories was 3.20 out of 7, 
taken as evidence that PCIs were somewhat counted in the truth-conditional meaning. The 
researchers claim that a score of 1 on the first scale – which asked if “the speaker told the truth” 
– “reflects that the subject viewed the target sentence as a lie” (12). Due to considerations 
presented later in Section 8.1, I do not deem this to be an accurate claim, because being “not 
true” does not equate to being a lie – items can be true and still be considered a lie (e.g., 
Coleman & Kay’s (1981) Stories IV and VIII) and items can be not true and still not considered 
a lie (e.g., mistaken falsehoods, “loose” talk that still falls within the pragmatic halo (Lasersohn, 
1999); for this reason, I view this study as an experiment about truth-conditional meaning, not 
about lying. In Experiment 2, the 7-point scale was replaced by a binary true/false task 
measuring participants’ response times to a prompt again stating “the speaker told the truth.” 
Their results matched those of the first experiment in that the false implicature stories were rated 
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as “lies” (i.e., not true) 40% of the time.9 The authors take these results as evidence in support of 
the PII theory, which allows for PCIs to be taken as basic meaning in some instances and 
predicts variability between individuals: “in real interaction, there is no single basic-level 
meaning which is solely responsible for truth evaluations” (Or, Ariel, & Peleg, 2017: 16).  
2.4.3. Theoretical Framework 
For this study, I will be adopting Ariel’s framework of Privileged Interactional 
Interpretations (PIIs). The theory is built around a universal process rather than a universal 
outcome; its ability to apply in any and all contexts provides a practical versatility that I believe 
is necessary to address real-world phenomena. A theory like PII, which is designed to address 
psychologically real manifestations of meaning, is naturally better-suited to handle experimental 
data than a theory (e.g., Bach’s) designed in and for analytic philosophy. Other theories of 
linguistic meaning (e.g., Relevance Theory) can account for context-sensitive lie judgment data 
as well, so the adoption of the PII theory is in order to provide a consistent way of classifying 
and discussing the stimuli used and the findings obtained rather than declaring it as a superior 
theory of linguistic meaning for all purposes. The PII framework will be utilized henceforth 
throughout this investigation; the other theoretical frameworks outlined above – Bach’s 
minimalism, the contextualist Relevance Theory, the Neo-Gricean approach, and Default 
Semantics – will be revisited in Section 9.3 to assess how each of them would account for the 
experimental results from Chapters 4–8. 
 I view Ariel’s theory as a way to bridge currently conflicting theories and results in the 
false implicature literature. Meibauer claims that false implicatures are lies, while Saul asserts 
that something has to be part of bare linguistic meaning to be a lie. While these two theories 
seem incompatible, it is possible that they can coexist. Instead of the traditional conception of 
WIS, featuring a rigid divide between WIS and implicated content, Ariel’s theory offers a 
                                                          
9 Their exact wording makes this finding a bit unclear: “The error rate for truth evaluation indicates that nearly 40% 
of all items in condition 2 were viewed as lies. This result reinforces the results from Experiment 1, as it 
demonstrates that when a Yes/No truth evaluation is forced upon participants, condition 2 is considered as a lie 
rather than ‘kind of a lie.’” It is (1) unclear whether “40% of all items” means that 40% of the items had a majority 
“false” response or that 40% of all ratings were “false” and (2) unclear how 40% means that items in this condition 
are considered a lie. These are in addition to (3) the concern that answering “no” to “the speaker told the truth” is not 
necessarily equivalent to answering “yes” to “the speaker lied.” 
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solution: the PII is what is considered in a lie judgment. The level of linguistic meaning that 
emerges as the PII can vary based on contextual factors and individual differences, and past 
experimental results (e.g., Doran et al., 2012; Sternau et al., 2015) can be taken as further 
evidence that different forms of meaning are differentially selected as the PII in different 
scenarios. It is likely to be the case that bare linguistic meaning without enrichment (akin to 
Ariel’s Literal1, the strongest option in the scale presented by Sternau et al.) is more likely to be 
selected as the PII lie judgments than it is in everyday scenarios, which in turn tend to feature the 
level of explicature as the PII – Saul may be right in this sense. If PII is operationalized instead 
of Saul’s minimal WIS, Meibauer’s theory can succeed as well if either explicated or implicated 
content is taken as the PII in a lie judgment, which may happen under certain circumstances. 
 I return to the classic Bronston example to illustrate the explanatory utility of this theory: 
(2-16) Prosecutor: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston? 
Samuel Bronston: No, sir. 
P: Have you ever? 
SB: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.  
 
Recall that Bronston, who at one point before this interaction did have his own Swiss 
account, was initially charged with perjury, an injunction that was upheld by a court of appeals 
only to be overturned later by the Supreme Court. If Saul is right that false implicatures cannot 
be lies, Bronston would not have been charged with perjury in the first two decisions. If 
Meibauer is right that false implicatures are lies, the decision would not have been ultimately 
reversed. In a PII-based account, we can say that the first judges selected the implicature as the 
PII and based their verdict on this, whereas the Supreme Court selected the bare linguistic 
meaning as the PII and overturned the charge of perjury.10 
Returning to the UN/FBI example provides further support: 
 
                                                          
10 It should be noted that the PII theory does very well to establish a framework in which it is possible for these two 
different groups of people to reach different interpretations of the same utterance, but it does not make any 
predictions or claims about why different people will reach different interpretations. 
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(2-17) A: My father works for the United Nations. 
B: My father works for the FBI.  
  
Let’s say it is the case that B’s father works as a janitor in the FBI headquarters building. Does B 
lie? The scenarios called to mind earlier that may influence lie judgments include: What if B is 
running for prominent political office and is speaking in public? What if B is on the witness 
stand? What if A and B are taken hostage and need to reach a high-ranking contact to discuss a 
ransom? What if B is intentionally trying to make A believe their father is a high-ranking FBI 
official? What if B has a track record of lying to A and A does not like or trust B? 
These scenarios, varying in contextual characteristics, may cause individuals to shift what 
they take as the PII – and, consequently, whether they take the utterance to be a lie or not. Again, 
Meibauer or Saul may make more unilateral predictions regarding B’s utterance, namely, that it 
is or is not, respectively, a lie. An inflexible conception of linguistic meaning requires these 
predictions. A flexible formulation of meaning, however, like the PII, allows for these lie 
judgments to shift intercontextually without having to change the definition of lying. This 
dissertation will contribute to the potential predictive power of the PII theory, at least with 
respect to lying, by exploring experimentally how differing aspects of context affect PII selection 
in lie judgments.  
A hypothesis that will be carried forth in this study is that the explicit (in this case, 
experimental) task of judging an utterance to be a lie is – typically – a specific context that 
makes people more likely to select a minimal level as the PII as compared to everyday non-lie-
judgment interactions.11 Adopting Ariel’s theoretical framework makes it possible to account for 
instances in which this is not the case, that is, when special contextual circumstances lead to a 
more enriched PII that is then analyzed in the lie judgment. Factors that are hypothesized to 
contribute to these special contextual circumstances include the discourse genre of the 
interaction, speaker-related biases, the speaker’s intention to deceive, and the situational stakes 
                                                          
11 See Mosegaard Hansen (2002) for empirical evidence that the courtroom is another context that requires 
interlocutors to be more explicit than they would be in everyday scenarios; she uses this as evidence in favor of the 
availability of literal meaning. 
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surrounding the interaction; motivations for each of these hypotheses appear in the introductions 
of each of the corresponding chapters (4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7.1). 
Lastly, Michaelson (2016) proposes the Lying Test as a functional way to determine the 
semantic content of any utterance in context. 
 
(2-18) LT: If p is part of the semantic content associated with a sentence P, as uttered by X to Y, 
then either:  
A. P is a lie;  
B. it is not the case that X believes that p is false; or  
C. it is not the case that X intends to deceive Y with respect to p.  
(Michaelson, 2016: 482) 
 
At the core of this proposal is the belief that implicated content cannot be lies (contra 
Meibauer); in fact, an utterance being judged as a lie is what places it in semantic content. 
Michaelson prefers this Lying Test to “notoriously inconsistent” true/false judgments, because 
“judgments on lying appear to be … relatively stable and uniform in a variety of cases” 
(Michaelson, 2016: 471). 
This theory will only work within a flexible framework like Ariel’s. As the findings in 
this thesis will further corroborate, lie judgments are absolutely not “stable and uniform in a 
variety of cases.” For example, note the differences between Weissman & Terkourafi’s (2019) 
and Willemsen & Wiegmann’s (2017) results, disagreements among high-ranking U.S. judges in 
the 1960s, and the entirety of data to be presented in this dissertation; using this test to define an 
invariant “linguistic meaning” will fail entirely. What this can capture is the PII taken by a given 
individual in a given interaction; indeed, this is an assumption built into this project. A theory 
that allows individual and intercontextual flexibility is necessary for a theory like Michaelson’s 
to function. 
This section has motivated the selection of Ariel’s PII theory as the framework for the 
current project and its goals. The thesis targets lie judgments to study the effects of context on 
perceptions of lying and folk intuitions on lying as it relates to linguistic meaning. In so doing, 
this investigation treats lying as a socially rooted, psychologically measurable phenomenon. 
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While lying can also be examined as a topic from other perspectives, such as analytic, 































3  Methods 
 This chapter covers methodological aspects of the thesis, including data collection, data 
analysis, and materials.  
3.1 Data Collection 
 The primary methodology used in this project is the rating scale survey. In one 
experiment, a response time methodology is used. This section outlines both methodologies as 
well as Amazon Mechanical Turk, the platform that houses participant recruitment, survey 
distribution, and participant compensation. 
3.1.1  Rating Scale Surveys 
 Rating scales are used widely across various academic and non-academic fields. One of 
the most versatile methods of data collection, rating scales are used to target “attitudinal objects 
in social research” (Kasper, 2008: 295). Katsos & Cummins (2010) would support this offline 
path of experimentation for lie judgments, noting that an untimed methodology is best-suited 
“when we are interested in the eventual interpretation of the expression being studied” (291). 
Rating scales ask participants to rate a stimulus along some dimension on a numbered scale. 
Coleman & Kay (1981) utilized a 1–7 rating scale in their seminal empirical investigation of lie 
judgments, and most lie judgment studies since have adopted this scale (Arico & Fallis, 2013; 
Danziger, 2010; Hardin, 2010; Meibauer, 2016a; Rutschmann & Wiegmann, 2017, Weissman & 
Terkourafi, 2019). In this scale, a rating of 1 represents the extreme low (not a lie) and 7 
represents the extreme high (lie), with 4 as a neutral midpoint. Using a 7-point scale allows 
participants to indicate their strength of judgment; a 7 rating and a 5 rating are both considered 
lies, but the former more strongly so than the latter. The other survey data-collection method that 
has been used (Turri & Turri, 2015; and the subsequent challenge to that work by Wiegmann, 
Samland, & Waldmann, 2016) presents participants with a binary forced choice (i.e., “Is this a 
lie? Yes/No”). The rating scale format encompasses this question but additionally captures the 
strength of judgment, so it is the methodology chosen for the surveys in this study. Though the 
previous studies that have used this scale have relied upon a purely ordinal scale, this study 
adopts a more linear sliding scale for data analysis reasons (see Section 4.2).  
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 In the surveys in this project, participants see a total of three items. In these experiments, 
the first item is the critical item – the one which includes a false ex/implicature.12 Following the 
critical item are control items – straightforward truths and straightforward lies – presented in 
random order. The control items are used to (a) determine whether participants were paying 
attention and (b) calculate individualized ratings (see Section 3.1). Control items match the 
condition of the critical item; if the critical item is a false explicature in a high stakes scenario, 
the accompanying straightforward truth and lie would also be in high stakes contexts. If a 
participant rated both the straightforward lie item and the straightforward truth item in the wrong 
direction, it is taken as evidence that that participant was not fully attending to the task and the 
data are excluded. 
 By showing each participant only one critical item, this reduces the extent to which 
participants are comparing one item directly to another. In a form with multiple critical items, the 
ratings on any item will be compared to and thus influenced by immediate past experience with 
the other stimuli. While these effects could potentially be averaged out by counterbalancing the 
order of stimuli, the one-per-participant approach was adopted instead in order to ensure the 
most natural ratings, uninfluenced by previous stimuli, for every rating given in the entire 
dataset. A downside of this approach is that it cannot account for individual-level differences; if 
each participant provided multiple critical item ratings, the statistical model could account for 
this individual-level variation as a random effect; since the other approach was utilized, such an 
analysis will not be possible. 
3.1.2 Response-Time Experiment 
 The other experimental methodology used is a response-time experiment, utilized widely 
throughout the social sciences. Within experimental pragmatics, this methodology has been 
utilized to examine the time course of processing stimuli of interest, primarily true/false 
judgments regarding scalar implicatures (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Katsos, & 
Williams, 2005; Noveck & Posada, 2003). Recently, Or, Ariel, & Peleg (2017) measured 
participants’ yes/no response times to the prompt “the speaker told the truth” after false 
                                                          
12 The critical item was always first so as to avoid participants comparing the critical item rating directly to their 
straightforward lie or truth item ratings. 
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implicature stimuli, a setup that more closely resembles the response-time experiment in this 
project. In the current experiment, participants are presented with critical stimuli and asked for 
yes/no judgments to one of two prompts: “Is this statement a lie?” and “Is this statement 
misleading?” This provides information about the real-time classification of utterances according 
to these categories; response times have been utilized elsewhere in the social sciences in 
investigations of categorization (e.g., Ashby, Boynton, & Lee, 1994; Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 
2006; Maddox, Ashby, & Gottlob, 1998). For more details about methods in the response-time 
experiment, see Chapter 8. 
3.2 Participants 
 Participants in the survey tasks were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Participants in the response time experiment were recruited both from Mechanical Turk 
(compensated financially) and from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) courses 
(compensated with course credit).  
3.2.1 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
 Amazon Mechanical Turk (henceforth MTurk) describes itself as a “marketplace for 
work that requires human intelligence.” MTurk’s API allows Requesters (such as researchers) to 
post Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) that are fulfilled by Workers for pay. Once a HIT is 
posted, eligible workers can see the task description and compensation amount. For the surveys 
described in this study, accepting a HIT provides the Worker with an external link. Following 
that link brings the Worker to Qualtrics (http://www.qualtrics.com), the survey hosting and 
collecting platform used in this study, or Ibex Farm (http://spellout.net/ibexfarm), the platform 
used in the Response Time experiment.. Upon completion of the survey, Workers receive a 
validation code to input on MTurk, and receive compensation upon manual approval of this 
code. MTurk allows Requesters to set parameters for Workers that can fulfill the HIT; for this 
study, in an attempt to control for cross-cultural differences, Workers had to be located within 
the United States. MTurk also allows Requesters to screen Workers by the Worker’s approval 
rate on all previous HITs; participants in these experiments had to have an approval rate of 85% 
or higher. MTurk also allows “premium” qualifications to be set; in the Political Bias 
experiment, the premium qualification “U.S. Political Affiliation = Conservative” was used 
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during part of recruitment to target individuals who identify as conservative. Only data from 
native English speakers (self-reported) were used.13  
 Numerous research articles have demonstrated that the quality of data collected via 
MTurk is equivalent to that of data collected in laboratories, with both off-line behavioral data in 
behavioral psychology (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 
2013; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) and linguistics (e.g., Schnoebelen & Kuperman, 
2010), and even with on-line response-time data (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). These 
studies demonstrated that not only is MTurk data quality equivalent to the quality of traditionally 
collected non-Internet data, but the results from MTurk replicate results found in laboratory 
experiments as well. 
 Despite the many replications demonstrating data quality, there are still doubts expressed 
about MTurk, specifically related to two topics: (in) attentiveness and (non) naïveté. MTurk 
workers may be more distracted during the task than laboratory participants because of a lack of 
researcher supervision (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014; Clifford & Jerit, 2014), and a few 
studies have found that online participants are relatively inattentive (Fleischer, Mead, & Huang, 
2015; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). However, more studies have found that 
MTurk participants are actually more attentive than participants in traditional laboratory 
experiments (Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Paolacci et al., 2010), including a 36-site replication 
study (Klein et al., 2014). To further improve attentiveness, researchers suggest selecting high-
reputation Workers (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014), keeping the surveys short to decrease 
the amount of data collected from each HIT (Fleischer et al., 2015), and ensuring the task is 
relatively interesting (Crump et al., 2013). The surveys used in this experiment meet these 
criteria. 
The other concern is related to Workers repeating tasks and issues related to non-naïveté. 
Chandler et al. (2014) found that there was a small percentage of Workers who repeated similar 
HITs, which may be an undesirable outcome for some research projects. MTurk allows 
                                                          
13 By limiting responses to the USA, most of the respondents reported English as their native language. Data from 
participants who reported a language other than English as their native language was not used. It is, of course, 
possible that some participants lied about their native language; by relying entirely on self-report, there is no way to 
verify this. This problem is shared by all experiments using this sampling method. 
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customizable qualifications in addition to the aforementioned preset ones. In this study, a 
customizable qualification was set up to indicate whether a Worker had already participated in 
the study; if the Worker has already completed a survey, they were ineligible to complete another 
and were no longer allowed to access the HIT.   
 Using MTurk for data collection provides several major advantages. First, it allows for 
quick data collection; HITs are typically fulfilled very quickly, allowing for collection of a large 
number of results in a short period of time. Second, it provides a more diverse population than 
would be possible otherwise, specifically in terms of location, age, and level of education. 
Recruiting from the university, for instance, would provide a relatively homogenous sample in 
terms of all three of these demographic factors, an issue that is avoided by using MTurk. Some 
studies have also found that MTurk samples provide increased ethnic diversity (e.g., Buhrmester 
et al., 2011; Casler et al., 2013). Last, it allows researchers a relatively inexpensive way to 
collect large amounts of data while still paying Workers a fair wage, though it has been 
suggested that financial incentive is not a major motivator for many Workers (Buhrmester et al., 
2011; Paolacci et al., 2010). 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 All data analysis in this project is done in R (R Core Team, 2018). In addition to the lme4 
package (Bates et al., 2015) used for modeling, the car (Fox et al., 2012), dplyr (Wickham et al., 
2015), emmeans (Lenth, 2018), ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009), lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2017), MASS (Ripley et al., 2013), wesanderson (Ram & Wickham, 2015) packages 
are all used for data analysis and plotting.  
3.3.1 Rating Scales 
 The proper way to analyze rating scale data is a debated topic. Some claim that 
parametric tests are valid for Likert-type rating scale data (e.g., Norman, 2010; Sullivan & 
Artino, 2013), but most argue that these types of scales are ordinal and, therefore, parametric 
tests are invalid (e.g., Allen & Seaman, 2007; Boone & Boone, 2012; Jamieson, 2004; Kuzon Jr, 
Urbanchek, & McCabe, 1996). This project utilizes more advanced statistical modeling for 
analysis than previous studies featuring the lie judgment task; while those studies have used 
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parametric analyses for their 1–7 ordinal scales, proper treatment of scales is prioritized in the 
present study.  
A happy medium that allows for parametric analysis of rating scale data is the sliding 
scale (Sullivan & Artino, 2013; Allen & Seaman, 2007). A screenshot of a sliding scale from the 
present study is shown below in Figure 3-1: 
 
Figure 3-1 – An example of a sliding scale lie judgment 
 Instead of forcing participants to choose from only a few integers, this allows them to 
slide freely along a scale. The endpoints and midpoint are labeled to provide anchors, but the 
actual value of the selection is not revealed to the participant. The underlying value is still 
recorded (down to two decimal places, in this case), providing a more continuous measure of the 
same type of rating. The anchor points can be re-scaled to anything; for consistency with 
previous studies, a scale with a length of 6 is utilized. This scale is zero-centered (-3 to 3), 
meaning positive ratings represent a lie and negative ratings represent not a lie. 
 In theory, this sliding scale should provide results nearly identical to the ordinal scale 
without the type of scale offered causing systematic differences in the data. In a pre-dissertation 
pilot study, it was determined that there is no significant difference based on the scale offered to 
participants. The numerical results of the ordinal and sliding scales are nearly identical, and the 
sliding scale allows for uncontroversial parametric analysis.  
The rating scale data in this study are analyzed using linear models in base R and linear 
mixed-effects models from the lme4 package. Following Barr et al. (2013), the maximal random 
effects structure approach was used; models were first fit with random slopes and intercepts, and 
intercepts-only models were used in cases of non-convergence of the fully maximal model. In 
proof of this point, histograms of the residuals from the main linear models in all experiments are 
presented in Appendix B; all show normal distributions. 
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 For the survey experiments, the primary dependent variable is the raw rating taken from 
the scale, in the -3 to 3 format. Since individuals may differ in their tendencies to use or avoid 
the endpoints of the scale, an individualized rating is calculated for each data point as well. Since 
every participant rated a lie control and truth control item as well, the ratings to those are taken 
as new endpoints of a scale for each individual, with the rating for the critical item calculated as 
a proportion between those new endpoints.14 In nearly all cases, the analyses run on 
individualized ratings provide the same results as those run on the raw ratings. To avoid 
repetition, an individualized ratings analysis is mentioned in a results section only if it yields a 
difference in statistical significance with respect to the analysis run on raw ratings. The 
individualized analyses are used as big-picture confirmations of the direction of the effect, so 
differences in statistical significance with respect to the (arbitrary) 0.05 alpha cutoff are not over-
interpreted; if one model provides a p-value of 0.04 (significant) and the other 0.10 (marginally 
significant), this difference is treated as inconsequential as long as the effect is in the same 
direction. 
 For all statistical models on the lie rating scale data, a dummy coding scheme was used; 
in such cases, the reference level is specified. Post-hoc Tukey tests were utilized when necessary.  
 In the response time experiment, there are two dependent variables to investigate – the 
response (yes/no) and the response time (in ms). The former is analyzed using logistic 
regression, and the latter is analyzed using linear regression.  
3.4 Materials 
 The study in its entirety consists of five experiments – four survey experiments and one 
response time experiment. The four surveys correspond to the four manipulated contextual 
factors – intent, stakes, genre, and political bias.  
 
 
                                                          
14 In rare cases, the target item rating was outside the newly calculated endpoints. Because of the way the 
individualized ratings were calculated, these data points were excluded from the individualized analyses.  
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3.4.1 Target Lines 
For consistency, the same types of linguistic expressions are used as target lines across 
the different contextual manipulations, meaning that the same linguistic phenomenon to trigger 
the ex/implicature is present. In some cases, the exact sentence differs from context to context; 
this was done to make sure each item presents a realistic situation. For example, in Explicature 5 
(partitive some), the underlying some of the X are Y structure is present for all, but the X and Y 
are different in different experiments so as to best and most naturally fit each context. If possible 
to do so naturally, the same exact sentence was used across experiments; otherwise, alterations 
were made as necessary while still upholding the same type of ex/implicature.15 The types of 
linguistic expressions used are taken from within the PII framework and previous work on false 
implicatures where applicable; citations listed here are for these sources, as opposed to more 
foundational work from e.g., Grice, Sperber & Wilson, and Carston that also describes the 
phenomenon. Some of these implicatures are treated differently in different frameworks (e.g., 
and constructions are treated as ambiguous in some frameworks (e.g., Lakoff & Peters, 1969); 
partitive constructions are actually part of semantic meaning, not explicature (e.g., Barker, 
1998)); the current approach utilizes the classifications from the PII framework. 
One scalar implicature term (some) will be used in the present experiments. Given recent 
findings on scalar diversity (e.g., McNally, 2017; Terkourafi et al., 2020; Van Tiel et al., 2016), 
it should not be assumed that the results for some extend to all scalar implicatures. Both the 
partitive “some of the X are Y” and non-partitive “some X are Y” constructions were used as 
separate types, per the findings of Grodner et al. (2010) and Tanenhaus & Degen (2011) that the 
partitive construction is a cue strengthening the scalar inference and the rate at which it is drawn. 
Full stimuli with contexts appear in Appendix A. The rows in the tables below refer to 
the four different contextual manipulations: the speaker’s intent to deceive, the stakes of the 
scenario, the genre of discourse, and judger biases towards a political figure. For some of these 
manipulations, the utterance was the same in the different conditions; for others, the utterance 
                                                          
15  This was determined by my interpretation of the explicature type and consultation with other existing examples in 
the literature.  
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varies slightly between conditions. In the latter cases, the conditions of the experiment are 
specified (e.g., “Stakes – high” and “Stakes – low”). 
Explicature – and-enrichment: coactivities – X and Y did A → X and Y did A together (Sternau 
et al., 2017: 111) 
Intent “Shawn and Nicole just got engaged” 
Stakes “My Vice President and I played golf last Saturday” 
Genre  “Jerry and I played golf last Saturday” 
Political “VP Biden/Pence and I played golf last Saturday” 
 
Explicature – and-enrichment: temporal relation – X did A and B → X did A and then B 
(Sternau et al., 2017: 111) 
Intent “Last year I got married and had a baby” 
Stakes “Last year I got married and had a baby” 
Genre  “Last year I got married and had a baby” 
Political “I lifted the sanctions and profits increased” 
 
Explicature – default enrichment – I’ve done A → I’ve done A today (Sternau et al., 2017: 110) 
Intent “I’ve eaten lunch” 
Stakes – high “I’ve been elected mayor” 
Stakes – low  “I’ve been elected scribe” 
Genre – Casual “I’ve been elected governor” 
Genre – Courtroom “The defendant has threatened me” 
Genre – Political  “I’ve been elected governor” 
Political “Kim Jong Un and I have met to discuss a peace treaty” 
 
Explicature – lexical ambiguity resolution – doctor → medical doctor (Sternau, 2013: 115)   
Intent “I’m a doctor” 
Stakes “I’m a doctor” 
Genre  “My wife is a doctor” 







Explicature – non-partitive some – Some X are Z → Some but not all X are Z 
Intent “Some campers have caught a stomach virus” 
Stakes “Some committee members voted against me” 
Genre  “Some committee members disagreed with my proposal” 
Political “Some committee members have been accused of corruption” 
 
Explicature – partitive some  – Some of the X are Z → Some but not all of the X are Z 
Intent “Some of the samples have been tainted” 
Stakes “Some of the tests turned up positive” 
Genre  “Some of the squirrels they tested had rabies” 
Political “Some of the [Democrats/Republicans] on the committee 
disagreed with my proposal” 
 
Implicature – “sick in bed” – X has been sick in bed with pneumonia → I haven’t seen X 
(Coleman & Kay, 1981: 31) 
Intent “[Friend] has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks” 
Stakes – High  “[Ex-boyfriend] has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two 
weeks” 
Stakes – Low  “[Friend] has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks” 
Genre  “The CEO has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks” 
Political “The CEO has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks” 
 
Implicature – “works for the FBI” – My father works for the FBI → My father works for the FBI 
as a high-ranking official/agent of some sort (Meibauer, 2005: 1388). 
Intent “My father works for the FBI” 
Stakes “My father works for the FBI” 
Genre  “My father works for the FBI” 
Political “[New national security advisor] has worked for the FBI for the past 10 years” 
 
Implicature – “all-natural ingredients” – Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients → 
Product X is good for the environment (Mcquarrie & Phillips, 2005: 14) 
Intent “Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients” 
Stakes “Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients” 
Genre  “Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients” 




Implicature – “let’s just say” – Let’s just say all the food was finished → There were a lot of 
people at the event (Sternau, 2013: 161). 
Intent “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
Stakes “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
Genre  “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
Political “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
 
3.4.2 Context Stories 
For two of the four contextual manipulations – intent and stakes – the contexts were 
normed to ensure that the high and low versions of each were being understood as such. Details 
and results of those norming procedures can be found in Sections 6.2.1 and 7.2.1, respectively. 
The contexts in two manipulations – genre and speaker-related biases – did not require norming. 
Details of the stimulus design in each of these experiments appear in Sections 4.3.1 and 5.3.1, 
respectively. 
An example of a full item – context, utterance, and rating scale – is presented below in 
Figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-2 – Example of a full survey item 
This example also highlights why the notion of epistemic vigilance will not immediately 
factor into the interpretation of these experimental results. Epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 
2010) is the mechanism that allows hearers to utilize cognitive processes in search of what to 
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believe in communication. In this experiment, the judger is not the hearer, but an informed third 
party who already knows the relevant truth/falsity of the issue at hand. In the above example, 
Violet’s boss does not know that all of the samples are tainted, but the participant in the 
experiment does. The participant, therefore, has no need for epistemic vigilance in this case, as 
they already know the reality. Their task is to assess whether Violet’s utterance is a lie. Violet’s 
boss, however, would rely heavily on epistemic vigilance in this scenario. The boss would 
leverage their past interactions with Violet (including the fact that she has messed up before) in 
their process of determining what to believe from her utterance. In this sense, epistemic vigilance 
is of the utmost importance in real life interactions involving lying and misleading, but not 
immediately relevant for participants in these experiments. The notion of epistemic vigilance 
will be returned to in Section 9.4. 
3.4.3 Control Items 
 Straightforward truths and lies were utilized in the surveys for the sake of both control 
and comparison. Target lines in these items were lines that the characteristics of the prototypical 
lie – the content is false, the speaker knows the content is false, the speaker intends to deceive 
the hearer,16 and the false content is expressed literally (i.e., part of the bare linguistic meaning) 
as opposed to via false ex/implicature. The average lie rating (on the -3 to 3 scale) for truth 
control item across all experiments was -2.75; the average lie rating for lie control stories across 
all experiments was 2.68. 
3.5 Terminology 
 Terminology for variables is consistent throughout the subsequent chapters. The relevant 
terms are defined below.  
                                                          
16 An exception to this criterion is in the Intent experiment. In every experiment, the control items were designed to 
match the critical item in the relevant manipulation; in the Intent experiment, therefore, for Low Intent critical items, 
Low Intent control items were used. Participants may still read an intention to deceive in the story, but no such 
intent is mentioned explicitly. See Chapter 6 for details on the operationalization of intent in this experiment.  
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Meaning Condition – the category of meaning within the theoretical framework. Two levels – 
Explicature, Implicature. In the RT Experiment chapter, Straightforward Lie and Straightforward 
Truth are also included. 
Expression – the subtype of expression within each level of Meaning Condition (e.g., and-
enrichment: coactivities, and-enrichment: temporal relation, default enrichment [full list in 
Section 3.4.1]). 
Genre – discourse genre of the conversation. Three levels – Casual, Courtroom, Political. 
Agreement – whether the judger agrees with the speaker of the utterance. Two levels – Agree, 
Disagree.  
Intent – intent to deceive of the speaker. Two levels – High, Low. 
Stakes – stakes of the scenario. Two levels – High, Low. 
Question – (RT Experiment only) The question asked to participants in their version of the 

















4  Genre 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter investigates the effect of genre on lie judgments. Genre here refers to the 
societally shared discourse expectations and standards that accompany the setting of an 
interaction. In this experiment, critical items are false ex/implicatures in three different settings, 
situated within the courtroom, political, and casual genres. By manipulating the genre, this 
experiment aims to determine whether the standards for what counts as a lie differ between 
conversational settings.  
4.1.1 Literature Review 
4.1.1.1 Genre 
The notion of genre in linguistic analysis refers to the interrelationships between 
utterance, setting, and society, “the specifically discoursal aspect of ways of acting and 
interacting in the course of social events” (Fairclough, 2003: 65). The sorts of genre that will be 
manipulated here are what Fairclough refers to as “situated genres … which are specific to 
particular networks of practices” (69). Fairclough describes the key components of genre: 
activity, which refers to the purpose(s) of discourse within that context; generic structure, which 
refers to ritualized structural staging within the discourse; the social relation of the interactants, 
which includes power dynamics and discursive roles; and communication technologies, which 
refers to the medium through with the interaction plays out. These components together describe 
a genre and can be discussed independently or together.  
Bakhtin (1986) also wrote about the idea of speech genres, which he summarized as 
“relatively stable types of … utterances” that are each developed within different “spheres of 
language” (Bakhtin, 1986: 60). He stresses that speech genres are societally developed, and 






(4-1)  Speech genres organize our speech in almost the same way as grammatical (syntactical) 
forms do. We learn to cast our speech in generic forms and, when hearing others’ speech, 
we guess its genre from the very first words; we predict … a certain compositional 
structure … If speech genres did not exist and we had not mastered them, if we had to 
originate them during the speech process and construct each utterance at will for the first 
time, speech communication would be almost impossible.            
(Bakhtin, 1986: 78–79) 
The genre governing a conversation or an utterance not only guides the speaker but the 
listener, too; this extension suggests that knowledge of genres influences the interpretation of 
utterances in real time. Genre research in linguistics tends to focus on formal aspects of language 
as opposed to any sort of experimental approach to utterance interpretation, but the notion of 
context systematically constraining discourse (and its interpretation) is afforded by genre in such 
a way that it may be applicable in an experimental study of lying and linguistic meaning. It is 
important to note that all discussions of genre here refer to the versions within the greater U.S. 
society; a courtroom encounter refers to a typical courtroom encounter in the U.S. legal system 
while recognizing that judicial encounters in different societies and cultures are entirely different 
genres. 
The genres examined in this experiment – courtroom, political, and casual – are more 
likely what Giltrow & Stein (2009) refer to as “hyper-genres” (10), a superordinate level 
encompassing multiple related genres (e.g., the political hyper-genre would include the genres of 
political speech, election posters, debates, press conferences, among others (Cap & Okulska, 
2013)). Others (e.g., van Eemeren, 2010) use different terminology to refer to the same notion, 
like “genre” for the supercategory and “activity type” (per Levinson, 1979) for the subcategory.  
With respect to lying, Williams (2002) wonders whether there are certain “relations … 
situations or domains” that may come with an increased level of distrust (“as it is often said that 
no sensible person expects to hear the truth when buying a used car from a dealer”) (Williams, 
2002: 110). There may be certain genres that engender different standards regarding the concepts 
of “lying” and “saying” that vary from those in casual everyday speech.  
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4.1.1.2 Lying in the Courtroom 
Horn (2017) directly addresses the notion of false ex/implicatures in the courtroom. 
Discussing cases like the notorious Bronston example and Bill Clinton’s impeachment 
proceedings, Horn notes that the Literal Truth Defense – that that which is on record is literally 
true, despite any false inferences it may give rise to – has proved “exceptionally useful” (Horn, 
2017: 39) for a variety of lawyers and defendants in court. Indeed, with the Bronston case as the 
Supreme Court precedent, the American legal system (and the Australian and English as well) 
explicitly differentiates between deceptions which are literally said (perjury) and those which are 
not (not perjury) (Green, 2018). When Clinton “offered an evasive, non-responsive, and factually 
true reply to the question posed … he did not actually lie” (Green, 2018: 3).  
 Based on several examples and the official legal precedent, Horn sees the legal context as 
one that clearly and strictly differentiates between lying and intentionally misleading. Horn and 
Green both predict that examples of false ex/implicatures17 in a courtroom context are not lies, 
on the basis that the utterances are literally true. If this distinction is as pertinent to courtroom 
discourse and this understanding as societally shared as Horn and Green expect, it is 
hypothesized that most people will judge these examples to not be lies as well. Regarding the 
present experiment, lie ratings for witness utterances are hypothesized to be lower than lie 
ratings for utterances in the casual conversation genre, the latter being an unmarked case in 
which the distinction between lying and non-lying verbal deception is neither as relevant nor as 
attended to as it is in the courtroom.  
 There are several subgenres within the hyper-genre of courtroom discourse (Danet, 
1980), including lawyer arguments, lawyer-client interactions, the reading of official documents, 
witness testimony, etc. As witnesses are sworn in under oath to tell “the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth,” notions of truth and lying are of the utmost relevance for witness 
testimony. This leads Green and Horn to discuss false implicatures in the courtroom primarily in 
terms of witnesses; as such, the witness testimony genre will be utilized in this experiment. 
                                                          
17 Horn’s theoretical linguistic framework does not utilize the concept of “explicature” but rather Generalized and 
Particularized Conversational Implicatures; Horn predicts, within his own framework, that both should not be 
considered lies.  
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4.1.1.3 Lying in Politics 
 Both scholarly and popular conversations of political discourse have recently focused on 
the role of truth in political speech (see, for example, “Many Politicians Lie. But Trump Has 
Elevated the Art of Fabrication,” in the New York Times (Stolberg, 2017), or “How to Address 
the Epidemic of Lies in Politics” from Scientific American (Tsipursky, 2017)). Ralph Keyes (and 
many others) have referred to the “post-truth era” (Keyes, 2004) in reference to modern times of 
a “lie tolerance” that permeates society, most notably and visibly in politics. Discussions of the 
“post-truth” political landscape and the associated “malaise” (Lewandowsky et al., 2017) stress 
the idea that truth is less relevant than ever in the political speech genre. “Dishonesty has come 
to feel less like the exception and more like the norm” (Keyes, 2004: 12); certainly the sentiment 
has increased manifold since Keyes noted this in 2004. But the notion of politicians being 
deceptive is seemingly as old as politics itself.18 As Hannah Arendt writes, “truthfulness has 
never been counted among the political virtues” (Arendt, 1971: 4). Some, in the spirit of 
Machiavelli, defend the politician’s lies as justified (e.g., Jay, 2010; Newey, 1997; Strauss, 
1958)), while others reject this notion (Arendt, 1971; Bok, 1999; Ramsay, 2000), aligning more 
with Kant, who wrote: “A true system of politics cannot therefore take a single step without first 
paying tribute to morality” (Kant, 1991 [1795]: 125).  
 Bakir and colleagues (Bakir, Herring, & Robinson, 2019; Robinson, Miller, Herring, & 
Bakir, 2018) structure the discussion of lying in politics within their Organized Persuasive 
Communication (OPC) framework, in which manipulative (propaganda) and supposedly non-
manipulative (public relations) strategic maneuvers are considered under the same umbrella. 
OPC refers to “organized activities aimed at influencing beliefs, attitudes, and behavior” 
(Robinson et al., 2018: 7) and includes deceptive and non-deceptive acts. Their work does not 
explicitly predict whether a deceptive utterance (including, but not limited to, false 
ex/implicatures) will be seen as more of a lie if it comes from a politician, but they do note that 
OPC, including deceptive OPC, has “become part of the political environment and central to the 
exercise of power” (Robinson et al., 2018: 11). Within the category of deceptive OPC exist the 
                                                          
18 See, for a still relatively recent example, Eric Alterman’s book When Presidents Lie for perspective on U.S. 
presidential lies throughout the 20th century. 
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subcategories of lying and several types of deception without lying; the authors note that the 
latter can be just as serious as overt lying and that their subtlety can make them more effective. 
 While existing theories and frameworks, including OPC, do not make explicit predictions 
about lie ratings of political utterances, this experiment can be framed with respect to related 
work. Recent studies on fact-checking have investigated whether finding out that a politician’s 
statement is false influences peoples’ attitudes towards that politician; the results from this 
research have supported different conclusions. Aird and colleagues (Aird, Ecker, Swire, 
Berinsky, & Lewandowsky, 2018) found that encountering multiple fact-checked false 
statements decreased participants’ support for a political figure, suggesting that a politician’s 
veracity does matter to people. This does not necessarily mean that people will expect a 
politician not to lie, but they at least hope that the politician speaks truthfully and care when they 
do not. Two other studies (Nyhan et al., 2019; Swire, Berinsky, & Ecker, 2017), on the other 
hand, found that fact-checked false statements had no effect on participants’ attitudes towards the 
political figure in their experiment.19  
From both scholarly work and discussions in popular media, it is apparent that people 
expect politicians to be deceptive. Whether this deception is justified is, and likely forever will 
be, the subject of rigorous debate, but the expectations that come with the role are essentially 
built into our society. Regarding the present experiment, this expectation could manifest in 
several directions. One possibility is that false ex/implicature lie ratings will be lower in the 
political genre than they are in the casual conversation genre. If societal expectations are that 
politicians either are expected to speak deceptively or are justified in doing so, then false 
ex/implicatures could be seen as “part of the job” and not as much of a lie. Another potential 
outcome is that people fall under the camp of Kantian idealists and view a politician’s deception 
as worse than a non-politician’s. In this case, lie ratings would be higher in the political genre. A 
third possibility is that laypeople, like scholars, are split on this matter, with some viewing the 
                                                          
19 It is worth noting that these two studies used President Donald Trump as the speaker in their stories and the null 
effect of falsehoods on support was found among Trump supporters. It may be the case that this case and sample are 
not wholly representative. 
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politician’s deception as justified and others viewing it as egregious. In this case, ratings in the 
political genre would be more polarized than those in the casual or courtroom genres. 
As with the courtroom genre, there are several subgenres within the broader classification 
of political discourse (Cap & Okulska, 2013), including political speeches, campaign 
advertisements, debates, late-night TV interviews, press conferences, etc. The press conference is 
an occasion in which politicians, speaking directly to both the media and the public, are 
especially accountable for what they say (Ekström, 2009). The notions of truth and lying are 
relevant in such a context, and the press conference genre will be used in this experiment. 
4.1.1.4 Casual Speech 
 The last genre investigated in this experiment will be “casual conversation” (Eggins & 
Slade, 1997). This type of genre is seen as being less “purpose-driven” (Fairclough, 2003: 71) 
than, for example, courtroom or public political discourse scenarios; there are, of course, 
purposes in interactions with friends or peers, but they are not as “clearly tied to broadly 
recognized social purposes” as others. It is worth noting another dimension that differs between 
these interactions and those in the other two genres: these conversations are private, whereas the 
other two are public. The purpose of exploring this genre experimentally is to provide a 
relatively nondescript “baseline” condition to which the other two can be compared. In this 
experiment, there are ordinary daily conversations between two people who are given 
relationship roles (e.g., friends, peers, spouses) but not societal roles. This was done to limit the 
impact of any societal role-based genre influence and ensure there was no (overt) difference in 
power between the two interlocutors in these scenarios.  
4.1.2 Research Questions 
Along with its contributions to the dissertation’s primary objectives to investigate lie 
ratings of false ex/implicatures and ex/implicature consistency, this study addresses the 
following specific research question: 




 It is hypothesized that witness false ex/implicature utterances in the courtroom genre will 
be rated as less of a lie than those utterances spoken in a casual conversation due to the important 
legal distinction between lying and non-lie deception in the courtroom. There are several 
potential hypotheses regarding whether politicians’ false ex/implicature utterances in the press 
conference genre are treated as more of a lie than in casual conversation: they may be rated as 
more of a lie, due to people holding politicians to a higher standard of truth-telling; they may be 
rated as less of a lie, due to peoples’ expectations that politicians will lie; or both may be true and 
ratings will be more polarized in this condition. There are no specific hypotheses regarding the 
casual conversation genre; this condition will be treated as a baseline to which the other two 
conditions can be compared. 
4.2 Methods 
 This part outlines methodological details specific to this experiment. This experiment 
utilized the Lie Rating Task described in detail in Section 3.1.1, in which participants see a story 
that ends with the critical line of dialogue for them to judge on the lie rating sliding scale in 
response to the question “Is this statement a lie?” The scale runs from -3 to 3, with lower ratings 
indicating not a lie and higher ratings indicating a lie. Dummy coding is used in all models, and 
random effects structures are specified when applicable. 
4.2.1 Materials 
In this experiment, three versions were crafted for each expression: one in a courtroom 
setting, one in a political speech setting, and one in a casual setting. The political genre featured 
political figures making public appearances at press conferences in front of the media; by 
featuring, for example, a governor giving a press conference, it is ensured that the governor is 
acting publicly as governor and the discourse is within the political genre. Speakers in the 
courtroom genre were always witnesses in a trial and the story clarified that their utterance was 
delivered under oath. Speakers in the casual genre were proper-named characters; example 
scenarios include ordinary conversations with friends and acquaintances (in line with the 
examples of casual conversation analyzed in Eggins & Slade (1997).  
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The full set of stimuli appears in Appendix A1.20 
4.2.2 Participants 
 The final dataset comprised responses from 642 participants (average age = 31.82; 332 
male, 299 female, 4 non-binary, 7 did not report gender) recruited from MTurk. 
4.3 Results 
 This portion of the study will first investigate overall effects, followed by a more detailed 
look within each category of linguistic meaning.  
 
 
Figure 4-1 – boxplot of lie ratings to all critical items, split by Genre on left and Meaning 
Condition on right. Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal 
bars in each column depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean 
with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 displays scale midpoint. 
                                                          
20 It is worth noting here that several other factors may vary secondarily along with genre. A trial in a courtroom and 
a political speech seem to naturally involve higher stakes than an everyday ordinary conversation; if this is the case, 
stakes are an inherently important part of the genre. This is an unavoidable consequence of manipulating genres, a 
notion known to be multidimensional and complex; while not possible through a manipulation like this, further 




 A linear model was run on the data with Genre, Meaning Condition, and their interaction 
as fixed effects. Results of the model are presented in Table 4-1.  
 
Table 4-1 – Linear model on entire dataset 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
(Intercept) 16.08 1 3.836 0.051 . 
Genre 80.49 2 9.604 < 0.001 *** 
Meaning Condition 130.84 1 31.226 < 0.001 *** 
Genre : Meaning Condition 33.59 2 4.008 0.019 * 
 
 Across all critical items, there were significant main effects of Genre, Meaning 
Condition, and their interaction. Utterances in the courtroom genre were rated significantly lower 
(less of a lie) than utterances in the other two genres (Figure 4-1 left). Utterances in the political 
genre were rated lower than those in the casual genre, but a Tukey post-hoc test indicates this 
difference was not significant (p = 0.50). Independent of genre, implicatures were rated 
significantly lower than explicatures (Figure 4-1 right). The rest of this section will examine each 














Figure 4-2 – boxplot of lie ratings to explicature items, split by Genre. Boxes display 
interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column depict medians, 
black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. Horizontal bar 
across at 0 displays scale midpoint. 
To investigate effects specifically within the category of explicatures, a linear mixed 
effects model was run on only the explicature items, with Genre as a fixed effect and random 
intercepts for Expression. Casual is the reference level in this model. Results are presented in 
Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 – Linear mixed effects model on explicature items 
Genre Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.380 0.418 0.909 0.396 
Courtroom -1.000 0.254 -3.941 < 0.001 
Political -0.083 0.257 -0.323 0.747 
 
 Ratings to explicatures in the courtroom genre are significantly lower than ratings to 
explicatures in the other two genres (Figure 4-2), as confirmed by an estimated marginal means 
post-hoc test (Tukey-corrected p-values of 0.04 (Courtroom – Political) and < 0.001 (Courtroom 
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– Casual). There was no significant difference in ratings between explicatures in the political and 
the casual genres (p = 0.51). 
 To investigate within-category consistency for explicatures, a new model was run with 
Expression as a fixed effect instead of a random effect; the Genre:Expression interaction term 
was included as well. Results of the model are presented below in Table 4-3.  
Table 4-3 – Linear model on explicatures, including Expression as fixed effect 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
(Intercept) 14.92 1 3.824 0.051 . 
Genre 36.97 2 4.740 0.009  ** 
Expression 169.00 5 8.667 < 0.001 *** 
Genre:Expression 157.29 10 4.033 < 0.001 *** 
 
 There were significant effects of Genre, Expression, and their interaction; expression 
accounted for more variance than Genre. The interaction is driven by ratings for the default 
enrichment utterance,21 in which the difference between the courtroom utterance and the other 







                                                          
21 It should be noted here that the utterance in the courtroom context was different from the utterances in the 
political and casual contexts due to naturalness of constraints in crafting the stimuli. The item exhibits the same 
default enrichment explicature type, but the exact lexical items used differ; it is not unreasonable to wonder whether 
two different types of default enrichment explicatures may indeed behave differently based on e.g., the salience of 
that default, the relevance in the context. The interaction based on this one item should not be over-interpreted but 
rather accepted with this caveat.  
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The results, by Genre, for each Expression, are shown in Figure 4-3.  
 
Figure 4-3 – boxplot of lie ratings to explicature items, split by Genre and sorted by Expression. 
Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column 
depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. 














Figure 4-4 – boxplot of lie ratings to implicature items, split by Genre and sorted by Expression. 
Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column 
depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. 
Horizontal bar across at 0 displays scale midpoint. 
To investigate effects specifically within the category of implicatures, a linear mixed 
effects model was run on only the implicature items, with Genre as a fixed effect and random 
intercepts for Expression. Casual is the reference level in this model. Results are presented in 
Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4  – Linear mixed effects model on implicature items 
Genre Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -1.259 0.268 -4.704 0.002 ** 
Courtroom -0.188 0.262 -0.716 0.475 
Political -0.342 0.261 -1.310 0.191 
 
 There were no significant effects of genre on ratings to implicatures (Figure 4-4). 
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 To investigate within-category consistency for implicatures, a new model was run with 
Expression as a fixed effect instead of a random effect; the Genre:Expression interaction term 
was included as well. Results of the model are presented below in Table 4-5.  
Table 4-5 – Linear model on implicatures, including Expression as fixed effect 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
(Intercept) 27.30 1 9.508 0.002 
Genre 4.60 2 0.801 0.450 
Expression 1.99 3 0.231 0.875 
Genre:Expression 33.50 6 1.944 0.07 
 
 There was a small, near-significant interaction between Expression and Genre. In the 
model run with individualized ratings, this interaction is significant (F = 2.354, p = 0.031). The 
interaction is influenced by the “all-natural ingredients” implicature, in which ratings to the 
casual genre item are higher, and the “let’s just say all the food was eaten” implicature, in which 
ratings to the political genre item are lower (Figure 4-5).  
 
Figure 4-5 – boxplot of lie ratings to implicature items, split by Genre and sorted by Expression. 
Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column 
depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. 




4.4.1 Effect of Genre  
There was a significant effect of genre on lie ratings, specifically pertaining to the 
courtroom genre. Lie ratings were lower to utterances spoken by a witness under oath during a 
trial than to the same types of utterances spoken by a politician in a political speech or someone 
speaking casually to a friend. This finding is consistent with the predictions made by Horn and 
Green as well as the standards of the U.S. legal system, whose operationalization of perjury 
differentiates between that which is literally said and that which is indirectly conveyed. Because 
the difference between lying and non-lying deception is so pertinent within the courtroom 
context, participants are especially cognizant of this distinction when making lie judgments, 
resulting in lower ratings in this context. It may be the case that the concept of perjury plays a 
role in people’s awareness of the distinction. In a casual, everyday encounter, liars are not at risk 
of being convicted of perjury, whereas those sworn in under oath in a trial are. The risk of 
perjury – with the legal precedent that it applies only to that which is literally true (established in 
the Bronston case) – may cause judgers to be hyper-aware of the distinction between that which 
is literally uttered and that which is otherwise conveyed. 
Within the PII theoretical framework, this result can be attributed to the selection of a 
stricter level of linguistic meaning in a courtroom context than in the others. The and-
enrichment: coactivities utterance will be examined here as a case study to exemplify the 
phenomenon.  
(4-3)  “Jerry and I played golf on Saturday” 
 In all three versions of the pre-utterance context, it is revealed that the speaker and Jerry 
each played golf on Saturday but did not play together – they went and played separately, at 
different courses. The bare linguistic meaning of the utterance is that (a) Jerry played golf on 
Saturday and (b) the speaker played golf on Saturday; the explicature of the utterance is (c) that 
they played golf together. In the courtroom context, the mean lie rating (on a -3 to 3 scale) for 
this utterance was -0.696, compared to 1.058 in the political context and 0.772 in the casual 
context. Not only is the courtroom utterance significantly lower, it falls on the opposite side of 
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the lie/not lie dividing line as well. In fact, 35% of people rated it a lie on the scale, compared to 
77% for the political utterance and 64% for the casual utterance. 
 In the current framework, there are two potential meanings of the utterance – the bare 
meaning that Jerry played golf and the speaker played golf, and the explicated meaning that they 
played golf together. The selection of one of these meanings as the PII is dependent on the 
surrounding context and the individual interpreter. In this courtroom context, stricter (more bare) 
interpretations are favored, compared to the more enriched interpretations preferred in the other 
contexts; the stricter interpretations here result in lower overall ratings. This context-based 
difference surfaces at an overall level with a large enough sample, though it is not the case that 
every individual rates the courtroom utterance as a lie and the others as not a lie. In addition to 
contextual genre-related differences, there are individual-level differences – the PII framework 
can account for this variation as well via the same selection mechanic.  
 While this context-based difference was significant for explicatures, such was not the 
case for implicatures; there was no significant effect of genre for implicatures. Apparent in 
Figure 4-4, the upper interquartile range for implicatures in all three contexts caps at the midline; 
only 25% of people considered any false implicature to be a lie of any strength. With 75% of 
ratings in the not lie category, there was a high level of agreement that such cases are not lies. 
Implicatures exhibited less variance (3.05) and a smaller interquartile range (3.03) than did 
explicatures (5.18, 4.45). Analyses conducted on means within implicature items revealed no 
significant effect of genre, but it is worth noting that the median rating in the political genre is 
lower than in the other two. This can be attributed to positive skew of the data in this condition: 
there were higher proportions of ratings in both the upper half of the scale and the extremely low 
range of the scale for political genre utterances, resulting in a lower median than mean.  
 There was no significant difference in lie ratings between the political genre and the 
casual genre, but there is some evidence, related to the positive skew of the data, to suggest 
ratings were more polarized in the political genre than in the other two. The interquartile range of 
ratings to political genre utterances is 4.59, compared to 3.90 and 4.06 to the courtroom and 
casual genre utterances, respectively. The political genre ratings also exhibit greater variance 
(5.32 compared to 4.16 and 4.69). These metrics indicate that results were wider spread, 
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exhibiting greater variance, for the political utterances. It was neither the case that idealist hope 
for honest politicians caused lie ratings to be higher nor the case that realist expectations that 
politicians will lie caused lie ratings to be lower. These sentiments may still be present, and the 
coexistence of both among the population may be driving the increased spread in ratings; another 
task would be necessary to assess their presence.  
4.4.2 Linguistic Meaning 
 In addition to exhibiting the tendency to be affected by discourse genre, explicatures also 
demonstrated less within-category consistency than did implicatures. The average lie ratings for 
the six explicature utterances (averaged across genres) were -1.66 (and-enrichment: temporal 
relation), -0.290 (non-partitive some non-partitive), -0.05 (lexical disambiguation), 0.42 (and-
enrichment: coactivities), 0.63 (partitive some), and 1.11 (default enrichment). While the mean 
for all explicature ratings is 0.02 (at the midpoint), a further look reveals that this is made up of 
four utterances that closely reflect this midpoint-centralized tendency, one significantly above 
the others, and one significantly below the others. This is consistent with the suggestion from 
Sternau et al. (2016) and Doran et al. (2012) that there is a hierarchy within the category of 
explicature (or GCIs). For a full discussion of the explicature hierarchy, see Section 9.1.1. 
 Implicatures, on the other hand, exhibited more consistency. The average lie ratings for 
the four implicature utterances (averaged across genres; scaled -3 to 3) were -0.93 (“sick in 
bed”), -1.36 (“let’s just say”), -1.51 (“worked for the FBI”), and -1.97 (“all-natural ingredients”); 
there were no significant differences between these. This suggests that the group theoretically 
defined as implicatures is more consistent than the group theoretically defined as explicatures 
with respect to inclusion in the PII.  
4.5 Conclusions 
There was a significant effect of genre on lie rating. Ratings to false ex/implicature 
utterances in the political genre were more polarized than those in the casual conversation 
baseline condition, hinting at the possibility that the population is split regarding its standards 
and expectations for politicians and the truth of their public claims. In addition, this experiment 
confirms Horn’s hypothesis that false ex/implicatures in the courtroom are regarded differently 
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from those in a casual, unmarked genre. Consistent with Horn’s hypothesis and the precedent in 
the U.S. legal system, false ex/implicatures were judged as less of lies if they appeared in a 
courtroom genre than if they appeared in a political or casual genre. This constitutes evidence 
that the genre in which a conversation is situated influences people’s perceptions of what counts 
as a lie; within the present framework, the courtroom genre drives the selection of a more 
minimal PII.  
The fact that the difference between lying and non-lie verbal deception (i.e., by false 
ex/implicature) is pertinent in the courtroom inspires Horn to defend the distinction at a 
theoretical level. Horn writes, 
“Meibauer’s approach [treating false implicatures as lies] risks the blurring of important 
conceptual (and legal) distinctions; it strikes me as sounder to describe the properties that 
related categories have in common than to efface a distinction between categories that 
must be recovered in some – arguably most – contexts. To subsume knowingly false 
assertions and knowingly false implicatures under a single banner would be akin to 
branding all types of intentional killing as first degree murder and then having to 
reconstitute the category of manslaughter when we need it.”  
(Horn, 2017: 51) 
The results of this experiment, in line with Horn’s above argument, suggest against a 
theory of lying that does not distinguish between straightforward lie and false ex/implicature. In 
fact, that false implicatures were uniformly rated as not lies runs counter to Meibauer’s claim 
that false implicatures are lies. The central tendency of explicatures was precisely at the midpoint 
between lie and not-lie, suggesting that neither is it the case that only bare linguistic meaning 
falsehoods are considered lies. Independent of genre, explicatures behaved more inconsistently 








5  Speaker-Related Biases 
5.1 Introduction 
Every individual has various people in their life with whom they generally agree and 
disagree, like and dislike, trust and distrust. A central hypothesis of this chapter is that these 
dispositional attitudes manifest in biases that, in turn, influence lie judgments. It is hypothesized 
that a judger’s attitudes towards a speaker, specifically here a predisposition to agree or disagree 
with them, will have a significant influence on the interpretation of the utterance in question 
during lie judgments, an exhibit of confirmation bias. In order to make this manipulation testable 
across a large population in an experimental setting, it is necessary to use speakers who are 
known by all participants. To ensure that American participants would have opinions about the 
characters in the stories, two prominent American political figures were used: Presidents Barack 
Obama and Donald Trump. While participants do not know these individuals personally, past 
experiences and beliefs contribute to judgers having the same type of preconceived propensity to 
agree or disagree with these speakers and their utterances.  
5.1.1 Political Divisiveness  
 There is a general sentiment that American society is especially politically divided at the 
present moment, a sentiment advanced by prominent media outlets (e.g., the Washington Post 
(Bump, 2016), the New York Times (Peters, 2018), and The Atlantic (Foran, 2017)) and backed 
quantitatively by research (Pew Research Center, 2017; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Barber & 
McCarty (2013) pinpoint the mid-to-late 1970s as the starting point for this increase in 
polarization. Authors have attributed this polarization to many things, including differing 
perspectives on the government’s responses to changing social conditions (Stonecash, 2015), 
increased political competition (Lee, 2015), growing ethnic and racial diversity (Abramowitz, 
2015), and polarized news media reports and analyses (Levendusky, 2013). No matter the cause, 
this polarization is a reality, and along with it come increasingly unfavorable attitudes towards 
the other side. 
Part of the psychology of political polarization is confirmation bias, “the seeking or 
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis 
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in hand” (Nickerson, 1998: 175). A subclass of confirmation bias is “myside bias” (Perkins, 
1989), the tendency to apply confirmation bias specifically when our subjective opinions are in 
play (as opposed to more objective hypotheses or expectations).22 Mason (2015) describes how 
the phenomenon can manifest in politicized situations: “A threat to our group’s status causes us 
to think, feel, and act defensively. We are hard-wired to feel like winners if our group wins, and 
losers if our group loses” (58). People seek out information that aligns with their existing views 
(see Smith et al. (2008) for review), especially with respect to political opinions (e.g., Frimer et 
al., 2017; Stroud, 2010). People may prefer to ignore evidence if it conflicts with their existing 
views – a “disconfirmation bias” (e.g., Edwards & Smith, 1996; Lord et al., 1979). This may 
result in people interpreting utterances in a way that grants a speaker the benefit of the doubt 
when their own personal views and support are called into question. Similarly, people have been 
shown to be hypercritical and skeptical when confronted with an opposing viewpoint, putting 
more resources into its critical analysis than they would an agreeable viewpoint (Edwards & 
Smith, 1996; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
5.1.2 Dispositional Factors 
 Political disagreement is one way of implementing a broader phenomenon, what Miller & 
Steinberg (1975) call dispositional factors: “Our past experience and our expectations dispose us 
to look for certain behaviors and to interpret them in certain ways” (11). That is to say, we do not 
interpret a behavior (linguistic or non-linguistic) independent of its actor but rather understand it 
within the context of all preconceived notions of and prior interactions with that individual. 
Dispositional factors do not concern deindividuated characteristics (e.g., race, gender, class, 
culture) that influence interactions (“sociological” factors) but rather perceptions of the 
individuals themselves, cultivated through previous interactions or observations (“psychological” 
factors). These previous interactions could have, for example, a robust history of deception that 
leads to an interpreter being wary of what the speaker says. In a non-laboratory context, this 
would lead to increased epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010) on the part of the hearer, who 
                                                          
22 Some (e.g., Mercier, 2017) have argued that other types of confirmation bias are fallacious and myside bias is the 
true manifestation of the entire phenomenon.  
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will be less trusting of the speaker and therefore more discerning in their determination of what 
to believe from the speaker’s utterances.  
Because these interpersonal relationships are so specific to every individual (as Miller & 
Steinberg (1975) describe, they follow an “idiosyncratic rule structure … known only to the 
participants” (21)), it is impossible to manipulate this notion successfully in an experiment. 
While participants judging utterances from figures like Barack Obama and Donald Trump would 
hardly be classified as an example of “interpersonal communication,” the necessary premise 
underlying the manipulation is that the judger is predisposed to feel a certain way towards the 
speaker; the accompanying hypothesis is that these predispositions/dispositional attitudes will 
affect interpretation and lie judgments. The political manipulation here is an easily controlled 
and valid manipulation that exemplifies the underlying phenomenon of dispositional attitudes in 
the form of the agree/disagree dimension.23 
On a two-sided view of confirmation bias, there are bidirectional hypotheses regarding lie 
judgments of false ex/implicatures. One possibility is that in cases in which the speaker is 
someone with whom the judger agrees, the judger will select a favorable interpretation of the 
utterance (i.e., the bare linguistic meaning without the ex/implicated content) as the PII and, in 
turn, judge the utterance as not a lie. The other possibility is that in cases in which the speaker is 
someone with whom the judger disagrees, the judger will select a less favorable interpretation of 
the utterance (i.e., the ex/implicated content) as the PII and, in turn, judge the utterance as a lie. 
These two directions are two sides of the myside bias coin: “We may look for evidence that is 
                                                          
23 There are several dimensions of interpersonal relationships that are relevant in the present discussion, including 
like/dislike, agree/disagree, and trust/distrust. In real-life daily interactions, these three vary independently – it is 
possible for there to be a person whom you like but do not agree with (on, e.g., politics), or a person whom you like 
but you know you cannot trust. In this experiment, given the nature of the manipulation, it is likely that these three 
co-vary; to the extent that a participant disagrees with Donald Trump, for example, it is likely that they also dislike 
and distrust him. In the questionnaire of this experiment, participants were asked, “Do you generally agree with 
Donald Trump/Barack Obama?” Since this was the question used to determine dispositional attitudes in the 
experiment, only the agree/disagree dimension will be referred to explicitly henceforth, and the notions of 




embarrassing to hypotheses we disbelieve or especially dislike, but this can be seen as looking 
for evidence of the complementary hypothesis” (Nickerson, 1998: 211). 
5.1.3 Research Questions 
Along with its contributions to the project’s primary objectives to investigate lie ratings 
of false ex/implicatures and ex/implicature consistency, this study addresses the following 
specific research question: 
(5-1) Do preconceived biases towards the speaker influence lie ratings of false ex/implicatures? 
5.2 Methods 
 Methodological details specific to this experiment are outlined here. This experiment 
utilized the Lie Rating Task described in detail in Section 3.1.1, in which participants see a story 
that ends with the critical line of dialogue for them to judge on the lie rating sliding scale in 
response to the question “Is this statement a lie?” The scale runs from -3 to 3, with lower ratings 
indicating not a lie and higher ratings indicating a lie. Dummy coding is used in all models, and 
random effects structures are specified when applicable. 
5.2.1 Materials 
 For this experiment, only one version of each story needed to be created; the only 
alteration between the two conditions is the speaker in the story, which alternated between 
President Donald Trump and President Barack Obama. As such, it was not required to norm 
these stimuli.  
 A full list of stimuli appears in Appendix A2.  
5.2.2 Participants 
The final dataset comprised responses from 838 participants (average age = 38.56; 419 
female, 418 male, 1 did not report gender). The same suite of demographic questions was 
presented to participants after they rated the stories, plus one additional question asking whether 
they generally agree with the president who appeared in that story (Trump or Obama). The 
sample from MTurk was fairly left-leaning politically, so responses from people who agree with 
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Obama or disagree with Trump accumulated more quickly than those from people who disagree 
with Obama or agree with Trump. After the first round of data collection, a premium 
qualification was added to the MTurk recruitment to allow only participants who had their 
profile set to U.S. Political Affiliation = Conservative. Data were collected until there were at 
least 15 responses in those less-populated groups for each Expression. The final dataset includes 
data from 160 Obama opponents and 270 Obama supporters, and 240 Trump opponents and 168 
Trump supporters.  
5.3 Results 
This section will first investigate overall effects displayed in Figure 5-1, followed by a 
more detailed look within each category of linguistic meaning.  
 
Figure 5-1 – Boxplot of lie ratings to all critical items, split by Agreement on left and Meaning 
Condition on right. Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal 
bars in each column depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean 
with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
 A linear regression model was run on the data with Agreement, Meaning Condition, and 






Table 5-1 – Linear model on entire dataset 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
(Intercept) 4.2 1 0.926 0.336 
Agreement 52.6 1 11.486 < 0.001 *** 
Meaning Condition 51.9 1 11.325 < 0.001 *** 
Agreement : Meaning Condition 8.3 1 1.818 0.178 
 
 Across all critical items, there were significant main effects of Agreement and Meaning 
Condition. Utterances spoken by a figure with whom the judger disagrees were rated 
significantly higher than those spoken by a figure with whom the judger agrees. Regardless of 
agreement with the speaker, explicatures were rated significantly higher than implicatures. The 
rest of this chapter will examine each level of Meaning Condition separately, looking at both the 
effects of agreement within each and the within-category consistency. 
5.3.1 Explicatures 
 
Figure 5-2 – boxplot of lie ratings to explicature items, split by Agreement. Boxes display 
interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column depict medians, 
black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. Horizontal bar 
across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
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To investigate effects specifically within the category of explicatures, a linear mixed 
effects model was run on only the explicature items, with Agreement as a fixed effect, random 
intercepts for Expression, and random slopes for Expression by Agreement. Agree is the 
reference level in the below model. Results are presented in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 – Linear mixed effects model on explicature items 
Genre Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.51 0.45 1.14 0.31 
Disagree -0.67 0.22 -3.11 0.01 * 
 
 Ratings of false explicature items in which the judger disagrees with the speaker are 
significantly higher than ratings of the same items when the judger agrees with the speaker.  
To investigate within-category consistency for explicatures, a new model was run, with 
Expression as a fixed effect instead of a random effect; the Agreement:Expression interaction 
term was included as well. Results of the model are presented below in Table 5-3.  
Table 5-3 – Linear model on explicatures, including Expression (and interaction) as fixed effect 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
Agreement 58.81 1 14.71 < 0.001 *** 
Expression 356.00 5 17.81 < 0.001 *** 
Agreement:Expression 27.20 5 1.36 0.237 
 
 There were significant main effects of Agreement and Expression. There was no 
significant interaction; the effect of Agreement was in the same direction for the four items 
tested (Figure 5-3). 
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Figure 5-3 – Boxplot of lie ratings to explicature items, split by Agreement and sorted by 
Expression. Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in 
each column depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with 














Figure 5-4 – Boxplot of lie ratings to implicature items, split by Agreement and sorted by 
Expression. Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in 
each column depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with 
standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
To investigate effects specifically within the category of implicatures, a linear mixed 
effects model was run on only the implicature items, with Agreement as a fixed effect, random 
intercepts for Expression, and random slopes for Expression by Agreement. Agree is the 
reference level in the below model. Results are presented in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4 – linear mixed effects model on implicature items 
Agreement Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -0.56 0.29 -1.96 0.14 
Disagree -0.26 0.24 -1.07 0.31 
 
 There was no significant effect of Agreement for implicature items. 
To investigate within-category consistency for implicatures, a new model was run with 
Expression as a fixed effect instead of a random effect; the Agreement:Expression interaction 
term was included as well. Results of the model are presented below in Table 5-5. 
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Table 5-5 – Linear model on implicatures, including Expression (and interaction) as fixed effect 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
Agreement 6.23 1 1.48 0.224 
Expression 95.81 3 7.59 < 0.001 *** 
Agreement:Expression 4.29 3 0.34 0.796 
 
 There was a significant main effect of Expression; the “Alex Johnson has worked for the 
FBI for the past 10 years” and “They switched to a cleaning product that has 100% all-natural 
ingredients” generated higher ratings than “The CEO has been sick in bed with pneumonia” and 
“Let’s just say all the food was finished,” as determined by the Tukey post-hoc test. There was 
no significant interaction (see Figure 5-5).  
 
Figure 5-5 – Boxplot of lie ratings to implicature items, split by Agreement and sorted by 
Expression. Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in 
each column depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with 




5.4.1 Effect of Agreement 
 There was a significant effect of Agreement on lie ratings in the expected direction, with 
lie ratings in cases of disagreement with the speaker significantly higher than those in cases of 
agreement. This finding is consistent with hypotheses of myside bias that predict selective 
interpretations in biased scenarios such as these.  
Within the PII theoretical framework, this result can be attributed to either the selection 
of a stricter level of linguistic meaning in cases of agreement or a more enriched level of 
meaning in cases of disagreement. To distinguish between these two possibilities, the ratings will 
be compared to those from the Political genre in the Genre experiment (Chapter 4). Those stimuli 
are also used within the political genre experiment. To manipulate genre while limiting 
dispositional factors, generic political roles (e.g., “governor”) are attributed to speakers in that 
experiment, as opposed to the specifically mentioned political figures Trump and Obama in this 
experiment, which aims to highlight dispositional factors. Results in the three conditions are 






Figure 5-6 – Boxplot of lie ratings to critical items,  split by Agreement (Yes, the unpolarized 
version from the Genre experiment, No). Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 
1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column depict medians, black circles with error bars in each 
column show the mean with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
 
A linear mixed effects model was run on all critical items (implicature and explicature), 
with Agreement as a fixed effect and random intercepts for Expression. Unpolarized, from the 
Genre experiment, is the reference level in the below model. Results are presented in Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6 – Linear mixed effects model including unpolarized ratings from Genre experiment 
Agreement Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -0.49 0.29 -1.71 0.10 
Agree 0.04 0.17 0.20 0.84 
Disagree 0.54 0.18 3.08 0.002 ** 
 
 There was a significant difference between Disagree and Unpolarized ratings and no 
significant difference between Agree and Unpolarized ratings. In other words, the Agree 
condition in the present experiment approximates the Unpolarized baseline from the Genre 
experiment and the Disagree condition deviates from that baseline. This evidence supports the 
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idea that the Disagree scenario is the marked one, with participants selecting a more enriched 
version of the utterance at the PII in order to fit in with their pre-existing negative biases towards 
a speaker with whom they disagree. This finding is consistent with the idea presented by 
Nickerson (1998) that confirmation bias can manifest in two directions. The myside bias present 
in this experiment seems to manifest as “yourside” bias, with negative bias, as opposed to 
positive, being the driving force.  
Dispositional attitudes are especially relevant in real-world instantiations of lie 
judgments. Having existing negative attitudes towards an individual may make us more likely to 
utilize epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010) (see Section 9.4 for a lengthier discussion of 
epistemic vigilance). Sperber et al. note that utilizing the most scrutinous strategy of 
interpretation (sophisticated understanding) will “require an understanding not only of the 
communicator’s epistemic states but also of her intentions, including intentions to induce false 
beliefs in her audience” (372). Having negative attitudes towards the speaker is not the same as 
knowing their intentions, but anything (including past experiences and preconceived biases 
towards the speaker) that makes the hearer more skeptical and less trusting of the speaker will 
lead to increased epistemic vigilance.  
While not explicitly tested in this experiment, the notion of trust – central to epistemic 
vigilance – may have an impact similar to that of the agree/disagree dimension observed here. 
Within any relationship, people improve at attribution making, an important part of interpersonal 
communication (Newman, 1981). As the notion of trust (or distrust) is constructed through the 
history of an interpersonal relationship (Weber & Carter, 2003), people develop differing 
propensities to give someone the benefit of the doubt (Kramer, 2001). Dannenberg (2018: 206) 
writes: “we are [morally] obligated to our friends to show them considerably more trust in what 
they say than we may choose to show others.” Lackey (2008) proposes the other side of this 
concept: that prior experience with an individual may give use independent reasons – beyond an 
utterance itself – to suspect that the utterance is a lie. These notions may manifest in the occasion 
of interpreting an utterance with a false ex/implicature: here, whoever is judging whether an 
utterance to be a lie has the option of selecting the minimal meaning (making the utterance not a 
lie) or the enriched meaning (making the utterance a lie). Trusting someone leads us to give them 
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the benefit of the doubt; distrusting someone (for whatever reason) may be cause to select the 
enriched meaning, holding them accountable for all that their utterance communicates, and deem 
that person a liar.  
5.4.2 Linguistic Meaning 
 As the above results demonstrate, explicatures were the class of utterances sensitive to 
the Agreement manipulation; in addition, explicatures demonstrated a higher level of within-
category inconsistency than did implicatures. The average lie ratings for the six explicature 
utterances (averaged across Agreement) were -1.35 (non-partitive some), -0.06 (and-enrichment: 
coactivities), 0.02 (lexical ambiguity resolution), 0.25 (partitive some), 0.73 (and-enrichment: 
temporal resolution), and 1.38 (default enrichment). This wide range (2.73) is consistent with the 
suggestion from Sternau et al. (2016) and Doran et al. (2012) that there is a hierarchy within the 
category of explicature (or GCIs). I return to this point in Section 9.1.1. 
 Implicatures, on the other hand, exhibited more consistency. The average lie ratings for 
the four implicature utterances were -1.29 (“sick in bed”), -1.12 (“let’s just say”), -0.38 (“FBI 
father”), and 0.01 (“all-natural ingredients”). This range (1.30) is considerably smaller than that 
of the explicatures. This suggests that the group theoretically defined as implicatures is more 
consistent than the group theoretically defined as explicatures with respect to inclusion in the PII. 
5.5 Conclusions 
 This experiment has demonstrated that dispositional attitudes that manifest in biases 
towards the speaker can influence lie judgments of false ex/implicatures. Biases towards an 
individual can exist for many reasons; in this experiment, notable political figures were used to 
specifically manipulate the dimension of agreement/disagreement, but every individual has their 
own personal set of biases – grounded in a number of different dimensions – towards the people 
with whom they interact. This experiment found that when the judger has disagreement-related 
biases towards the speaker, they tend to give higher lie ratings to their utterances. Within the PII 
framework, this result can be explained by the selection of a more enriched level as the PII when 
the judger has negative attitudes towards the speaker. In these cases, the judger does not extend 
the speaker the benefit of the doubt and holds them accountable for the entire communicated 
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meaning conveyed by their utterance; the judger’s interpretation of the utterance is in accordance 






























6  Intent to Deceive 
6.1 Introduction 
Whether intent to deceive is a necessary component of a definition of lying has been a 
contentious point among scholars over the past decade. Intent to deceive is included in the 
traditional/dictionary definition of lying (e.g., Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2019; Williams, 
2002), and it was the second-ranked criterion in the Coleman & Kay (1981) empirical study. 
Whether this criterion is truly required, however, has recently been called into question. 
6.1.1 Literature Review  
Bald-faced lies have often appeared at the center of the intent to deceive discussion, 
initiated by Carson (2010, 2006) and Sorensen (2007). Neither thinks intent to deceive is 
necessary for a lie. Carson provides the following example: 
(6-1) Suppose that I witness a crime and clearly see that a particular individual committed the 
crime. Later, the same person is accused of the crime and, as a witness in court, I am 
asked whether or not I saw the defendant commit the crime. I make the false statement 
that I did not see the defendant commit the crime, for fear of being harmed or killed by 
him. It does not necessarily follow that I intend that my false statements deceive anyone. 
(I might hope that no one believes my testimony and that he is convicted in spite of it.) 
(Carson, 2006: 289) 
Carson theorizes that this utterance constitutes a lie, specifically one that lacks the 
intention to deceive. The character in this story is going on record as stating something that he 
believes to be false, “warranting the truth” of what he said, to use Carson’s words. Lackey (2013: 
239) refers to this as a “coercion lie” due to the extralinguistic circumstances.  
Sorensen refers to this type of lie as a “bald-faced lie,” defined as an instance in which 
“the fact that the speaker is lying is … common knowledge between everyone involved” 
(Sorensen, 2007: 251). Sorensen’s example comes from Norwegian reporter Åsne Seierstad and 
her private tour of Baghdad, during which the tour guide says: “Everything [President Saddam 
Hussein] did in the past was good and everything he will do in the future is good” (Seierstad, 
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2003: 29). Seierstad reflects: “He knows he is lying, he knows I know he is lying, he knows that 
I know that he knows I am lying.” Sorensen notes that the tour guide has no intention to deceive 
Seierstad, and it is common ground that he doesn’t believe his statement; nonetheless, the 
testimony is considered a lie (at least by Seierstad and Sorensen). Sorensen even declares that 
these bald-faced lies are “the most obvious kind of lie” (Sorensen, 2007: 252). Other authors, 
including Fallis (2015, 2009), Stokke (2013a,b), Marsili (2017), Falbo (2017), and Krstic 
(forthcoming), similarly abandon the idea that intention to deceive is a necessary component of 
lying.24 
Other types of speculative lies have been propounded as more evidence against the 
necessity of intent to deceive as a criterion. Sorensen (2010) refers to “‘knowledge-lies” as 
“intended to prevent the addressee from knowing that p is untrue but … not intended to deceive 
the addressee into believing [that] p” (Sorensen, 2010: 610). He cites the many soldiers claiming 
“I am Spartacus!” in the film Spartacus as a classic example of this type of lie. Everyone after 
the first repeater of the phrase cannot be taken to intend to want Crassus to believe they are, in 
fact, Spartacus; therefore these utterances lack an intent to deceive.  
Others have, through various lines of argumentation, defended including intent to deceive 
as a necessary component of lying. Some have argued that bald-faced lies are not truly lies, for a 
variety of different reasons: they lack the crucial intent to deceive that is necessary for lying 
(Kenyon, 2003; Mahon, 2008); they are more aligned with insults or verbal aggression 
(Meibauer, 2014b); they are more aligned with other overtly untrue expressions like irony or 
metaphor (Dynel, 2011, 2015); or they do not count as assertions and therefore do not count as 
lies (Chisholm & Feehan, 1977; Keiser, 2016).  
Other authors argue that these controversial cases are lies but do not actually lack an 
intent to deceive. Staffel (2011) claims this to be the case regarding Sorensen’s knowledge-lies: 
“in asserting the false proposition q, the liar will prevent the addressee from knowing that ~q by 
providing evidence for q that will raise the addressee’s credence in q, thereby deceiving her” 
                                                          
24 Carson (2010), Fallis (2009), Sorensen (2007), Stokke (2013a,b), and Marsili (2017) each provide their own 




(Staffel, 2011: 301). Lackey (2013) tries to avoid the “unhappy divorce” between lying and 
deception that is threatened by the hypotheses of Carson and Sorensen by expanding the notion 
of deception. Lackey replaces “intent to deceive” with “intent to be deceptive,” a move 
warranted by her definition of the two: 
(6-2) Deceit: A deceives B with respect to whether p if and only if A aims to bring about a 
false belief in B regarding whether p. 
Deception: A is deceptive to B with respect to whether p if A aims to conceal information 
from B regarding whether p.  
(Lackey, 2013: 241)  
This distinction hinges on exactly what A intends to have B believe by virtue of the utterance. 
Lackey uses Chisolm & Feehan’s (1977: 150) definition of what it means to “state that p,” which 
includes not just explicit assertion but implicature as well.  Lackey argues that a division like this 
allows for the witness case to still be considered a lie without intention to deceive, since the 
witness intends to be deceptive.25 While the witness says they did not see the defendant commit 
the crime, the p referenced above includes the implicature that the witness means the defendant 
did not commit the crime; they are therefore deceptive by concealing information regarding 
whether p. 
 A recent experimental direction has followed in the footsteps of the theoretical debate 
about intent to deceive. Three published studies (Arico & Fallis, 2013b; Meibauer, 2016a; 
Rutschmann & Wiegmann, 2017b) have gathered participant lie judgments on bald-faced lies to 
determine the role of intent to deceive in the eyes of the non-philosopher. Arico & Fallis 
presented bald-faced lies to participants and found near-unanimous agreement that such cases 
were indeed lies: 94% of participants gave these stories a full 7/7 rating while only 2% ascribed a 
rating of 4 (midpoint) or lower; the average lie rating was 6.86. Meibauer (2016a) also gathered 
lie judgments on bald-face lies, and crucially gathered judgments on two other scales – deception 
                                                          
25 I do not wish to recapitulate the entire back-and-forth on this topic, but it is worth noting the critique against 
Lackey’s definition from Fallis (2015), who argues that bald-faced liars are not deceptive “on any plausible notion 
of deception” (88). 
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and brazenness.26 Meibauer’s participants also judged bald-faced lies to be lies (average lie 
rating = 6.22) and, crucially, judged them to be deceptive as well (average deception rating = 
5.62 out of 7). Rutschmann & Wiegmann (2017) also gathered lie and deception ratings and, 
similar to Meibauer, found that bald-faced lies were considered lies (average rating = 6.43), were 
considered to somewhat contain an intent to deceive (4.86), and were not considered to actually 
deceive the hearer (3.16). In Experiment 2, which presented participants with a forced-choice 
yes/no as opposed to a 7-point scale, they again found that the majority of participants rated 
bald-faced lies as lies (89%) and as including an intention to deceive (64%). The deception 
ratings from these last two studies are either evidence that bald-faced lies really do include a 
deceptive intention (cf. Lackey) or that the participants did not pick up on the blatancy of the 
utterance in the situation (Meibauer, 2016: 266). Altogether, this experimental evidence strongly 
supports the idea that bald-faced lies are lies and somewhat supports the idea that they contain 
the intention to deceive as well.  
 Irrespective of the theories that argue that intent to deceive is not a necessary component 
of defining lying, it may still be the case that intent to deceive has some impact on lie judgments 
in various scenarios. This train of thought again invokes the moral dimension of lying. Sorensen 
(2007), who argues against the necessity of intent to deceive, refers to bald-faced lies as “morally 
neutral” (263). It may be the case that this moral dimension can be ignored in the definitional 
philosopher’s vacuum, and Fallis (2015) argues in favor of the divorce of lying and deception 
that Lackey strives to uphold. But in line with the legions of philosophers who have discussed 
the moral implications of lying (Augustine, Kant, and Mill, among them), the notions of 
deception and lying are undoubtedly linked in the mind of the rest of the population. A wide 
range of work that deals with lying without the pursuit of parsing the term takes the traditional 
definition to be appropriate and thereby includes the intention to deceive (DePaulo et al., 1996; 
Hancock et al., 2008; Talwar & Lee, 2008). In these studies that investigate social, non-
definitional aspects of lying, an intention to deceive plays a major role in what is judged a lie. 
Though lies are considered morally worse than false implicatures (non-lies) by Adler (1997) and 
                                                          
26 “Brazenness” doesn’t seem to be an intuitive and easily accessible concept in English, but Meibauer’s study was 
run in German and “brazenness” is his translation for the written word; it may be the case that “dreist” is an easier 
concept to access for German speakers than “brazenness” is for English speakers.  
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Saul (2012), it remains to be (systematically and experimentally) investigated whether 
highlighting an intention to deceive can cause participants to view false implicatures as lies. The 
seemingly conflicting results of Weissman & Terkourafi (2019) and Willemsen & Wiegmann 
(2017) can perhaps be partially explained by the explicit inclusion of an intention to deceive in 
the latter (see Section 2.2.1), further motivating a systematic exploration of the role of intent to 
deceive in false ex/implicature lie judgments. If intent to deceive is an important criterion for 
lying, it is expected that emphasizing or removing such an intent will influence lie ratings of 
false ex/implicatures.  
The experiment discussed in this chapter will present participants with false 
ex/implicature utterances for lie rating and manipulate the speaker’s intention to deceive in the 
story. Half of the story versions will give the speaker a clear intention to deceive the hearer (high 
intent) and the other half will not mention any deceptive intention.  
 This manipulation also addresses one of the primary concerns of the field of pragmatics – 
speaker intentions. Haugh & Jaszczolt (2012) discuss the difference (and relation) between 
mental state intentions, which reside only in the mind of the speaker, and emergent 
communicative intentions, which arise based on linguistic expressions in context. Mental state 
intentions are the speaker’s true intentions, to which we do not typically have access in real life 
interactions; we instead rely on inferences to determine the speaker’s intentions based on 
background information and their linguistic and non-linguistic behavior. The intent manipulation 
in the present experiment hinges on the difference between these two. A participant may 
decipher an intention to deceive in these scenarios from the speaker’s delivery of the utterance 
itself – these are the emergent intentions Haugh & Jaszczolt describe, Grice’s communicative 
intention (Grice, 1957, 1969). In the high intent version, however, the speaker’s mental state 
intentions are made clear in the context as well.  
Though these higher-order intentions do not factor into the Gricean concept of meaningnn, 
many have argued that these intentions can influence utterance interpretation. Searle’s (1983, 
2007) introduced the theoretical notions of prior intention, a mental representation of the goal of 
a forthcoming action, and intention in action, which triggers and continues the “psychological 
chain” that leads to overt behavior. Recent interpretations have aimed to capture this dual-
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intention notion in models with psychological reality (e.g., Bara, 2010; Pacherie, 2006, 2008), 
including attempts to study the neural mechanisms behind them (e.g., Agosta et al., 2011; Bara & 
Ciaramidaro, 2010; Walter et al., 2004). It has been argued on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds (e.g., Ruhi, 2007; Tirassa, 1999) that the sort of goal-oriented intentions that Searle 
describes can affect meaning in context as well. Haugh & Jaszczolt (2012) write: “in more 
discursive approaches to pragmatics, the analytical focus is on the normative work intention does 
when deployed in discourse or interaction, with a particular emphasis on how speaker 
commitment or accountability can be disputed.” In the high intent items of this experiment, 
participants have explicit evidence of the speaker’s mental state intention to deceive the hearer 
and can observe the emergent communicative intention of saying something that is literally true; 
in the low intent items, any such higher-order intention attribution is purely inferential. This 
privileged access may indeed alter participants’ interpretations of an utterance as compared to a 
scenario in which they did not have access to the speaker’s mental state intention. It may, for 
example, invite participants to fixate on the speaker’s deceptive intention behind the literally true 
utterance and increase their confidence that the possibility that the speaker’s false ex/implicature 
is not accidental, leading to higher lie ratings. Knowing the speaker’s prior intention to achieve 
the goal of deceiving the hearer may encourage participants to hold the speaker accountable for 
the enriched meaning that the utterance communicates whereas in other scenarios they may take 
the speaker to only be committed to a literal meaning of the utterance. 
6.1.2 Research Questions 
Along with its contributions to the thesis’s primary objectives to investigate lie ratings of 
false ex/implicatures and ex/implicature consistency, this study addresses the following specific 
research question: 
(6-3) Does an explicit intention to deceive on the part of the speaker influence lie ratings of 
false ex/implicature utterances? 
6.2 Methods 
 Outlined here are the methodological details specific to this experiment. This experiment 
utilized the Lie Rating Task described in detail in Section 3.1.1, in which participants see a story 
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that ends with the critical line of dialogue for them to judge on the lie rating sliding scale in 
response to the question “Is this statement a lie?” The scale runs from -3 to 3, with lower ratings 
indicating not a lie and higher ratings indicating a lie. Dummy coding is used in all models, and 
random effects structures are specified when applicable. 
6.2.1 Materials 
Stories for this experiment were crafted such that one of the two story versions mentioned 
an explicit motivation for the speaker to want to deceive the hearer. This will be referred to as 
the high intent version. No such mention was made in what is referred to as the low intent 
version. Norming was conducted by presenting participants the story context only (without the 
target utterance) and asking them to rate, on a sliding scale, “How likely is [speaker] to try to 
deceive [hearer] about [x]?” A full example is provided below in Figure 6-1: 
 
Figure 6-1 – Example item from norming study. 
 For analysis, the scale was exported as a 0–100 scale with no decimals, though no 
number was shown to participants as they provided their judgments – only the poles of the scale 
were labeled. Participants, native English speakers from the United States recruited from MTurk 
(N = 700; average age = 35.21; 320 male, 378 female, 2 other), rated one story each. Two 
versions (high and low) were normed for each of 14 stories – 6 explicatures, 4 implicatures, and 
4 controls. T-tests were run to confirm significant differences between the two versions for each 
story. The average rating for all high intent stories was 67.06; the average rating for all low 
intent stories was 27.17. Intent was operationalized as a categorical binary factory (high, low), 
but the numerical intent ratings were included in additional confirmation models; in these 
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models, the ratings from norming for each story version were used as a continuous independent 
variable. 
 A full list of stimuli appears in Appendix A3. 
6.2.2 Participants 
 Participants for the lie rating task were self-reported native English speakers from the 
United States recruited from MTurk (N = 529, average age = 30.54; 266 male, 246 female, 8 
other, 9 elected not to report gender).  
6.3 Results 
 This results section will first investigate overall effects, followed by a more detailed look 
within each category of linguistic meaning. Figure 6-2 displays the results split by Intent (left) 
and level of linguistic meaning (right). 
 
Figure 6-2 – Boxplot of lie ratings to all critical items, split by Intent on left and Meaning 
Condition on right. Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal 
bars in each column depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean 
with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
 A linear mixed effects model was run on the data with Intent, Meaning Condition, and 
their interaction as fixed effects. Results of the model are presented in Table 6-1. 
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Table 6-1 – Linear model on entire dataset 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
Intent 20.96 1 5.54 0.02 * 
Meaning Condition 353.63 1 93.46 < 0.001 *** 
Intent : Meaning Condition 2.13 1 0.56 0.45 
 
 Across all critical items, there were significant main effects of Intent and Meaning 
Condition. Utterances delivered with an explicit intention to deceive were rated as more of a lie 
than their counterparts with no explicit intention to deceive. The rest of this section will examine 
each level of Meaning Condition separately, exploring both the effects of intent within each and 
the within-category consistency. 
6.3.1 Explicatures 
 
Figure 6-3 – Boxplot of lie ratings to explicatures, split by Intent. Boxes display interquartile 
range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column depict medians, black circles 
with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 
reflects scale midpoint. 
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To investigate effects specifically within the category of explicatures (displayed in Figure 
6-3), a linear mixed effects model was run on only the explicature items, with Intent as a fixed 
effect and random intercepts for Expression. Low intent is the reference level in the below 
model. Results are presented in Table 6-2.  
Table 6-2 – Linear mixed effects model on explicature items 
Intent Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>t) 
(Intercept) 0.20 0.52 0.38 0.72 
High Intent 0.45 0.20 2.27 0.02 * 
 
 Lie ratings to false explicatures delivered with high intent (average = 0.69) were 
significantly higher than ratings to false explicatures delivered with low intent (0.19). The model 
run with intent ratings as a continuous predictor found a marginally significant effect of Intent as 
well (p = 0.06).  
To investigate within-category consistency for explicatures, a new model was run with 
Expression as a fixed effect instead of a random effect; the Intent:Expression interaction term 
was included as well. Results of the model are presented below in Table 6-3.  
Table 6-3 – Linear model on explicatures, including Expression (and interaction) as fixed effects 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
Intent 16.04 1 5.17 0.02 * 
Expression 408.54 5 26.32 < 0.001 *** 
Intent:Expression 28.32 5 1.82 0.11 
 
 In addition to the significant effect of Intent, there was a significant effect of Expression, 
pointing to the variability within the category of explicatures. There was no significant 
interaction between Expression and Intent. The results, split by Intent for each Expression, are 




Figure 6-4 – Boxplot of lie ratings to explicature items, split by Intent and sorted by Expression. 
Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column 
depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. 
Horizontal bar across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
 As is evident in Figure 6-4, the effect of Intent was largest for the lexical ambiguity 
resolution item. The average lie ratings for the six explicature utterances (averaged across both 
versions) were -1.29 (and-enrichment: temporal resolution), -0.49 (lexical ambiguity resolution), 
0.37 (non-partitive some), 0.60 (partitive some), 0.98 (and-enrichment: coactivities), and 2.35 











Figure 6-5 – Boxplot of lie ratings to implicatures, split by Intent. Boxes display interquartile 
range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column depict medians, black circles 
with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 
reflects scale midpoint. 
To investigate effects specifically within the category of implicatures, a linear mixed 
effects model was run on only the implicature items, with Intent as a fixed effect and random 
intercepts for Expression. Low intent is the reference level in the below model. Results are 
presented in Table 6-4. 
Table 6-4 – Linear mixed effects model run on implicature items  
Intent Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>t) 
(Intercept) -1.35 0.17 -8.20 < 0.001 *** 




 There was no significant difference in lie ratings between high (average = -1.11) and low 
intent (-1.35) false implicatures; both were reliably considered not lies. The model run with 
intent ratings as a continuous predictor also found no significant effect of Intent (p = 0.11). 
 To investigate within-category consistency for implicatures, a new model was run with 
Expression as a fixed effect instead of a random effect; the Intent:Expression interaction term 
was included as well. Results of the model are presented below in Table 6-5. 
Table 6-5 – Linear model on implicatures, including Expression (and interaction) as fixed effects 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
(Intercept) 88.38 1 31.61 < 0.001 *** 
Intent 12.25 1 4.38 0.04 * 
Expression 24.34 3 2.90 0.04 * 
Intent : Expression 26.94 3 3.21 0.02 * 
 
 There was a significant interaction between Intent and Expression. The high intent 
version was significantly higher than the low intent version for two of the stories (“sick in bed” 
and “all-natural ingredients”). For one story (“works for the FBI”), the low intent version 
received higher ratings; while the difference for this story was not significant, the reversal in 
direction drives the significant interaction in the model. The results, split by Intent for each 




Figure 6-6 – Boxplot of lie ratings to explicature items, split by Stakes and sorted by Expression. 
Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column 
depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. 
Horizontal bar across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Effect of Intent 
 There was a small but significant overall effect of Intent whereby utterances delivered 
with an explicit intention to deceive were rated as more of a lie than the same utterances 
delivered without that explicit intention to deceive. Drawing participants’ attention to the 
speaker’s intention to deceive the hearer caused lie ratings to be higher for false explicatures. 
Unlike the work on bald-faced lies, this experiment was not designed to test ratings for cases in 
which there is claimed to be no intention to deceive, but rather cases in which such an intention 
is explicitly given to the speaker in the context. This explicit attribution was enough to 
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significantly increase ratings by making participants aware of the speaker’s mental state intention 
to deceive the hearer. Without that mental state intention to rely on, participants have only the 
emergent communicative intention that arises by way of the speaker’s uttering of the utterance 
itself.  
Within the PII framework, these results regarding intent can be explained by a higher 
likelihood to select an enriched level of meaning as the PII when the judger knows the speaker’s 
deceptive intentions. For example, when the judger knows that the speaker is intending to 
deceive the hearer, the speaker’s choice to say some when all is true is a clearly motivated, 
intentionally deceptive choice. Although some is still technically true, the knowledge that the 
speaker is intending to be deceptive invokes the ethical consideration of a lie judgment and 
makes the judger more likely to select the enriched meaning that they take it the speaker intends 
to convey. 
 It should be noted that though the overall effect of intent was significant, the difference in 
ratings between the two conditions is small. Though the speaker’s intentions in the high intent 
versions were clear – as confirmed by norming – the work from pragmatics on speaker intention 
and meaning specifies that it is the speaker’s intention in uttering a given utterance that shapes 
its meaning. It is possible that the story’s stating “Mary knows that John would not like that she 
had gone to see Emily” does not provide explicit enough details about the speaker’s intentions 
regarding the following utterance itself. A short follow-up experiment was designed to test if 
providing explicit mental state intentions about the utterance itself influenced lie ratings above 
and beyond the general speaker intentions provided in the high intent story versions.  
 To test this possibility, 102 new participants were recruited from MTurk (average age = 
33.10; 54 male, 45 female, 3 other/unreported). A subset of the original stimuli (two 
explicatures, two implicatures) was used in this follow-up. In these new versions, a clause was 
added to the pre-utterance portion of the item. Example (6-4) provides an example of the 
difference.  
(6-4a)  Mary responds: “Emily has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks” 
 
(6-4b)  Mary tries to deceive John by responding: “Emily has been sick in bed with pneumonia 




The dataset comprised high intent ratings from the main experiment and the new explicit intent 
ratings. The linear model run on the data found no significant effect of Intent (p = 0.59), and 
pairwise comparisons reveal that this effect was not significant for any of the four stories tested. 
Making the speaker’s mental state intention about this particular utterance explicit had no impact 
on lie ratings for the utterance compared to the versions in which the speaker’s general mental 
state intentions were clear.  
6.4.2 Linguistic Meaning 
 In this experiment, explicatures were the class affected by the Intent manipulation. The 
difference in average lie rating between high and low intent explicatures (0.50) was greater than 
the difference between high and low intent implicatures (0.24) and the difference between high 
and low intent straightforward lies (0.06).  
 As in the other experiments, explicatures were relatively inconsistent as a category. This 
wide range (3.64) is consistent with the suggestion from Sternau et al. (2017) and Doran et al. 
(2012) that there is a hierarchy within the category of explicature (or GCIs). I return to this point 
in Section 9.1.1. 
 The category of implicature exhibited more consistency. The average lie ratings for the 
four implicature utterances were -1.34 (“sick in bed”), -1.33 (“all-natural ingredients”), -1.26 
(“let’s just say”), and -1.01 (“works for the FBI”). This small range among ratings for 
implicatures (0.33) is consistent with other experiments in this study.  
 The average lie rating for the four high intent implicature stories was -1.11, significantly 
lower than the 0 midpoint. Even with explicit intention to deceive given to the speaker, false 
implicatures were still not considered lies. This finding runs counter to Meibauer’s claim that 
false implicatures are lies, as these items meet all of Meibauer’s criteria and still were not rated 






 This experiment has demonstrated that a speaker having a clear intention to deceive the 
hearer can lead to higher lie ratings for false ex/implicature utterances. This small effect can be 
attributed to the higher likelihood for a judger to select a more enriched level of meaning as the 
PII when they know the speaker’s intention in communicating the false ex/implicature is to 
deceive the hearer. This experiment also found consistency within implicatures in their tendency 
to not be considered a lie. Explicatures were less consistent as a category, with the examples in 
























7 Situational Stakes 
7.1 Introduction 
What is at stake in a situation may influence lie judgments of an utterance in context. 
This experiment manipulates the stakes surrounding an interaction in which a speaker’s utterance 
contains a false ex/implicature to investigate whether higher situational stakes affect lie ratings 
of these utterances.  
7.1.1 Literature Review 
Stakes are not often employed as a concept within linguistics, but they do appear within 
the deception literature, specifically in lie-detection research (e.g., Carlucci, Compo, & 
Zimmerman, 2013; Caso et al., 2005). Porter & ten Brinke (2010) promote the need for a 
distinction between high and low stakes in deception detection, since “the behavioural 
consequences of high-stakes lies should be more salient than those of trivial ones” (59). The 
authors list Bill Clinton discussing the Lewinsky affair and Michael White deceiving the 
Canadian media after killing his pregnant wife as examples of the former and a participant in a 
lab lying about watching a video as part of an experiment as an example of the latter.27 Le (2016: 
iii) describes the difference: “Low-stakes deception typically has no or minimal consequences 
for the deceiver. In contrast, high stakes deception involves serious consequences for the 
deceiver.” This consequences-based definition of stakes, though not always provided explicitly, 
is also apparent in other work that operationalizes stakes; a paper on providing feedback on 
students’ writing assignments equates the stakes of an assignment to how much it counts in the 
students’ grades, i.e., the consequences (Elbow, 1997).  
Stakes also have received a lot of attention in epistemology. A classic case study is the 
Bank Case (DeRose, 1992; Stanley, 2005), which poses high and low stakes versions of a similar 
conversation; philosophers have argued whether the standards for what counts as knowledge 
differ in high and low stakes scenarios. A long list of theoretical (e.g., Boyd, 2016; Fantyl & 
McGrath, 2007; Schroeder, 2012) and experimental (e.g., Buckwalter & Schaffer, 2015; Pinillos, 
                                                          
27 It is worth noting that these given examples also differ in genre; in the present experiment, stakes will be 
manipulated independently, with genre held constant.  
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2012; Sripada & Stanley, 2012) work has addressed this question; while this research does not 
always explicitly define stakes, they all coalesce around the stakes amounting to contextual 
consequences and importance.  
Stokke (2013) describes the notion of consequences with respect to false implicatures. 
Discussing ethical implications of a lying/misleading distinction (see Section 8.1.1), he provides 
the following example: 
(7-1)  Imagine that Alice went on a trip to Las Vegas. She greatly enjoyed the trip, but afraid of 
 appearing unsophisticated, she wants to conceal this fact from her high-minded friends.
 Consider the choice between (a) and (b) in reply to a question about whether she liked
 Las Vegas.  
(a) I hated it.  
(b) There’s a copy of the Eiffel Tower there. 
 (Stokke, 2013: 352) 
Stokke notes that in this case, Alice lies if she says (a) but merely misleads if she says 
(b). He adds: “many have the intuition that choosing to lie is morally a worse choice than 
choosing to merely mislead in cases like this one” (352). To contrast with this example, he 
presents another via Saul (2012): 
(7-2) George, intending to murder Frieda, who is fatally allergic to peanuts, prepares a meal for
 her with peanut oil. Frieda asks George whether there are any peanuts in the meal. Now
 consider the contrast between (c) and (d).  
(c) It’s perfectly safe for you to eat the meal.  
(d) There are no peanuts in the meal. 
 (Stokke, 2013: 352) 
The choice between (c) and (d) is, again, a choice between lying and misleading, i.e., 
asserting something false or conveying the falsehood through implicature. According to Saul and 
Stokke, there is no morally superior choice between these two options as there was between (a) 
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and (b) – both are equally bad. Stokke reckons that “the reason that the moral difference between 
the two choices is weakened in cases like (7-2) might then be credited to the fact that the 
deception, however it comes about, has consequences of a sufficiently higher degree of severity.” 
Here, Stokke links situational consequences to the ethical standing of the utterance. While the 
present experiment does not directly address ethical considerations, it may be the case that a high 
stakes false ex/implicature in a consequential scenario is seen as more of a lie than a low stakes 
false ex/implicature in an inconsequential situation due to the underlying moral considerations. 
Even though Saul, Stokke, and other theorists would still declare (d) misleading, not lying, it 
may not be the case that naïve participants will do so.  
Though not utilized in terms of stakes, the notion of variably weighed consequences are 
present in linguistic theories, the notable example being “ranking of the imposition” from Brown 
& Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness. This factor, R, is defined as “the absolute ranking of 
impositions in the particular culture” (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 74). A scenario with high R 
(like asking for a substantial amount of money) will be gauged as more face-threatening than a 
scenario with low R (like asking for the time of day).28 The desired outcome here is minimizing 
face threat, different from the desired outcome of being believed (in deceptive behavior), but the 
notion that the rank of an extralinguistic factor can affect linguistic production and uptake is 
shared.  
7.1.2 Research Questions 
Along with its contributions to the primary objectives of the thesis to investigate lie 
ratings of false ex/implicatures and ex/implicature consistency, this study addresses the 
following specific research question: 
(7-3) Do differing situational stakes, operationalized in terms of consequences, influence lie 
ratings of false ex/implicature utterances? 
                                                          
28 I prefer the notion of “stakes” here to the more established notion of “face” for this experiment. The scenarios in 
the experiment certainly include face concerns, but the extralinguistic consequences go above and beyond face. It is 
true that if someone is sent to jail for murdering his wife, his face will be damaged more than if someone was found 
guilty of eating a cookie off the tray for Santa, but the consequences in these scenarios seem to go above and beyond 




 In this portion of Chapter 7, the methodological details specific to this experiment are 
detailed. This experiment utilized the Lie Rating Task described in detail in Section 3.1.1, in 
which participants see a story that ends with the critical line of dialogue for them to judge on the 
lie rating sliding scale in response to the question “Is this statement a lie?” The scale runs from -
3 to 3, with lower ratings indicating not a lie and higher ratings indicating a lie. Dummy coding 
is used in all models, and random effects structures are specified when applicable. 
7.2.1 Materials 
In this experiment, two versions were crafted for each expression: one with high stakes 
and one with low stakes. In an experiment designed to study the effects of stakes on the 
production of deception (Caso et al., 2005), the operationalization of stakes was that one-half of 
participants were told their responses would be videotaped and analyzed by police officers. To 
operationalize this sort of manipulation in an interpretation experiment would amount to 
changing the genre of the scenarios, so this method of stakes raising was not feasible. Instead, 
the manipulation used was like that of the Bank Case (DeRose, 1992; Stanley, 2005) in which 
two nearly identical scenarios are written to differ in stakes.29,30 Examples of high stakes 
scenarios include Child Protective Services investigating a mother and a boyfriend telling a 
girlfriend he has an STD; examples of low stakes scenarios include two friends catching up after 
work and classmates working on a small group project.  
Item contexts were normed on an independent set of participants to ensure the validity of 
the high/low stakes classifications (this assuages the valid concern posed in Sripada & Stanley 
                                                          
29 It should be noted that intention to deceive may still play a role in these contexts. It is possible that participants 
might attribute different levels of intention to deceive to a character in scenarios that differ in stakes. This is 
nonetheless a different manipulation from the explicit/unmentioned manipulation of intention to deceive that was 
utilized in Chapter 6, and there were no such explicit mention in the contexts of this experiment. If intent plays a 
role here, it does so implicitly and could be subsumed under the stakes manipulation. It should also be noted that 
other factors may vary between the high and low stakes versions, such as the relationship between speaker and 
hearer and the power dynamic of said relationship.  
30 It should also be noted that what was manipulated here are the stakes of the situations themselves. There is a 
relationship between the stakes of the situation and the stakes of the utterance itself, but it is possible for these to be 
manipulated separately and indeed may contribute different influences to the perceptions of the utterance. An 
utterance in a high stakes scenario does not necessarily mean an utterance that itself has severe consequences. This 
point is elaborated upon as a limitation in Section 9.5. 
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(2012) that experimental operationalizations of stakes are problematic if the low and high stakes 
versions are not seen as such by participants in an experiment). Participants were given 
instructions that equated stakes to consequences (i.e., a high stakes scenario has serious and 
important consequences for those involved; a low stakes scenario has small consequences for 
those involved) and asked to rate the stakes of a scenario on a sliding scale. An example from the 
norming study appears in Figure 7-1. 
Figure 7-1 – Example item from norming study. 
 For analysis, the scale was exported as a 0–100 scale with no decimals, though no 
number was shown to participants as they provided their judgments – only the poles of the scale 
were labeled. Participants, native English speakers from the United States recruited from MTurk 
(N = 700; average age = 34.21; 327 female, 372 male, 1 other) rated one story each. Two 
versions (high and low) were normed for each of 14 stories – 6 explicature, 4 implicature, and 4 
controls. T-tests were run to confirm significant differences between the two versions for each 
story (see Appendix for full set of t-test results). The average rating for high stakes stories 
(excluding controls) was 78.47; the average rating for low stakes stories was 28.29. Stakes was 
operationalized as a categorical binary factor (high, low), but the numerical stakes ratings were 
included in additional confirmation models; in these models, the ratings from norming for each 
story version were used as a continuous independent variable.  






 Participants for the lie rating task were self-reported native English speakers from the 
United States recruited from MTurk (N = 508; average age = 31.01; 268 male, 229 female, 6 
other, 5 elected not to report gender).  
7.3 Results 
 The overall effects will first be investigated here, followed by a more detailed look within 
each category of linguistic meaning. All results are presented on the -3 to 3 scale. Figure 7-2 
displays the results split by Stakes (left) and level of linguistic meaning (right). 
 
Figure 7-2 – Boxplot of lie ratings to all critical items, split by Stakes on left and Meaning 
Condition on right. Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal 
bars in each column depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean 
with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
 A linear mixed effects model was run on the data with Stakes, Meaning Condition, and 






Table 7-1 – Linear model on entire dataset 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
Stakes 42.92 1 10.31 0.001 ** 
Meaning Condition 131.74 1 31.61 < 0.001 *** 
Stakes : Meaning Condition 4.39 1 1.05 0.31 
 
 Across all critical items, there were significant main effects of Stakes and Meaning 
Condition. Utterances delivered in high stakes scenarios were rated as more of lies than their 
counterparts in low stakes scenarios. The rest of this section will examine each level of Meaning 




Figure 7-3 – Boxplot of lie ratings to explicatures, split by Stakes. Boxes display interquartile 
range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column depict medians, black circles 
with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 
reflects scale midpoint. 
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To investigate effects specifically within the category of explicatures (displayed in Figure 
7-3), a linear mixed effects model was run on only the explicature items, with Stakes as a fixed 
effect and random intercepts for Expression. Low Stakes is the reference level in the below 
model. Results are presented in Table 7-2.  
Table 7-2 – Linear mixed effects model on explicature items 
Stakes Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>t) 
(Intercept) 0.13 0.43 0.30 0.77 
High 0.38 0.21 1.77 0.08 . 
 
 Lie ratings to false explicatures in high stakes scenarios (0.53) were slightly higher than 
those in low stakes counterparts (0.09); this difference was marginally significant. A model run 
with stakes ratings used as a continuous predictor also found a marginally significant main effect 
of stakes (p = 0.09). 
To investigate within-category consistency for explicatures, a new model was run with 
Expression as a fixed effect instead of a random effect; the Stakes:Expression interaction term 
was included as well. Results of the model are presented below in Table 7-3.  
Table 7-3 – Linear model on explicatures, including Expression (and interaction) as fixed effects 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
(Intercept) 35.69 1 10.23 0.001 ** 
Stakes 8.69 1 2.49 0.11 
Expression 128.96 5 7.40 < 0.001 *** 
Stakes : Expression 50.72 5 2.91 0.01 * 
 
 There was a significant main effect of Expression and a significant Stakes:Expression 
interaction. A post-hoc Tukey test indicates the high stakes version received significantly higher 
ratings for two of the Expressions: default enrichment and partitive some. The effect of Stakes 
was not significant for any of the other Expressions. The results, split by Stakes for each 




Figure 7-4 – Boxplot of lie ratings to explicature items, split by Stakes and sorted by Expression. 
Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column 
depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. 














Figure 7-5 – Boxplot of lie ratings to implicatures, split by Stakes. Boxes display interquartile 
range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column depict medians, black circles 
with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. Horizontal bar across at 0 
reflects scale midpoint. 
 
To investigate effects specifically within the category of implicatures (displayed in 
Figure 7-5), a linear mixed effects model was run on only the implicature items, with Stakes as a 
fixed effect and random intercepts for Expression. Low Stakes is the reference level in the below 
model. Results are presented in Table 7-4. 
Table 7-4 –  Linear mixed effects model on implicature items 
Stakes Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>t) 
(Intercept) -1.15 0.20 -5.70 < 0.001 *** 




 Lie ratings to false implicatures in high stakes scenarios (-0.29) were significantly higher 
than those in the low stakes counterparts (-1.09). While the high stakes implicatures were rated 
higher than low stakes implicatures, the average rating for high stakes implicatures is still below 
the scale midpoint. A model run with stakes ratings used as a continuous predictor also found a 
significant main effect of stakes (p = 0.02). 
 To investigate within-category consistency for implicatures, a new model was run with 
Expression as a fixed effect instead of a random effect; the Stakes:Expression interaction term 
was included as well. Results of the model are presented below in Table 7-5. 
Table 7-5 – Linear model on implicatures, including Expression (and interaction) as fixed effects 
Parameter SumSq Df F value Pr(>F) 
(Intercept) 63.71 1 16.93 < 0.001 *** 
Stakes 36.47 1 9.69 0.002 ** 
Expression 10.57 3 0.94 0.42 
Stakes : Expression 24.57 3 2.18 0.09 . 
 
 There was no significant main effect of Expression; there was a near-significant 
interaction between Stakes:Expression. The results, split by Stakes, for each Expression, are 




Figure 7-6 – Boxplot of lie ratings to implicature items, split by Stakes and sorted by Expression. 
Boxes display interquartile range, whiskers extend to 1.5*IQR. Horizontal bars in each column 
depict medians, black circles with error bars in each column show the mean with standard error. 
Horizontal bar across at 0 reflects scale midpoint. 
 The effect of Stakes was significant for two Expressions – “sick in bed” and “let’s just 
say” – and not for the other two Expressions, as assessed by a Tukey post-hoc test.  
7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Effect of Stakes 
 There was a significant overall effect of Stakes whereby an utterance delivered in a high 
stakes scenario was rated as more of a lie than the same utterances delivered in low stakes 
scenarios. This result can be attributed to the consequences of the utterance in context; when the 
consequences of a scenario are low, and nothing is at stake, lie ratings are lower despite the 
linguistic considerations (i.e., the utterance and ex/implicature) being the same. This may be tied 
to the ethical considerations involved with the notion of lying. As demonstrated in the examples 
106 
 
given by Stokke (2013), the moral difference between lying and “merely misleading” present in 
low stakes is mitigated in high stakes scenarios. Though not probed directly, ethical 
considerations may be inherently present in a lie rating task. This is corroborated by the fact that 
low stakes straightforward lie control stories received a lower average rating (2.48) than high 
stakes straightforward lie control stories (2.82). Both were reliably considered lies, but the 
average rating for the high stakes lies was higher. There was no such difference between high 
stakes straightforward truth control stories (1.13) and low stakes straightforward truth control 
stories (1.24); there is no ethical difference when both options are telling the truth.  
One of the false explicature scenarios in this experiment describes a boyfriend telling his 
girlfriend about his doctor’s appointment for farsightedness. The boyfriend says “some of the 
tests turned up positive” when, in actuality, all four of the tests were positive. There is little at 
stake here, both regarding the situation in general and the difference between “some” and “all” in 
this case. Farsightedness is a common occurrence, and the consequences of being diagnosed with 
routine farsightedness are minor, likely that this character will have to wear glasses sometimes. 
In addition, if only some of the tests were positive, that is likely still cause for a farsightedness 
diagnosis; the difference between only some of the tests and all of the tests is irrelevant because 
the end result is the same. The average lie rating for this story was -0.44. In the high stakes 
version, the boyfriend says the exact same utterance to the girlfriend – “some of the tests turned 
up positive” – but in this case, he is describing his doctor’s appointment for four different STD 
tests, all four of which turned up positive. In this case, both the overall consequences of the 
scenario and the difference between the two potential described realities are significantly greater. 
Having four different STDs is a consequential occurrence in this context for both participants, 
certainly more so than being farsighted. In addition, the difference between only some of the tests 
being positive and all of the tests is the difference between having two or three STDs and having 
four. While both are bad, the latter is certainly worse. In this case, with both overall stakes and 
the difference between some and all consequential, the average lie rating for the story was 0.74, 
significantly higher than the low stakes version. 
This difference, attributable to the stakes, can be explained within the PII theory by a 
higher likelihood to select an enriched level in the high stakes version and a higher likelihood to 
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select the minimal level in the low stakes version. In high stakes situations, when the utterance 
matters more, participants are more likely to focus on what the utterance conveys as a whole, as 
this is more important when the consequences are higher; in low stakes situations, when what is 
conveyed by the utterance matters less, participants are more likely to focus on what is strictly 
literally said by the utterance, as heretofore has been shown to be rather typical of lie judgments.  
7.4.2 Linguistic Meaning 
 In this experiment, implicatures were the class most susceptible to the stakes 
manipulation. The difference in average lie rating between high and low stakes implicatures 
(0.82) was greater than the difference between high and low stakes explicatures (0.44) and the 
difference between high and low stakes straightforward lies (0.34).  
 As in previous experiments, the category of explicatures demonstrated more variability 
irrespective of the stakes manipulation. The average lie ratings for the six explicature utterances 
(averaged across both versions) were -1.14 (and-enrichment: temporal resolution), 0.02 (non-
partitive some), 0.04 (lexical ambiguity resolution), 0.21 (partitive some), 0.87 (and-enrichment: 
coactivities), and 1.94 (default enrichment). This constitutes evidence for a hierarchy within the 
category of explicature, consistent with previous findings from Sternau et al. (2016) and Doran et 
al. (2012). I return to this point in Section 9.1.1.  
 Implicatures exhibited more consistency. The average lie ratings for the implicature 
utterances were -0.93 (“works for the FBI”), -0.75 (“sick in bed”), -0.64 (“let’s just say”), and -
0.58 (“all-natural ingredients”). This range (0.35) is much smaller than that of the explicatures 
(3.08). This again suggests that the class of implicatures is more consistent and holistic than the 
class of explicatures. 
7.5 Conclusions 
 This experiment has demonstrated that the stakes of a situation can influence lie 
judgments of false ex/implicatures. In a high stakes scenario, lie ratings to false implicatures 
were significantly higher than those in a low stakes scenario (the difference for explicatures was 
present but not as great as that of the implicatures). In line with the reasoning of Stokke (2013), 
this difference is attributable to the salience of ethical considerations when consequences are 
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greater. In such a scenario, it is regarded as morally wrong to intentionally deceive, even if the 
falsehood is communicated indirectly. While in a low stakes scenario, a false implicature might 
be considered “merely misleading,” ethical considerations may cause people to rate the same 
false implicature in a high stakes scenario as more of a lie. In addition, this experiment found 




























8 Lying and Misleading – A Response Time Experiment 
8.1 Introduction 
 This study adopts a different methodology than the ones reported so far and uses a 
response time experiment to further probe judgments of false ex/implicatures. This experiment 
captures speeded binary judgments, as opposed to untimed sliding scale ratings; whereas the 
methodology to this point has been purely offline, this online method allows for an investigation 
of the processing and time course of lie judgments. This experiment also targets the notion of 
misleading in order to better understand people’s mental representations of the categories of 
lying and misleading.  
 
8.1.1. Misleading 
 If false ex/implicatures are not lies, as several authors have claimed, then they are 
typically treated as a kind of “misleading” (e.g., Horn, 2017; Saul, 2012; Stokke, 2013). Many 
authors, like Saul and Horn, who think content must be literally said (i.e., not ex/implicated) in 
order to be considered a lie still recognize that intentionally deceptive, technically true 
statements are not as true as straightforward truths; there is conceptual space for a middle 
category that can account for these types of utterances. Saul (2012) focuses on both ethical and 
linguistic considerations of the relationship between lying and misleading. Saul does not define 
misleading explicitly but is clear in her stance that that which is literally said is lying, and false 
content that arises via false implicature is “merely misleading.” Stokke (2016) defines 
misleading as “disrupt[ing] the pursuit of the goal of inquiry … prevent[ing] the progress of 
inquiry from approaching the discovery of how things are” (Stokke, 2016: 2). Lying, within this 
definition, is a special type of misleading that requires the “assertion of disbelieved information” 
(Stokke, 2016: 1); other types of misleading that disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry without 
asserting the disbelieved information are “merely misleading.”  
 Other authors have focused on moral aspects of a lying-misleading distinction. One 
tradition makes the claim that the deceitful motivation and consequences are all that matter, so 
whether this is done via assertion (lying) or not (misleading) is irrelevant (Scanlon, 1998; 
Williams, 2002). A second tradition holds that while misleading may not be morally acceptable, 
it is not as immoral as lying (a view echoed in both philosophical [e.g., Adler, 2018]) and legal 
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[e.g., Green, 2001] writings). A third viewpoint is that misleading is actually more morally 
reprehensible than lying (Rees, 2014) because it “exploit[s] the fulfilment of obligations to trust 
others’ conversational implicatures” (64). Rees views this as an additional wrongdoing that 
makes deception via implicature morally worse than deception via lying.31  
A distinction between lying and misleading is reflected in non-scholarly scenarios as 
well; see, for example, Samuel Bronston’s perjury conviction being overturned because his 
utterance, a false implicature, was not technically considered a lie. Williams (2002: 108) notes 
that the British Parliament has “a convention that ministers may not lie when answering 
questions or making statements, but they can certainly omit, select, give answers that reveal less 
than the whole relevant truth, and generally give a misleading impression.” A recent study 
compared “paltering” – “the active use of truthful statements to convey a misleading impression” 
– (Rogers et al., 2017: 456) to straightforward lying: in a series of experiments involving faux 
negotiations, researchers found that negotiators prefer paltering to lying as a negotiation strategy 
and that those on the other end prefer being paltered to than being lied to. In this study, there was 
an impression that lying is typically morally more egregious, though this was established through 
direct comparisons of lying/misleading counterparts.  
Experimental investigations of the ethical considerations involved in lying/misleading are 
planned for future work (see Section 9.5); the current study instead investigates 
definitional/categorizational aspects of lying and misleading. This experiment does not target 
ethical considerations directly, but they are nonetheless relevant and may indirectly influence 
ratings in the judgment tasks.  
 To investigate empirically whether real-world usages of “lie” and “mislead” match up 
with theoretically suggested distinctions would be a difficult endeavor. An unpublished corpus 
study (Weissman & Terkourafi, 2017) compared the environments of the two terms and found 
differences in the lexical environments in which each term tends to show up; a Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) model was able to accurately predict whether lie or mislead would appear (as a 
                                                          
31 Rees’s argument is that the moral wrongdoing of deception occurs either way – via lying or via misleading – and 
misleading includes an additional breach of trust that compounds to make the overall wrongdoing of misleading 
worse than that of lying. See Cohen (2018: 68–69) for counterargument predicated on the notion that trusting 
assertions is a deeper sort of trust that renders the “superficial” trust in implicatures irrelevant.  
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verb) in a given context with 75% accuracy (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.498).32 The difficulty with 
further fleshing out the relevance of an analysis like this to the topic of this dissertation – 
whether different types of meanings are characterized as lies – is due to the information that is 
available. In order to match usages of each term with the suggested theoretical distinction, one 
would have to delve into each instance in the corpus to determine if the “lie”s refer to asserted 
disbelieved content and the “mislead”s to non-asserted disbelieved content, but the utterance that 
delivered this content is not always available. An undoubtedly tedious endeavor is rendered 
impossible by this lack of information. For this reason, the current project adopts an 
experimental approach to target participant intuitions on what counts as lying and misleading as 
opposed to a non-elicited, corpus-based one. 
 
8.1.2 Response Time Experiments of Lying 
 One published experiment (Or et al., 2017) has investigated “lie judgments” to false 
ex/implicatures using a response time methodology. In this experiment, participants gave 
speeded yes/no judgments to the prompt “Did the speaker tell the truth?” for literally true, 
literally false, and false implicature stimuli. The authors take these results to reflect lie 
judgments: “this means that the target sentences that were literally true while implicating 
something false … were viewed more frequently as lies, compared to when [the utterance was] 
literally true” (86, emphasis mine). Since the experimental prompt was “Did the speaker tell the 
truth?” this is a truth judgment task, not a lie judgment task – the two should not be interpreted 
as exact opposites of each other because (a) is it possible for items to be not true and still not a 
lie (e.g., mistaken falsehoods, “loose talk” that still falls within the pragmatic halo [Lasersohn, 
1999]), and (b) it is possible for items to be true and yet still be a lie (see Coleman & Kay’s 
(1981) Stories IV and VIII). Just because something is not a lie does not mean it is true; likewise, 
just because something is not true does not mean it is a lie. As such, the only response time data 
on lie judgments for false ex/implicatures (as claimed by the authors) do not truly investigate lie 
judgments; they investigate truth judgments. In this study, they found that truth judgment 
                                                          
32 Stopwords were removed from the corpus in this analysis to ensure the model was trained and predicting based on 
lexical probabilities as opposed to grammatical construction probabilities (e.g., “lie to”). 
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responses to straightforwardly true utterances were quicker than responses to literally true 
utterances with false implicatures. 
 
8.1.3 Research Questions 
 To investigate the relationship between lying and misleading, this experiment gathers 
judgments on whether false ex/implicature items (as well as straightforward truths and lies) are 
misleading. This experiment uses two versions – one which asks participants “Is this statement a 
lie?” and another which asks a different set of participants “Is this statement misleading?” Both 
questions are tested to allow for comparisons between lie judgments and misleading judgments 
on the same stimuli; the questions are asked separately to avoid drawing participants’ attention to 
a within-experiment contrast between the two terms and instead capture the categories as they 
exist for naïve participants. Following previous experiments that investigated participants’ 
categorizations of items (e.g., Ashby, Boynton, & Lee, 1994; Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007; 
Maddox, Ashby, & Gottlob, 1998) a response time methodology will be utilized here to 
investigate not only the classifications themselves but the processing of such classifications as 
well. The experiment utilizes a forced-choice binary response instead of a sliding scale; yes/no 
responses to the two experimental prompts are discussed in terms of proportion of “yes” 
responses. 
 
The experiment addresses the following research questions: 
(8-1a)  Are false ex/implicatures considered misleading? 
(8-1b)  Is the hierarchy of linguistic meaning preserved in binary lie/misleading judgments? 
(8-1c) Is there a difference in the time it takes to make a lie judgment versus the time it takes to
 make a misleading judgment? 
 
The question of whether false ex/implicatures are lies has been addressed experimentally 
(see Section 2.2 for review of previous work, Chapters 4–7 for new results regarding this 
question), but whether these items are considered misleading (hypothesis 8-1a) is, to this point, 
experimentally unaddressed. It is hypothesized that false ex/implicatures will be considered 
misleading (Saul, 2012; Stokke, 2016). According to this hypothesis, the proportion of “yes” 
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responses to “Is this statement misleading?” is predicted to be higher than the proportion of “no” 
responses for false ex/implicatures; in addition, the proportion of “yes” responses to “Is this 
statement misleading?” is predicted to be higher than the proportion of “yes” responses to “Is 
this statement a lie?” for false ex/implicatures. Stokke (2016) additionally hypothesizes that lying 
is a subcategory of misleading; in this case, straightforward lies should be considered both lies 
and misleading in this experiment. If “yes” responses to “Is this statement misleading?” are 
significantly lower than to “Is this statement a lie?” for straightforward lies, it would suggest that 
the concept of misleading is upper-bounded33 as opposed to the supercategory version Stokke 
presents.  
With respect to the hierarchy of linguistic meaning (hypothesis 8-1b), in previous 
experiments, the linguistic hierarchy of bare linguistic meaning > explicature > implicature has 
manifested in the lie rating task. Research question 8-1b inquires if this hierarchy will be present 
in the results in a task that uses a binary yes/no judgment instead of a sliding scale. Although 
these two measurement techniques are measuring different things (the forced-choice task 
measures the proportion of people that respond “yes” to the prompt, whereas the sliding scale 
task measures the numerical rating given along the scale), they are both valid measurement 
techniques. Findings, largely from marketing research, have indicated that the results of the two 
measurements are typically comparable and correlated (Bartlett, Quay, & Wrightsman Jr, 1960; 
Cosley et al., 2003; Maharani, Widyantoro, & Khodra, 2016). In line with these findings, it is 
hypothesized that lie judgments will also follow the expected hierarchy. Whether misleading 
judgments follow the same hierarchy is a question more conceptual than methodological; in line 
with the general hypothesis that lying and misleading are closely related categories, it is 
hypothesized that misleading ratings will track PII selection as lie ratings do, and as such will 
exhibit the same hierarchy of linguistic meanings. For both questions, it is expected that 
straightforward lies will have the highest proportion of “yes” responses, followed by 
explicatures, implicatures, and straightforward truths, in that order. 
                                                          
33 An “upper-bounded” concept of misleading refers to the possibility that the categories of lie and misleading exist 
on a bounded strength-based continuum (i.e., truth – misleading – lie) in which lies are not misleading but rather 
their own category. A “supercategory” misleading, like that presented by Stokke, refers to the notion of lying being a 
subset within the supercategory of misleading; in this version, all lies are also misleading. 
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Finally, regarding whether response times to lie or misleading judgments are faster 
(hypothesis 8-1c), this experiment probes the accessibility and conceptual complexity of the 
categories of lying and misleading, as well as the decision boundary between the two. Response 
times have long been analyzed as a measure of categorization, and there is a rich literature from 
psychology regarding the mental representation of categories and the processes by which we 
determine category membership of stimuli. Among leading theories are rule-based approaches, 
which claim people assess a given stimulus along the dimensions relevant to a given category 
and combine those dimension assessments into a classification, either by conjunctive and 
disjunctive logical rules (Fific, Little, & Nosofsky, 2010) or in a decision tree (Lafond, 
Lacouture, & Cohen, 2009). Within these and other theories, decision times will be faster for 
stimuli that are farther from the decision bound and slower for stimuli that approximate the 
decision bound. When the categorization question is “Is this statement a lie?” straightforward lies 
and truths both sit far from the decision bound and should, therefore, yield faster response times 
than false ex/implicatures, which are closer to the boundary.  
Within this framework, analyzing response times to the two questions – “Is this statement 
a lie?” and “Is this statement misleading?” – will inform discussions of the categories of lying 
and misleading themselves. In much of the seminal work on classification theory, results come 
from very simple categorization tasks, but authors are clear that the theory extends to more 
complex settings as well: “whatever the building blocks of the stimuli and the concepts may be, 
an observer needs to decide in which region of psychological space the building blocks of a 
presented stimulus fall” (Fific et al., 2010: 341). Within that logical rule framework of 
categorization, the time it takes to classify a stimulus is a function of not just how close that 
stimulus sits to the decision bound but also how lengthy/complex the relevant dimensions are for 
the given category. If response times to “Is this statement a lie?” and “Is this statement 
misleading?” differ significantly, that could be taken as evidence regarding the complexity of the 
mental representations of the categories. The increased response time can be explained by a 
theory-dependent mechanic; within the logical rules framework, the explanation would be that 
having more dimensions on which to assess the stimulus leads to a more complicated 
combination of logical rules, which results in an increased decision time. Stokke’s theory of the 
lying/misleading relationship counts lying as a subset of misleading; this theory would predict 
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longer response times to “Is this statement a lie?” than to “Is this statement misleading?” because 
the subcategory of lying, being more specific and complex, will have more dimensions on which 
to analyze the stimulus.  
The difference between response times to the different levels of Meaning Condition will 
be analyzed as well, though not without two caveats. The first is methodological, having to do 
with utterance length. The target utterance appears on the same screen as the speeded judgment 
response; since a longer utterance will take longer to read than a shorter one, it is necessary that 
the response time collected does not simply capture reading time differences as opposed to 
judgment response times. (See Section 8.3.2 for the analytical workaround). The second caveat is 
a conceptual one that concerns utterance processing times. Early work and theory regarding the 
processing of implicatures suggested an increased processing load (and correspondingly slower 
response times) for calculating implicatures (e.g., Bott et al., 2012; Bott & Noveck, 2004). More 
recent work has suggested that this finding seems to be specific to scalar some implicatures and 
does not extend to all ex/implicatures (Van Tiel & Schaeken, 2017) and that even among scalar 
implicatures, other considerations like QUD and the availability of alternatives can influence 
processing time as well (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015). The jury is still out on the processing time 
of utterances with ex/implicatures compared to utterances without ex/implicatures. This 
consideration is worth noting with respect to this experiment, as this research question concerns 
lie/misleading judgment times, not utterance processing times. If it turns out to be the case that 
response times to implicature items are longer than response times to straightforward lie items, 
for example, that could be due to (a) increased processing time of calculating implicatures, (b) 
increased decision time for judging false implicatures, or (c) a combination of both. The response 
times of ex/implicatures in this experiment will still be compared to response times of 
straightforward truths and lies, but results will be analyzed cautiously, with this caveat in mind. 
Because of the evidence regarding scalar some, the explicature stimuli involving some were 







 The following section outlines methodological details of the experiment.  
8.2.1 Participants 
 200 participants (average age = 32.7; 84 female, 116 male) completed the experiment 
online.34 Participants were either UIUC students recruited for course credit (n = 43) or MTurkers 
recruited for monetary compensation (n = 157). All participants were native English speakers 
from the United States.  
8.2.2 Procedure  
 The experiment was set up to measure response times to the critical stimuli themselves. 
To achieve this, each trial consisted of two screens. The first screen presented the context 
without the target line (Figure 8-1 below). Participants were allowed to spend as much time on 
this screen as they liked to fully read and understand the story. When ready, they pressed any 
key, which triggered the second screen (Figure 8-2 on next page). The second screen presented 
the target line in bold and the question. Participants were instructed to select their answer as 
quickly and accurately as possible once the second screen of the trial appeared. Half of the 
participants would always see the lie question – “Is this statement a lie?” – and the other half 
would always see the misleading question – “Is this statement misleading?” A binary yes/no 
forced-choice response task was used for this experiment, as it lends itself better to a response 
time experiment than would a sliding scale rating task. The experiment was programmed in Ibex 
Farm (Drummond, 2013). 
 
Figure 8-1 – Example trial, first (untimed) screen. 
                                                          
34 The final dataset comprised data from 200 participants. This excludes data from 24 participants who did not pay 
attention during the task, as determined by responses to the control stimuli and response times that were consistently 




Figure 8-2 – Example trial, second (timed) screen. 
8.2.3 Materials 
In this experiment, the critical stimuli (four explicature target lines and four implicature 
target lines) were used with stories from the Intent and Stakes experiments (Chapters 6 and 7); 
only four conditions were used (high intent, low intent, high stakes, low stakes) to make 
counterbalancing and experimental design easier. By including both the high and low versions of 
each, any effects of Intent and Stakes can be investigated independently and will be averaged out 
in the grand average. Genre, with its three levels, would have introduced additional 
counterbalancing complexity, and stimuli from the political bias study were omitted because of 
the difficulty in attaining a balanced sample of participants (see Section 5.2.2).  
In addition to these critical trials, there were eight straightforward truth or lie filler trials – 
four which varied in intent and four which varied in stakes – again taken from the control stories 
of the Intent and Stakes experiments. Trials were counterbalanced across lists such that every list 
contained an equal number of straightforward lies, straightforward truths, explicatures, and 
implicatures(four of each), and equal distribution across the stakes and intent manipulations. 
Lastly, two control stories were included as well – one extremely straightforward story (either a 
lie or not a lie, counterbalanced) with a very short, one-word target line (“yes” or “no”) and one 
extremely not straightforward story with a very long, many-sentence target line. Participants 
paying attention should demonstrate very quick response times to the former and very long 
response times to the latter, so the response times to these control stimuli were assessed as a 




8.2.4 Data Analysis 
 Response times and the responses themselves were both analyzed as dependent variables. 
Response times were analyzed with linear regression models; responses were analyzed with 
logistic regression models. For mixed effects models, random effects structures are specified in 
each case. Dummy coding was used in all cases; reference levels are specified. 
In this chapter, “Meaning Condition” refers to the type of linguistic expression of the 
target utterance (straightforward lie, explicature, implicature, straightforward truth); “Question” 
refers to the question asked in the experiment (either “Is this statement a lie?” or “Is this 
statement misleading?”); “Stakes” and “Intent” refer to the contextual manipulations in the story 
preceding the target utterance (two levels – high and low – for each); and “Expression” refers to 
the target utterance itself.  
Observations (2.6%) with response times under 500ms and over 10000ms were removed 
and excluded from all further analyses.  
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Response Analysis 
 The results noted here will analyze the effects of Meaning Condition (i.e., straightforward 
lie vs. explicature vs. implicature vs. straightforward truths) and Question (lie vs. misleading on 
participants’ yes/no responses. The contextual manipulations (i.e., Stakes and Intent) are ignored 




Figure 8-3 – Bar plot of proportion of “yes” responses in each level of Meaning Condition for 
each Question. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean per condition. 
Table 8-1 – Proportion of “yes” responses in each level of Meaning Condition for each Question 
Meaning Condition “Is this statement 
a lie?” 
“Is this statement 
misleading? 
Straightforward lie 0.915 0.872 
Explicature 0.464 0.707 
Implicature 0.152 0.597 
Straightforward truth 0.048 0.083 
 
 Proportions of “yes” responses are shown in Figure 8-3 and Table 8-1. For each of the 
two questions of the experiment (“Is this statement a lie?” and “Is this statement misleading?”), a 
logistic mixed effects model with random intercepts for Participant was run to investigate the 
effects of Meaning Condition (straightforward lie, explicature, implicature, straightforward truth) 
on the likelihood of a “yes” response. Table 8-2 provides parameter estimates and p-values for 
the two models. Explicature is the reference level in both. 
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Table 8-2 – Logistic regression model: Response ~ Meaning Condition 
Lie Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) -0.142 0.101 -1.409 0.159 
Straightforward Lie 2.513 0.206 12.211 <0.001 ***  
Implicature -1.580 0.173 -9.148 <0.001 ***  
Straightforward Truth -2.845 0.256 -11.119 <0.001 *** 
Misleading Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.963 0.134 7.127 <0.001 *** 
Straightforward Lie 1.109 0.193 5.759 <0.001 *** 
Implicature -0.534 0.158 -3.372 <0.001 *** 
Straightforward Truth -3.533 0.233 -15.18 <0.001 *** 
 
 Results of the model indicate that there were significant differences, to both questions, in 
the likelihood of “yes” responses between all four meaning conditions. This represents a graded 
and ordered scale, visible in Figure 8-3, in which all steps are significant, in the order of 
straightforward lie > explicature > implicature > straightforward truth.  
 In addition, logistic regression models were run with Question as a fixed effect, random 
intercepts for Expression, and random slopes for Expression by Question to investigate whether 
there were significant differences in the likelihood of “yes” responses to “Is this statement a lie?” 
and “Is this statement misleading” for each of the four levels of Meaning Conditions – 
straightforward lie, explicature, implicature, and straightforward truth. Results of the model, with 
Holm-Bonferroni corrected p-values, appear in Table 8-3 below (with “Is this statement a lie?” 
as the reference level) and are visualized in Figure 8-3 by comparing the side-by-side red and 
blue bars for each Meaning Condition across the x-axis. A significant result in a “Misleading” 
row in Table 8-3 indicates a significant difference in the likelihood of “yes” responses between 





Table 8-3 – Logistic regression model: Response ~ Question 
Straightforward Lie  Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 2.79 0.44 6.29 < 0.001 *** 
Misleading -0.86 0.44 -1.98 0.09 . 
Explicature Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) -0.33 0.88 -0.37 0.71 
Misleading 1.32 0.50 2.63 0.03 * 
Implicature Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) -1.76 0.22 -8.03 < 0.001 *** 
Misleading 2.16 0.20 10.95 < 0.001 *** 
Straightforward Truth Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) -3.13 0.35 -9.03 < 0.001 *** 
Misleading 0.67 0.35 1.92 0.09 . 
 
 As displayed in the figure and table, the proportion of “yes” responses was significantly 
higher for misleading than lie for explicatures and implicatures and marginally significantly 
lower for misleading than lie for straightforward lies and straightforward truths. The difference 
was largest for implicatures.  
8.3.2 Response Time Analysis 




Figure 8-4 – Bar plot of Response Time (in milliseconds) in each level of Meaning Condition for 
each Question. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean per condition. 
 
Table 8-4 – Average response times (in ms) and standard deviation (in parentheses) in each level 
of Meaning Condition for each Question. 
Meaning Condition “Is this statement 
a lie?” 
“Is this statement 
misleading? 
Straightforward lie 2570 (1291) 2422 (1269) 
Explicature 2928 (1398) 2661 (1436) 
Implicature 3028 (1313) 2891 (1541) 
Straightforward truth 2657 (1248) 2551 (1298) 
 
Linear regression models were run to assess the effects of the relevant predictors on 
Response Time as a dependent variable. To investigate the effect of Question – is there a 
significant difference in response time to “Is this statement a lie?” and “Is this statement 
misleading?” – a model was run with Question as a fixed effect and random intercepts for 
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Expression. This model indicated a significant main effect of Question (p < 0.001), so separate 
follow-up models were run within each level of Meaning Condition. The results of these models, 
with Holm-Bonferroni corrected p-values, are below in Table 8-5. 
Table 8-5 – Linear response model: Response Time ~ Meaning Condition 
Straightforward Lie  Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 2574.77 169.35 15.204 < 0.001 *** 
Misleading -150.25 85.76 -1.75 0.24 
Explicature Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 2929.87 171.26 17.11 < 0.001 *** 
Misleading -264.58 99.14 -2.67 0.03 * 
Implicature Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 3026.59 136.63 22.15 < 0.001 *** 
Misleading -133.72 101.08 -1.32 0.24 
Straightforward Truth Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 2661.25 182.34 14.59 < 0.001 *** 
Misleading -145.61 84.13 -1.73 0.24 
 
 Overall, responses to the misleading question are faster than to the lie question across the 
board; however, this difference is biggest and only significant for explicatures.  
 Examining the differences in response times between the levels of Meaning Condition 
involves an extra consideration – target line length. Since the expressions used are specific, it 
was not possible to completely control for target line length across the different levels of 
Meaning Condition. Average target line lengths (in characters) across all target lines in each 






Table 8-6 – Average length of target lines in each level of Meaning Condition  
Meaning Condition Average target line length in 
characters (Standard Deviation) 
Straightforward lie 34.69 (12.66) 
Explicature 27.45 (9.67) 
Implicature 43.05 (11.88) 
Straightforward truth 33.93 (12.51) 
 
 With differences in length between these levels of the factor, it would be statistically 
unsound to compare RTs for two groups of stimuli in which the lengths differ significantly, even 
when length is included in the model. To compare in a way that is both statistically sound and 
still of theoretical interest, the four levels of Meaning Condition were combined into two levels – 
direct (straightforward lie, straightforward truth) and indirect (explicature, implicature). In the 
direct group are utterances that convey the relevant linguistic content (be it true or false) directly; 
the indirect group includes those in which the false content is delivered via ex/implicature. Table 
8-7 shows the average length of target lines grouped this way.  
Table 8-7 – Average length of target lines, separated into direct and indirect groups 
Meaning Condition 
Group 
Average target line length 
(characters) 
Standard deviation 
Direct 34.31 12.59 
Indirect 35.24 13.34 
 
 These two groups are matched for target line length35 and can be compared directly. For 
each Question, a linear model was run with Meaning Condition Group and target line length as 
fixed effects (no interaction term) and random intercepts for Participant. Results of the model are 
shown in Table 8-8, with Direct as the reference level. 
                                                          
35 It should be noted that this is not a fortunate coincidence; target lines in the straightforward lie and straightforward 
true conditions were designed to match the lines from the indirect group in length. 
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Table 8-8 – Linear regression model: Response Time ~ Meaning Condition Group 
Lie Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 2635.35 82.56 31.92 <0.001 *** 
Indirect 347.79 54.41 6.39 <0.001 *** 
Misleading Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 2482.18 84.60 29.34 <0.001 *** 
Indirect 307.34 59.34 5.18 <0.001 *** 
 
 Indirect utterances (explicatures and implicatures) caused significantly longer response 
times than direct utterances (straightforward lies and straightforward truths).  
8.3.3 Response-Contingent Analysis 
 A response-contingent analysis was run to investigate whether there was a significant 
difference in response times between “yes” and “no” responses to the explicature and implicature 
stimuli.36 Results split by responses are visualized in Figure 8-5.  
 
                                                          
36 This section focuses only on response times to explicatures and implicatures. “No” responses to straightforward 
lies and “yes” responses to straightforward truths are likely due to mis-clicks or attention lapses; there are not 





Figure 8-5 – Bar plot of Response Time (in milliseconds) for explicatures and implicatures 
separated by Question and Response. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean per 
condition. 
 The only conditions leading to a significant difference in response times between “yes” 
and “no” responses were to implicatures in the “Is this statement a lie?” question. Under these 
circumstances, “yes” responses took significantly longer than “no” responses. 
8.3.4 Within-Category Consistency 
 To investigate the internal consistency of the relevant Meaning Condition categories 
(explicature and implicature), two logistic regression models were run, one for each of those 
levels of Meaning Condition, with Question (lie vs. misleading), Expression (four levels), and 





Figure 8-6 – Proportion of “yes” responses for each Expression tested for both Questions. 









Table 8-9 – Proportion of “yes” responses for each Expression tested for both Questions.    
Explicatures 
“Is this statement 
a lie?” 
“Is this statement 
misleading? 
and-enrichment: coactivities 0.490 0.786 
and-enrichment: temporal resolution 0.050 0.427 
default enrichment 0.880 0.870 
lexical ambiguity resolution 0.433 0.737 
Implicatures   
sick in bed 0.090 0.510 
works for the FBI 0.175 0.541 
all-natural ingredients 0.230 0.677 
let’s just say 0.111 0.660 
 
Descriptive proportions for each Expression are presented above; results of the logistic 
regression models are presented below in Table 8-10. 
Table 8-10 – Logistic regression model: Response ~ Expression : Question  
Explicature ChiSq Df Pr(>|ChiSq|) 
Expression 162.68 3 <0.001 *** 
Question 18.99 1 <0.001 *** 
Expression:Question 19.30 3 <0.001 *** 
Implicature ChiSq Df Pr(>|ChiSq|) 
Expression 9.39 3 0.025 * 
Question 44.54 1 <0.001 *** 
Expression:Question 4.84 3 0.184 
 
 There were significant effects of Expression within both categories, indicating some level 
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of inconsistency among the different expressions. The inconsistency among implicatures was 
significant but relatively small; inconsistency among explicatures was greater. 
8.3.5 Contextual Manipulations 
 The effects of the contextual manipulations were analyzed as well. For each target line, 
there were four story versions – high intent, low intent, high stakes, low stakes. The effects of 




Figure 8-7 – Proportion of “yes” responses split by High and Low Intent for each level of 
meaning condition in each Question. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean per condition. 
Results (lie on top in red, misleading below in blue) are shown in Figure 8-7.37 Logistic 
regression models were run within each question, with Meaning Condition (four levels), Intent 
(two levels), and their interaction as fixed effects and random intercepts for Participant.38 
                                                          
37 A programming error resulted in one of the straightforward truth high intent items being presented incorrectly in 
the misleading form. These observations were discarded; the straightforward truth high intent condition in the 
misleading form contains data from three items instead of four.  
38 The model for lie additionally contains random slopes for Participant by Intent; the model for misleading with 
random slopes included did not converge, so the intercept-only model is presented. 
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Outputs of these models are presented in Table 8-11, with statistics of the general model first. 
Since both have significant (or near-significant) interactions, these outputs are followed by 
follow-up Fisher’s tests to investigate for which levels of Meaning Condition the effect of Intent 
is significant. 
Table 8-11 – Logistic regression model: Response ~ Meaning Condition : Intent 
Lie ChiSq Df Pr(>|ChiSq|) 
Meaning Condition 82.53 3 <0.001 *** 
Intent 1.606 1 0.205 
Meaning Condition*Intent 7.183 3 0.07 . 
Follow-up Fisher’s Test Odds Ratio Estimate  p-value 
Straightforward Lie 1.697  0.721 
Explicature 0.696  0.254 
Implicature 0.402  0.043 * 
Straightforward Truth 6.27  0.118 
Misleading ChiSq Df Pr(>|ChiSq|) 
Meaning Condition 146.41 3 <0.001 *** 
Intent 3.336 1 0.07 . 
Meaning Condition*Intent 5.37 3 0.15 
Follow-up Fisher’s Test Odds Ratio Estimate  p-value 
Straightforward Lie 1.343  0.658 
Explicature 0.479  0.027 * 
Implicature 0.656  0.191 
Straightforward Truth 1.54  0.56 
 
 For the lie question, there was no overall significant effect of Intent, though there was a 
marginally significant interaction between Intent and Meaning Condition, driven by a difference 
within implicatures. Within implicatures, there was a significant effect of Intent, with high intent 
causing higher lie ratings. In the misleading question, there was a marginally significant overall 
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effect of Intent (high intent causing higher misleading ratings), and a significant effect of intent 
in that direction for explicatures. 
For each level of Meaning Condition, linear regression models were run to investigate if 
there was a significant effect of intent on response time, with Question, Intent, and their 
interaction as fixed effects and random intercepts for Expression. The effect of Intent was 
significant only for straightforward truths (p = .02), with low intent truths leading to quicker 
response times than high intent truths.  
8.3.5.2 Stakes 
 
Figure 8-8 – Proportion of “yes” responses split by High and Low Stakes for each level of 
meaning condition in each Question. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean per condition. 
 Results (lie on top in red, misleading below in blue) are shown in Figure 8-8. Logistic 
regression models were run within each question, with Meaning Condition (four levels), Stakes 
(two levels), and their interaction as fixed effects.39 Outputs of these models are presented in 
Table 8-12, with statistics of the general model first.  
                                                          
39 The model with random intercepts for Participant for Stakes – “Is this statement misleading?” did not converge; 
the results reported here are for the logistic regression model with fixed effects only. 
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Table 8-12 – Logistic regression model: Response ~ Meaning Condition : Stakes 
Lie ChiSq Df Pr(>|ChiSq|) 
Meaning Condition 226.20 3 <0.001 *** 
Stakes 0.336 1 0.562 
Meaning Condition*Stakes 9.187 3 0.027 * 
Follow-up Fisher’s Test Odds Ratio Estimate  p-value 
Straightforward Lie 0.484  0.140 
Explicature 0.847  0.571 
Implicature 0.937  1 
Straightforward Truth 5.41  0.033 * 
Misleading ChiSq Df Pr(>|ChiSq|) 
Meaning Condition 155.92 3 <0.001 *** 
Stakes 0.098 1 0.754 
Meaning Condition*Stakes 0.552 3 0.907 
 
For the lie question, there was no significant overall effect of Stakes, though there was a 
marginally significant interaction between Meaning Condition and Stakes, driven by a significant 
difference to straightforward truths. There was neither a significant overall effect of Stakes nor a 
significant interaction for the misleading question. 
For each level of Meaning Condition, linear regression models were run to investigate if 
there was a significant effect of Stakes on response time, with Question, Stakes, and their 
interaction as fixed effects and random intercepts for Expression. There were no significant main 
effects or interactions.  
8.4 Discussion 





(8-1a)  Are false ex/implicatures considered misleading? 
 Both false explicatures and false implicatures received significantly higher “yes” 
proportions to “Is this statement misleading?” than “Is this statement a lie?” and over 50% of 
respondents responded “yes” to “Is this statement misleading?” Explicatures were considered 
misleading more often than implicatures (70.1% to 59.7%), and both were considered misleading 
less often than lies (87.2%). Nonetheless, both were significantly over 50%, meaning both were 
considered misleading more often than not. That false implicatures were considered misleading 
(59.7%) but not lies (15.2%) is in line with the predictions of e.g., Horn (2017), Saul (2012), 
Stokke (2016), and Weissman & Terkourafi (2019) that false implicatures are “merely 
misleading” and not lies. Because of differences in theoretical framework, those accounts do not 
specifically make predictions about the class of false explicatures, which were reliably 
considered misleading (70.7%) in this experiment and caused a near 50-50 split in lie judgments 
(46.4%). 
(8-1b)  Is the hierarchy of linguistic meaning preserved in binary lie/misleading judgments? 
In analyzing lie judgments of false ex/implicatures with a binary response as opposed to a 
sliding scale, this experiment has replicated findings from previous experiments. In previous 
experiments, the hierarchy of bare linguistic meaning > explicature > implicature was present, a 
hierarchy that surfaced in this experiment as well. Not only was the difference in lie judgment 
proportions significant between the four levels tested in this experiment (straightforward lie > 
explicature > implicature > straightforward truth), the difference in misleading judgments 
reflected this hierarchy with all comparisons significant as well. 
As in previous studies, there was inconsistency among explicatures. While the category 
average for “Is this statement a lie?” was around the 50% mark (46.4%), it was not the case that 
all four explicatures tested were around this mark. And-enrichment: coactivities (49.0%) and 
lexical ambiguity resolution (43.3%) cause participants to be close to evenly split, but and-
enrichment: temporal resolution was consistently judged to not be a lie (5%) and default 
enrichment was consistently judged to be a lie (88%). For “Is this statement misleading?” the 
percentages of “yes” responses are higher (range: 42.7% to 87%), but the four stimuli follow the 
exact same relative ordering. The hierarchy of explicatures represented in this binary judgment 
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task reflects the same hierarchy present in the rating scale studies; this finding is elaborated upon 
in Section 9.1.1. 
Implicatures in this speeded binary judgment task demonstrated a similar level of 
consistency as in the rating scale studies. There was a small significant effect of Expression 
within the model run on implicatures, but the range across each question was quite small (51% to 
67.7% for “Is this statement misleading?” and 9% to 23% for “Is this statement a lie?”) 
compared to that of the explicatures. This is in line with findings from the previous experiments 
that demonstrated greater variability in the category of explicatures than implicatures.  
(8-1c) Is there a difference in the time it takes to make a lie judgment versus the time it takes to
 make a misleading judgment? 
 Misleading judgments were significantly faster than lie judgments across the board. 
When analyzed within the logical rule framework of categorization (e.g., Fific et al., 2010), this 
finding lends support to Stokke’s conception of the subset relationship between lying and 
misleading – what was earlier referred to as an “upper-bounded” concept of misleading. In 
Stokke’s account, a lie meets all the criteria of misleading and additional criteria of lying. These 
additional criteria lead to more complex categorization calculations, resulting in the increased 
response times to “Is this statement a lie?” compared to “Is this statement misleading?” This 
subset relationship is also supported by the 87.2% proportion of “yes” responses to “Is this 
statement misleading?” to straightforward lie stimuli.  
 Indirect utterances led to slower response times than direct utterances (straightforward 
truths and lies) in both questions. This is consistent with (a) the notion that these indirect cases 
are more difficult to judge, explained in the logical rule categorization framework by their being 
close to the decision bound. It should be noted that this result may also be consistent with (b) 
theories claiming that indirect utterances take longer to process than direct utterances; in this 
case, the increased response time may not be due to a slower lie/misleading judgment but rather 
a slower processing time to the utterance itself. While it is not possible to differentiate between 
these two options with the results of this experiment, I argue it is more likely the former than the 
latter. New evidence regarding utterance processing times (Van Tiel & Schaeken, 2017) casts a 
small shadow of doubt on the possibility of (b), especially considering that the stimuli in this 
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experiment did not utilize some. In addition, the notion that false ex/implicatures are closer to the 
decision bounds for both lie and misleading is reflected in participant responses: “yes” 
proportions are closer to 50% for ex/implicatures than straightforward truths and lies.40  
8.5 Conclusions 
 This response time experiment replicated findings from previous offline experiments and 
provided new insights on the concept of misleading as well as on the processing of 
lie/misleading categorizations. The experiment replicated the previous rating scale findings 
regarding lie judgments of false ex/implicatures using a speeded binary judgment task. False 
implicatures were judged to not be lies, whereas judgments to different types of false 
explicatures were inconsistent, spanning from consistently not lies to evenly split judgments to 
consistently lies. This experiment also provided empirical evidence regarding the category of 
misleading. Evidence from this experiment supports Stokke’s (2016) notion of misleading that 
places lies as a subcategory within the category of misleading. That straightforward lies were 
reliably considered misleading and response times for misleading judgments were significantly 
quicker than for lie judgments support this subset relationship between the two categories. The 
present results also support Saul’s (2012) theory that false implicatures are “merely misleading” 





                                                          
40 While “yes” proportions for implicatures are farther from the midpoint to “Is this statement a lie?” (15.2%) than to 
“Is this statement misleading?” (59.7%), response times were still higher to “Is this statement a lie?” A look at the 
response-contingent analysis reveals that the 15.2% minority that gave “yes” responses to “Is this statement a lie?” 
for false implicatures had significantly longer response times than the 84.8% that gave “no” responses; the increased 
response times in this category are due largely to excessively longer response times from the minority of participants 
that deemed false implicatures to be lies. This may be due to a lower degree of certainty among those with the 
unpopular opinion, as certainty has been shown to correlate with response times in decision tasks (Kiani et al, 2014). 
It has also been documented that errors in response time experiments are slower than accurate responses (e.g., 
Maddox et al., 1998) so increased response times could be due to response errors, but as this is a genuine judgment 
task and there is no accurate response to false implicature items, it is unfounded to call “no” responses errors. 




9  Discussion 
The objectives of this thesis were to investigate lie ratings of false ex/implicature 
utterances in order to determine whether people consider these utterances to be lies, whether 
contextual variation influences those lie judgments, if there is variation with respect to lie 
judgments among the different types of explicatures and implicatures, and, if they are not 
considered lies, whether they are considered misleading. In light of differing theoretical 
perspectives (e.g., Meibauer, 2005; 2011; 2014a; Saul, 2012; Horn, 2017) and experimental 
evidence (Willemsen & Wiegmann, 2017; Weissman & Terkourafi, 2019) regarding whether 
utterances with falsely implicated content should be or are considered lies, this dissertation set 
out to explore this question with a wide-reaching experimental project that addressed this 
question on a much larger scale than other studies, directly probed contextual influences on lie 
judgments, and tested different types of explicatures as well as different implicatures in order to 
explore whether different members of these categories are judged the same in cases of lie 
determinations. There were four offline lie rating experiments, targeting the influences of genre 
of discourse (Chapter 4), speaker-related biases (Chapter 5), speaker’s intention to deceive 
(Chapter 6), and stakes of the scenario (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 presents an online response time 
experiment designed to address the processing of categorization during lie judgments and 
misleading judgments.  
This chapter will synthesize the results of all five experiments presented in Chapters 4–8 
and address the main research questions of the thesis considering the data comprehensively. It 
begins with summaries of the results across the experiments, investigating explicature (9.1.1) and 
implicature behavior (9.1.2), the role of contextual manipulations in lie judgments (9.1.3), and 
quick notes on straightforward lies (9.1.4) and demographic variables (9.1.5). Next, the results 
will be compared to existing theories of lying that make claims about false ex/implicatures (9.2). 
The results are then analyzed within different theories of linguistic meaning to gauge how well 
these theories can account for the patterns observed in the results (9.3). Subsequently, I will 
discuss an extension from experiment to reality centered around the important notion of 
epistemic vigilance (9.4). Finally, the chapter concludes with a look at potential future directions 
for this research (9.5).  
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9.1 Cross-Experiment Results 
 In this section, each Meaning Condition is examined separately to investigate the within-
category consistency for each of these groups. The two categories, Explicature and Implicature 
(see Section 2.4.1), are based on the Relevance-Theoretic definitions of each – an explicature is a 
“development of a logical form encoded by [the utterance]” and an implicature is an “assumption 
communicated by [the utterance] that is not explicit” (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 182). In the 
following analyses, Context refers to the experimental context condition (e.g., Genre – 
Courtroom refers to the courtroom context from the Genre experiment; Stakes – High refers to 
the high stakes context from the Stakes experiment).  
9.1.1 Explicatures 
The six explicature types tested were the following: 
and-enrichment: coactivities – e.g., “X and Y did A” → X and Y did A together 
and-enrichment: temporal resolution – e.g., “X did A and B” → X did A and then X did B 
default resolution – e.g., “I’ve done A” → I’ve done A today 
lexical ambiguity resolution – e.g., “I’m a doctor” → I’m a doctor of medicine 
non-partitive some – e.g., “Some X are Z” → Some but not all X are Z 




Figure 9-1 – Graph of all six explicature types throughout all contexts tested in this study. Circle 
represents the mean and error bar represents standard error. Contexts are labeled on x-axis. 
 Evident in Figure 9-1, explicatures span a wide range in this study. Apparent in the graph, 
four of the stories (and-enrichment: coactivities, lexical ambiguity resolution, partitive some, and 
non-partitive some) were consistently in the middle of the scale, while default enrichment was 
typically rated higher and and-enrichment: temporal resolution was typically rated lower. A 
linear model was run with Expression and Context as fixed effects; there were significant main 
effects of both (both p < 0.001). Post-hoc estimated marginal means were calculated via the 
emmeans package in R (Lenth, 2018) to compare the ratings for each Expression irrespective of 




Figure 9-2 – Graphical representation of the estimated marginal means post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons for explicature expressions. The six expressions appear in order on the y-axis, with 
Tukey-adjusted p-values on the x-axis; colored lines that represent the comparisons between the 
six expressions appear horizontally at the p-value for that comparison. 
 In the above figure, the pairwise comparisons are represented by vertical lines between 
the pairs, and the horizontal location on the x-axis corresponds to the p-value of that comparison. 
Vertical lines on the right side of the graph are between two explicatures that did not differ 
significantly from each other; those left of 0.05, including many at the extreme left (< 0.001), are 
between two explicatures that did differ significantly.  
 Using an alpha of 0.05, the explicatures from this experiment can be split into three 
distinct groups based on their behavior in the lie rating tasks, in which within-group comparisons 
are not significant and across-group comparisons are significant. The three groups, ordered in 




(9-1)  (strongest) default enrichment > 
  and-enrichment: coactivities = partitive some >  
  (weakest) lexical ambiguity resolution41 = non-partitive some = and-enrichment:
 temporal resolution. 
 The results from the response time experiment, which utilized a speeded binary yes/no 
task instead of an untimed sliding scale, support this hierarchy. Though the two some stories 
were not included in this experiment, the other four fell into nearly the same groups (from both 
the lie and mislead portions of the experiment):  
(9-2) default enrichment >  
and-enrichment: coactivities = lexical ambiguity resolution >  
and-enrichment: temporal resolution.  
The precise ordering of types in the middle is, from both the response time and sliding 
scale experiments, variable and obscure. Across the board, default enrichment was the highest-
rated, and and-enrichment: temporal resolution was the lowest-rated, with other types in the 
middle.  
These results together constitute evidence for a hierarchy within explicatures; behavior in 
the lie judgment tasks differed significantly between the different types of explicatures tested. An 
explicature hierarchy has been found in other experiments as well. Sternau et al. (2017) used the 
Deniability test to measure participants’ views of a speaker’s level of commitment to different 
types of explicatures. The Deniability test in this task can be summarized as: If speaker S utters 
utterance U licensing explicature E, to what extent (on a 1-7 Likert scale) can S deny meaning E. 
The hierarchy found in their experiment is presented, again in terms of strength (i.e., lower 
deniability ratings), in (9-3): 
(9-3) (stronger) reference resolution = fragment completions > 
 (weaker) default enrichment = and-enrichment 
                                                          
41 This group assignment was carried out with an alpha of 0.05; it should be noted that lexical ambiguity barely 
misses this cutoff and the difference between this explicature and and-enrichment temporal resolution is marginally 
significant (p = 0.06).  
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 The authors also included lexical ambiguity resolution, but an experimental confound 
caused the authors to dismiss most of the items of this category; the deniability ratings of the 
non-dismissed items would qualitatively place this explicature type in the weaker group with 
default enrichment and and-enrichment, but the authors exclude the underpowered category from 
their analysis altogether.  
 The categories shared among these experiments are default enrichment, and-enrichment, 
and, to some extent, lexical ambiguity resolution. In Sternau et al.’s experiment, there was no 
significant difference between these three types (conservatively: the two types, heeding the 
cautioned exclusion of lexical ambiguity resolution). In the present study, however, there were 
not only significant differences between default enrichment and and-enrichment, but also 
between two different types of and-enrichment (coactivities and temporal resolution).  
 The experiment of Doran et al. (2012) is relevant for comparison here as well, though 
conducted in a different framework utilizing different terminology (theirs, positioned within the 
Neo-Gricean framework of Levinson [2000], tested different types of GCIs in terms of their 
inclusion in WIS). While this is a different theoretical designation within a different linguistic 
framework, some of the GCI utterance types tested were the same as explicature types tested in 
the present study. Their experiment provided participants with a dialogue and a situational fact; 
the fact, in this case, renders the second line of dialogue technically true but its GCI false. 
Participants were asked to judge whether that second line of dialogue is true or false – this 
experimental task is similar to that of the present study, but with a binary true/false judgment 
instead of a lie rating task. They interpret a higher percentage of “false” responses to indicate a 
higher inclusion in WIS (i.e., stronger meaning). Their experiment consisted of three separate 
conditions: a baseline condition; a “literal” condition, in which participants were instructed to 
judge literally; and a “Literal Lucy” condition, in which participants were instructed to make 
judgments from the perspective of an exceptionally literal character. Their stimuli types included 
coactivities (and-enrichment: coactivities), conjunction buttressing (and-enrichment: temporal 
resolution), and a category of quantifiers and modals with scalar inferences (though some was 
not one of the tested terms). In the Literal Lucy condition, in which participants were being the 
most literal, the quantifiers and modals category had a 32% false response rate, conjunction 
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buttressing had 21%, and coactivities had 15%. Though the authors did not statistically analyze 
differences between the GCI types, it is observed that the two types of and-enrichment were 
close together in terms of inclusion in WIS. It is also worth noting that coactivities stories were 
the weakest of all of the GCI types they tested. 
 The above two studies did not test whether a partitive vs. non-partitive construction of 
some influenced the rate of drawing the scalar inference, as was found in Grodner et al. (2010) 
and Tanenhaus & Degen (2011). The present study did include both constructions of some and 
replicated previous findings that the partitive construction is a stronger cue to drawing the scalar 
“but not all” inference than the non-partitive construction, as evidenced by higher lie ratings to 
the partitive form. This suggests judgers took the speaker to be more committed to the “but not 
all” meaning when they use the partitive form than when they used the non-partitive, resulting in 
the former being rated as more of a lie than the latter.  
 Explicatures were shown in this experiment to be an inconsistent category. The 
explicature hierarchy from this experiment was: default enrichment > and-enrichment: 
coactivities = partitive some > lexical ambiguity resolution = non-partitive some = and-
enrichment: temporal resolution. It is difficult to create an overall hierarchy, combining these 
results with others, due to differing results and not enough stimulus overlap; that there is within-
category variation, however, is a shared finding. Within a different framework of linguistic 
meaning, Doran et al. (2012) also found inconsistency in GCI types. Sternau et al. (2017) found 
disparities between different explicature types in their deniability task, but as the types all wound 
up within the same range of the deniability scale, the authors conclude that the category of 
explicature is a unified category, despite the within-category variation. With one explicature 
reliably rated as a lie (except in the courtroom context), one explicature reliably rated as not a lie, 
and four reliably in the middle, the status of explicature as a unified category is not as robustly 








Figure 9-3 – Graph of all four implicature types throughout all contexts tested in this study. 
Circle represents the mean and error bar represents standard error. Contexts are labeled on x-
axis. 
 As evidenced in Figure 9-3, the class of implicature demonstrated more internal 
consistency and covered less of a range in terms of lie judgments, landing in the “not-lie” portion 
of the scale (below 0). A linear model was run with Expression and Context as fixed effects; 
there was a significant effect of Context (p < 0.001) and no significant effect of Expression (p = 
0.53). Post-hoc emmeans comparisons were conducted again; no comparisons were significant 
(all ps > 0.61). In the response time experiment, the results replicated this finding: there was no 
significant effect of Expression for implicatures. 
Implicature utterances were, on the whole, not considered lies. No stories were rated 
significantly above the midway cutoff, and the cross-Context averages of all four Expressions 
were significantly below it. This finding runs counter to Meibauer’s (2005, 2011, 2014a) claim 
that false implicatures are lies. As represented in the average lie ratings for the four false 
implicatures tested, the majority of people do not consider false implicatures to be lies. That is 
not to say that Meibauer’s view is entirely unrepresented in the populace; there was still 
extensive variation in lie ratings to false implicature utterances. Meibauer’s opinion is not 
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unrepresented but rather represents a minority of people. The authors who have claimed false 
implicatures cannot be lies (e.g., Saul (2012), Horn (2017)) represent the majority.  
9.1.3 Contextual Variation 
 An analysis was conducted to investigate the overall effects of the various context 
conditions on lie ratings of false ex/implicatures. A linear mixed effects model was run on the 
data, including all explicature and implicature utterances with Context as a fixed effect and 
random intercepts for Expression. The model indicated a significant main effect of Context (p < 
0.001). Post-hoc estimated marginal means were calculated and compared pairwise to identify 
which contexts differed significantly from one another. A numerical representation of the 
analysis is presented below in Table 9-1. The letter labels are arbitrary and correspond to group 
assignments, based on the p-values of the pairwise comparisons. Group A contains the highest-
rated conditions, and all pairwise comparisons of the members of Group A (any row with A in 
the right column) are not significant. Group D contains the lowest-rated conditions, and all 
pairwise comparisons between members of Group D are not significant. It should be noted (per 
Lenth, 2018) that the group assignments and significance determinations are based on a strict 
alpha cutoff of 0.05. If the p-value of a pairwise comparison is greater than 0.05, the contexts get 
placed in the same group; if the p-value of a pairwise comparison is less than 0.05, the contexts 
are placed in different groups. As the 0.05 cutoff is rather arbitrary, the results below should be 










Table 9-1 – Numerical results of emmeans comparisons of the effects of context manipulations 
on lie ratings 
Context emmean Std. Error df lower.CL upper.CL Group 
Stakes - High 0.168 0.302 12.40 -0.489 0.825 A 
Bias - Disagree 0.087 0.294 11.01 -0.559 0.733 AB 
Intent - High -0.046 0.302 12.37 -0.702 0.611 AB 
Genre - Casual -0.266 0.307 13.11 -0.929 0.395    B 
Stakes - Low -0.383 0.303 12.61 -1.041 0.275 ABC 
Bias - Agree -0.395 0.292 10.79 -1.039 0.250    BCD 
Intent - Low -0.424 0.302 12.30 -1.080 0.232    BCD 
Genre - Political -0.462 0.308 13.45 -1.127 0.203       CD 
Genre - Courtroom -0.958 0.308 13.34 -1.622 -0.294          D 
 
 These results show a fairly robust middle section (groups B and C), with the Courtroom 
context standing out as that which led to the lowest ratings (significantly lower than the top half) 
and the High Stakes context standing out as that which led to the highest ratings (significantly 
higher than the lower half). That the courtroom context led to the most literal interpretations is in 
line with the predictions of e.g., Horn (2017) and Green (2018).  
 The effects of context tended to be stronger on explicatures than on implicatures. This 
may be due to the range of the scale where each tended to fall – implicatures were, on average, 
not seen as lies, whereas explicatures were typically in the middle of the scale. The contextual 
differences do not impact implicatures as strongly because the utterance is still not seen as a lie 
in either case. For explicatures, however, the contextual manipulation may be the difference 
between a lie and not a lie, crossing the midway point. As false implicatures are typically not 
regarded as lies regardless and false explicatures are right in the middle, the contextual 
manipulations have stronger influence on the latter.  
 The results of this study have demonstrated that there are contextual nuances that go into 
lie judgments. Previous theoretical work and experimental investigations have largely ignored 
the role that situational context plays in influencing lie judgments. The definitional philosophers 
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may need not concern themselves with this contextual variation, but any scholars hoping to study 
or describe real-life instantiations of lying or collect lie judgments in an experimental setting 
should note the important role of context in conceptions of lying.  
9.1.4 Straightforward Lies 
 
Figure 9-4 – Graph of all straightforward lie items throughout all contexts tested in this study. 
Circle represents the mean and error bar represents standard error. Contexts are labeled on x-
axis. 
 A similar analysis was run on the straightforward lie items (see also Figure 9-4) to see if 
contextual variation affects these types of items as well. On the whole it did not, with items in all 
contexts strongly and reliably rated as lies. Two comparisons are worth highlighting. It is 
noteworthy that there was still some ratings bias exhibited between the Agree and Disagree 
conditions of the bias experiment, with Agree ratings (mean = 2.23, sd = 1.28) significantly 
lower (p < 0.001) than Disagree ratings (2.65, sd = 0.87), though both were very clearly 
considered lies. In addition, Low Stakes ratings (mean = 2.48, sd = 1.12) were significantly 
lower than High Stakes ratings (mean = 2.82, sd = 0.73). Overall, it is evident that 
straightforward lies exhibited much more consistency across contexts than did explicatures or 
implicatures, as expected. Those levels of Meaning Condition contain more room for varied 
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interpretations and, as such, are the levels that exhibit interindividual and intercontextual 
variance. The difference between a high stakes straightforward lie and a low stakes 
straightforward lie (while significant) is rather small, and both are still very reliably considered 
lies; in this scenario there is only the one potential interpretation of the utterance. The difference 
between a high stakes false explicature and a low stakes false explicature is larger; in this 
scenario, there are two potential interpretations and the context drives participants’ (on average) 
likelihood to select one interpretation over the other.  
9.1.5 Demographic Factors 
 The demographic factors collected in the surveys (see Section 3.2) included, in addition 
to native language, participants’ self-reported age and gender and as self-reported scale ratings to 
the questions “How often do you lie?” and “How morally wrong do you think it is to lie?” To 
assess whether these demographic factors correlated significantly with lie ratings across the 
experiments in this study, a linear mixed effects model was fit with all four of the demographic 
factors as fixed effects and random intercepts for Expression and Context to account for item-
specific variance. There was a small but significant positive correlation of Rating with 
participants’ views of the moral wrongness of lying (r = 0.05, p = 0.006): those who self-
reported a higher belief of moral wrongness of lying were more likely to give higher lie ratings 
to the false ex/implicature utterance.42 This provides indirect support for the notion that the Lie 
Rating Task in some way tracks ethical considerations in addition to definitional considerations; 
the possibility that views on the ethics of lying and misleading may influence lie judgments 
should be explored further. 
9.2 Theories of Lying 
 Meibauer (2005, 2011, 2014a) prominently argues that false implicatures are lies. 
Meibauer’s argument is that in uttering an utterance with true proposition p and false implicature 
q, the speaker intends for the hearer to derive q and it is, therefore, an “integral part of the total 
signification of the utterance” (Meibauer, 2005: 1380). As such, the utterance is a lie regardless 
                                                          
42 While it is not relevant to the lie ratings discussion here, it is interesting to note that there was a significant 
positive correlation (r = 0.28, p < 0.001) between Age and moral wrongness; as age increased, so did participants’ 
views that lying is morally wrong.  
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of whether the false content is communicated via p or via q. This notion was not supported in the 
results, especially regarding what Meibauer would refer to as PCIs (his theory is couched in the 
Gricean/Levinsonian framework and as such utilizes GCIs and PCIs instead of explicatures and 
implicatures). These were, on average, not judged as lies in the experimental results, even in high 
stakes scenarios and when the judger positively knows that the speaker is intending to deceive. 
Some participants did judge false PCIs to be lies, in accordance with Meibauer’s claims, but 
these constituted the minority. As false GCIs (explicatures) were rated near the middle in most 
instances, this finding does not support Meibauer’s claim that these are lies, nor does it fully 
contradict it. Meibauer also notes that in some instances false PCIs seem closer to a lie than false 
GCIs. He bases this claim on an appeal to Grice’s CP, positing that “what matters is the amount 
of false information in relation to the questioner’s ‘purpose or direction of the talk exchange’” 
and suggesting that PCIs might provide false information to a question more overtly (Meibauer 
2014: 135). This semi-prediction is also not supported in the results, as GCIs (explicatures) were, 
on average, rated higher than PCIs across the board in these experiments. Overall, Meibauer’s 
highly contextualist approach claiming that the speaker is fully committed to (and may be held 
accountable as a liar for) all that is communicated by an utterance, including its implicature(s), 
was not borne out in the results of these experiments. 
 Saul (2012) argues that only that which is said can be considered a lie. To assess this 
claim, it is necessary to define what said means. If Saul’s strict notion of said is adopted, 
including only that which makes the proposition truth-evaluable in context, her account appears 
not to be exactly right, either. While she correctly predicts that false implicatures should not be 
lies (and are instead “merely misleading,” confirmed in the misleading judgments experiment), 
her account also predicts that (most) false explicatures should not be lies as well.  
The explicature type (default enrichment) rated a lie on average would count as Saul’s 
WIS, as the inference to interpret the utterance “I’ve had lunch” as “I’ve had lunch today” is a 
necessary contribution to yield the correct truth conditions in context. Saul’s theory would 
correctly predict that this will be judged as a lie. Her theory of meaning, however, does not count 
and-enrichments, for example, as part of WIS. The WIS of “Jerry and I played golf last 
Saturday” does not include the enrichment that they played golf together; if it did, then her 
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theory would be more akin to Relevance Theory. Her accompanying theory of lying, then, 
predicts that the and-enrichment: coactivities items should not be lies. These utterances were, on 
average across all contexts, in the middle (mean rating = 0.49), and 6 of 9 versions of this 
explicature type were significantly higher than the scale midpoint (rated as a lie).  
While this does not reject Saul’s account, it neither lends it robust support. See Section 
9.3 for accounts of linguistic meaning that can account for the data; Saul’s theory adopting a 
different notion of linguistic meaning may improve its accuracy. Horn’s (2017) account makes 
similar predictions. He classifies lying as asserting what you don’t believe and misleading as 
implicating what you don’t believe; within Horn’s Neo-Gricean framework, his predictions are 
that both intentionally false GCIs and PCIs count as misleading, not lies. Neither Saul’s nor 
Horn’s account is supported in full, but they certainly come much closer to describing participant 
behavior than Meibauer’s does.  
Kisielewska-Krysiuk (2016) offers a stance similar to Saul’s, but from a Relevance-
Theoretic perspective. She agrees that only that which the speaker says explicitly can be 
considered a lie, but within the RT framework this amounts to the level of explicature. This 
theory correctly predicts that false implicatures will not be judged as lies, but it also predicts that 
false explicatures are lies. As with Saul’s account (though in the opposite direction), this notion 
is partially but not robustly supported. Most explicatures were around the midpoint between lies 
and not lies; while some participants agree with Kisielewska-Krysiuk’s claim that false 
explicature utterances are lies, there is certainly not a consensus that this is the case.  
9.3 Theories of Linguistic Meaning 
 This section will relate the results of the experiments to several theories of linguistic 
meaning: Ariel’s Privileged Interactional Interpretation, Jaszczolt’s Default Semantics, Sperber 
& Wilson’s Relevance Theory, Neo-Gricean accounts like those of Levinson and Horn, Bach’s 
minimalist approach, and Michaelson’s Lying Test. The main overall findings of the study that 
will be considered are: that false implicatures were, on average, not considered lies; that false 
explicatures were, on average, in the middle between lies and not-lies; that lie ratings of both 
types exhibited considerable interindividual variation; that situational properties of the 
conversation (e.g., high stakes, courtroom discourse) can influence lie judgments of these items; 
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that different false implicatures exhibited within-category consistency in the lie judgment task; 
and that different false explicatures did not demonstrate this level of consistency.  
It should be noted that only some of these theories (PII, Default Semantics, Relevance 
Theory, Lying Test) attempt to capture psychological reality in pragmatics. They are designed 
with data in mind, built to be flexible enough to apply in various contexts. Others (the Neo-
Griceans’ and Bach’s) are not designed to capture psychological reality. The first group focus on 
audience uptake, especially Relevance Theory, whereas Grice himself was concerned with WIS 
as the central object of study (see Saul [2002)] for a much more eloquent and thoughtful account 
of how Grice’s goals and the Relevance Theorists’ goals differ importantly). The fact that hearer-
oriented theories are better-suited for the data than the speaker and language-oriented theories is 
not meant to be levied as lauding the former and criticizing the latter; rather, this should be 
viewed as the former succeeding at what they set out to achieve without any assumption that this 
pursuit is a better one than the latter’s.  
 In terms of accounting for the entirety of the data of these experiments, Ariel’s Privileged 
Interactional Interpretation theory holds up quite well. Within this theory, there are multiple 
potential levels of meaning that can surface as the privileged interactional interpretation (PII) in a 
given context. With any of the explicature or implicature utterances in this study, there exist two 
relevant potential meanings – the bare meaning (sans explicature or implicature) and the 
enriched meaning (which includes the explicature or implicature). One of these levels is selected 
as the PII, the interpretation of which is taken as binding the speaker. The PII of a given 
utterance can change based on context. This definition of PII also clarifies that there need not be 
one interpretation that is agreed by all to bind the speaker, even in a given context, and 
establishes the possibility that different interlocutors or observers may take different PIIs from 
the same interaction. This important inclusion goes a long way in explaining inter-participant 
variability in lie judgments. This reflects the fact that the PII is a theory aimed at uncovering 
psychological reality as opposed to a linguistic analysis of meaning itself. 
Taking this theory back to defining lying, it is not the bare linguistic meaning, 
explicature, or implicature that is unilaterally taken as binding the speaker in a lie judgment, but 
rather whatever is selected by an individual as the PII in a given scenario that binds the speaker. 
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Some contexts (like courtroom testimony) invite the selection of the bare level of meaning, 
whereas others (like a high stakes scenario) invite the selection of the enriched level. Interacting 
with that contextual variation is individual variation. It may be the case that some people tend to 
select the enriched level as the PII in lie judgments (Meibauer speaks for these) and others tend 
to select the bare level (Saul and Horn speak for these). The experimental design of this study 
cannot speak to individuals’ tendencies and consistency across multiple judgments,43 but in these 
experiments the ratings to false ex/implicatures exhibited much more variance in the population 
than ratings to straightforward lies and truths.  
While the PII theory can account for this interindividual variation, its design as a 
descriptive theory means it does not make explicit predictions about who will select which level 
in which contexts. Ariel (2002b) notes that people differ in how literal-minded they are (see, too, 
more recent work on so-called “logical” and “pragmatic” responders (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; 
Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; Tanner, Goldshtein, & Weissman, 2018)), but 
understanding what underlies these individual differences in interpretations and processing is a 
pursuit still underway. Ariel (2002b) also clarifies that people are “guided by their own interests” 
(1037) in selecting a PII in any given context, meaning that any individual’s agenda can affect 
their pragmatic inferencing and uptake of an utterance (see e.g., Thomas, 1995: 60–61; Chapter 5 
of this thesis). The PII theory does well to establish the ground on which contextual and 
interindividual variation can occur and will continue to be bolstered in its predictive capabilities 
as more research on that variation clarifies the specifics.  
 The PII theory also predicts a hierarchy of the levels of meaning in terms of their 
likelihood of being included in the PII. The hierarchy is, from strongest to weakest: bare 
linguistic meaning > explicature > implicature. This hierarchy was confirmed in all experiments 
of this study, regardless of both the contextual manipulation of the items and the format of the 
judgment (sliding scale vs. binary). This aligns with theoretical accounts (Ariel, 2016) and 
experimental evidence (Sternau et al., 2015) of such a hierarchy in terms of meaning strength, 
                                                          
43 With the methodological approach utilized in the present study, this angle cannot be addressed statistically. Future 
work may focus on interindividual variation in lie judgments and what drives it.  
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and is consistent with hierarchies from the related notion of speaker commitment (Moeschler, 
2013).  
The PII framework also does not necessarily predict consistency among explicatures, 
instead hypothesizing that stratification may exist within the category. The framework itself does 
not predict the order of explicature types on theoretical grounds, but previous work on 
explicatures within the framework (Sternau et al., 2017) has found a hierarchy. While that 
experiment used a deniability task (can the speaker deny meaning x?) and this study used lie 
judgments, the underlying notion of the strength of different types of linguistic meaning should 
factor into both tasks, as both can be seen as measuring speaker commitment. As such, it is 
expected that the inter-explicature differences discovered may be similar in the two. The 
explicature types used in that study and this are not completely overlapping, so a full comparison 
is not possible. It is worth noting, however, that that study did not find significant differences (in 
deniability) between default enrichments and and-enrichments, whereas the present study did. 
Default enrichment explicatures were routinely judged as lies, demonstrating greater strength 
than all other explicatures tested in this study. And-enrichments demonstrated differences in this 
study; the two types tested – coactivities and temporal enrichment – were significantly different, 
and both got significantly lower lie ratings than the default enrichment items. While these two 
sets of results do demonstrate differences, the within-explicature hierarchy is yet understudied 
and more work should be dedicated to better understanding such a hierarchy and its theoretical 
underpinnings (see Section 9.5.2). 
Inconsistency within explicatures is also predicted by those who denounce the very 
concept of explicature, chiefly Borg. Borg (2016) argues against the notion of explicature on the 
basis that there are several definitions of the concept and, as a result, no consistency in what 
“explicature” actually means. She refers to the canonical definition of explicature (from Sperber 
& Wilson, Carston) as “incomplete and … incapable … of differentiating explicitly 
communicated versus merely implied content” (Borg, 2016: 353), and other definitions from the 
literature as either unsuitable or theoretically unhelpful. She concludes, however, by noting that 
if the concept of explicature can serve a purpose anywhere, “it is within the realm of socio-
linguistics, as part of our attempt to understand the normative, legislative notion of what a 
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speaker is actually committed to by her utterance” (ibid.). That theories including explicature as 
a level of meaning are well-suited to explain intuition-based data is predicted by even their 
detractors.  
 The other leading multiplist theory, Jaszczolt’s Default Semantics, can account for some 
but not all of the primary findings in this study. Like the PII framework, Default Semantics is 
built around the possibility that contextual variation can lead to variable levels of meaning 
surfacing as the “primary meaning” in a given context. This meaning is developed pragmatically, 
informed by five sources of information: world knowledge, word meaning and sentence 
structure, situation of discourse, properties of the human inferential system, and stereotypes and 
presumptions about society and culture. All five of these sources can be located within the 
experiments of the present study and can be utilized to explain contextual differences in lie 
ratings: for example, stereotypes and presumptions about society influence the formulation of a 
primary meaning in the bias experiment, and situation of discourse influences the formulation in 
the genre experiment. This flexibility allows contextual variation in comparing meaning in lie 
judgments to meaning in daily, non-lie judgment interactions, and in comparing lie judgments 
across different contexts.  
 Default Semantics may struggle, however, with its applicability to the interindividual 
variation exhibited in this study. Default Semantics aims to “model utterance meaning as 
intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee” (Jaszczolt, 2012: 2) As 
evidenced in these and other experiments, especially regarding the category of explicature, 
people vary greatly in experiments targeting linguistic meaning. It is unclear how a theory based 
on the Model Speaker and Addressee can account for cases in which interindividual variation in 
interpretation is rampant. By declaring that such a thing as the Model Speaker exists, this theory 
seems to discard interindividual differences in interpretation. While there may exist a theoretical 
model to formulate the Model meaning of a given utterance, considering the sources of 
information, if this only matches how a subset of people interpret the utterance, the utility of 
such a calculation may be called in to question.  
 Another theory that fares rather well with respect to these results is Relevance Theory. 
Relevance Theory argues that in most cases, there is no need for a meaning below the level of 
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explicature. In this study, false explicature utterances were rated at the midpoint between lies and 
not lies and were judged as lies 46.4% of the time in the binary task. By these figures, around 
half of the participants are judging a level of utterance meaning more minimal than the 
explicature, which may appear to challenge the theory. There may, however, be a way to 
reconcile these results within the framework. In the Relevance-Theoretic tradition, the process of 
identifying what is communicated by a given utterance is the result of pragmatic work, guided by 
what is optimally relevant in that context. Sperber & Wilson’s definition of optimal relevance is 
as follows: 
(9-4)  An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience iff:  
a. It is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s processing effort 
b. It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator’s abilities and preferences. 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) 
If we interpret the “audience” to mean whoever is doing the interpretation of the 
utterance and not restrict it to just the addressee, Relevance Theory may be able to explain the 
present results. When the speaker’s audience is indeed the addressee, the speaker intends for the 
explicated meaning to be optimally relevant to the addressee; this is how deception can be 
successful (Kisielewska-Krysiuk, 2017). The audience in the case of the lie judgments collected 
in these experiments, however, is the third-party observer making the lie judgment. While the 
hearer’s goal in interpretation is to determine what the speaker means (or, per epistemic 
vigilance, what is true based on what the speaker means), the judger’s goal is to determine 
whether the utterance is a lie – this judgment occurring in an experiment asking explicitly about 
lying is already a context that primes participants to adopt a more scrutinous manner of 
interpretation than they otherwise would. This judger also has privileged access to the reality of 
the situation, access that the real-life addressee would not have. Having a different interpretive 
goal and knowing this additional information causes the judger to consider a different, yet still 
optimally relevant, meaning than the addressee would. This argument hinges upon a contentious 
point – that explicatures are cancelable. While some (notably Capone (2009, 2013) and Burton-
Roberts (2010, 2013)) argue vehemently that explicatures are not cancelable, the leading 
relevance theorists themselves (e.g., Carston, 2010) and others (e.g., Walczak, 2016) concur that 
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they are. Under Carston’s view then, the third-party audience may determine that the explicature 
can be canceled or post-calculation discarded, resulting in the more minimal meaning being that 
of optimal relevance.44 A different third-party observer may not discard the explicature and, in 
turn, judge the utterance as a lie. Those who consider explicatures non-cancelable would need to 
provide a different explanation for the half of participants that did not consider false explicature 
utterances to be lies.  
It is worth pointing out that Carston (e.g., 2002, 2009, 2012) does not see a discourse role 
for the level of bare linguistic meaning. That half of participants viewed utterances with false 
explicatures to be lies seems to counter this claim. I have tried to sketch out a way in which the 
findings of this study are consistent with Relevance Theory that is my own interpretation and 
does not come from those theorists themselves. It remains to be seen how someone like Carston, 
who has claimed not to see the need for the level of bare linguistic meaning in a theory of 
psychologically real pragmatics, would interpret the results of the present experiments.   
 The Neo-Gricean approach upholds a meaningful theoretical distinction between 
generalized and particularized conversational implicatures; upholding this notion is supported in 
the results. The explicatures used in this study would count as GCIs in the Neo-Gricean (and 
indeed the original Gricean) tradition and could be calculated via e.g., Horn’s Q & R principles 
or Levinson’s Q-, I-, and M-heuristics; the implicatures used in this study would count as PCIs in 
these frameworks. The results of the experiments in this study do support a distinction between 
the two categories. While the present study was analyzed in the PII framework, which adopts the 
Relevance Theory notion of explicature, the Neo-Gricean category differentiation works as well. 
Levinson refers to GCIs as defaults; that is, they are always present unless there are special 
circumstances. For example, that “Jerry and I played golf last Saturday” means Jerry and the 
speaker played together is a GCI. For someone to judge this utterance to be a lie if the two 
actually played separately, it necessitates their drawing the inference (without the inference, the 
utterance is true). For someone to judge this utterance as not a lie, they would disregard the 
                                                          
44 Epistemic vigilance, within Relevance Theory, provides motivation for continued interpretation after the initial 
reading; see Section 9.4 for more on this notion. 
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implicated portion and judge instead the minimal content.45 These theories also predict that PCIs 
are fully cancelable (Grice, 1975/1989), consistent (though not equivalent) with their not being 
rated as lies, on average. This theory includes no mechanism by which there should be 
interindividual variation in whether the GCI is drawn or not – it is purported to be dependent on 
the context itself (while the interlocutors are certainly part of a context, the theory does not 
specify interindividual variation as a part of the context that influences inferencing). If the 
framework included a means by which interindividual variation could affect the default/undrawn 
status of GCIs in addition to contextual variation, it could account for these data.  
 Bach’s conception of linguistic meaning is a rather minimalistic one, and his WIS may 
fail to be fully propositional. In this account, it may be difficult for lying to be restricted to WIS, 
as WIS may often not be truth-evaluable. Bach proposes the notion of impliciture, which 
includes expansion and completion. The explicatures in this study (excepting lexical ambiguity 
resolution) are implicitures to Bach; lexical ambiguity resolution is said to be at the level of WIS. 
That the lexical ambiguity resolution false explicature was seen as less of a lie than the classic 
Bachian expansion impliciture/explicature (“I’ve eaten lunch [today]”) may be considered 
evidence against the exact typologies included in Bach’s taxonomy,46 though it could be 
countered that this theory attempts no effort at explaining interpretation and interpretation 
strengths that may be relevant in lie judgments. 
 Michaelson (2016) proposes the “Lying Test,” which claims that lie judgments should be 
the primary source of data in determining semantic content. Summarized in his own words: 
“what the Lying Test proposes is that if a speaker isn’t lying in uttering P, despite both believing 
p to be false and intending to deceive the listener about p, then p cannot be part of the semantic 
content of P” (482). Michaelson argues that the Lying Test is preferable to a truth value (T/F) 
judgment task or Grice’s cancelability task because “judgments on lying appear to be both 
                                                          
45 Another possible explanation would be that people do not draw the inference at all, but in the context of a lie 
judgment experiment where people are uniquely focused on meaning, this does not seem likely to be the case.  
46 The utterances tested were all minimal propositions to Bach, as opposed to propositional radicals, so the 
differences between the two cannot be observed. The minimal propositions, however, demonstrated differences in 
lie judgments, weakly suggesting that an utterance-type difference between minimal propositions and propositional 
radicals may not draw the proper lines with respect to lying as well. Further work could follow up on this possibility 
in a more systematic way, again with the caveat that Bach’s account need not relate directly to the psychological 
reality of utterance interpretation.  
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relatively stable and uniform in a variety of cases where other potentially semantically-relevant 
judgments are neither” (471). As I have demonstrated throughout this entire thesis, Michaelson is 
sorely mistaken on this point. Lie judgments are just as unstable and ununiform as the other 
types of judgments, perhaps even more so. Lie judgments are subject to contextual variation and 
extremely subject to interindividual variation; cases in which individuals do not vary on lie 
judgments are restricted to straightforward truths and lies, and any case involving a false 
ex/implicature is essentially guaranteed to elicit a wide range of judgments.  
 That is not to say Michaelson’s theory should be discarded entirely; there is a sense in 
which it may be accurate. If a flexible theory of meaning is utilized, then Michaelson’s Lying 
Test is true (though perhaps not profound). It is a working assumption of this thesis that what is 
selected as the PII by a certain individual in a given context is what that person judges as a lie 
because the PII is defined as the meaning that the speaker is committed to. If a person rates an 
utterance with a false explicature as a lie, that person has selected the explicated meaning as the 
PII; if a person rates that utterance as not a lie, that person has selected the bare, minimal 
meaning as the PII. Michaelson’s Lying Test does describe this process, but note that it can only 
work within a flexible theory of meaning like PII. If the theory of meaning does not allow for 
interindividual variation, this Lying Test will fail, as it cannot account for when two people 
disagree on a lie judgment. Based on the results of this study, I advocate that the Lying Test 
cannot be used as a tool for determining semantic content of an utterance unless flexibility is 
introduced; it can be used as a tool for determining what meaning one individual judger holds a 
specific speaker accountable for in producing an utterance in that specific context. 
9.4 Epistemic Vigilance 
 The notion of epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010) refers to the sort of cognitive 
processes that help us determine what to believe from interlocutors in communication. The risk 
of being deceived is the very genesis of epistemic vigilance; we recognize that we cannot go 
through life believing everything that everyone ever tells us in interactions, so we develop 
strategies of vigilance to help us determine what (and what not) to believe.  
The three audience strategies of communication from Relevance Theory (Sperber, 1994; 
Wilson & Sperber, 2012) are relevant in this discussion – naïve optimism, cautious optimism, 
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and sophisticated understanding. The naïve audience trusts that the speaker is neither mistaken 
nor deceptive and will accept the first-accessed relevant interpretation, the cautious audience 
recognizes that the speaker may be mistaken in what they communicate; and the sophisticated 
audience recognizes the possibility that the speaker may be mistaken or deceptive. This last 
audience will employ the most epistemic vigilance. Mazzarella (2015) and Kisielewska-Krysiuk 
(2017) argue that these strategies influence the interactions between a hopeful liar/misleader and 
their audience. If audiences adopt the sophisticated interpretation strategy, they will recognize 
when utterances may have misleading implicatures. For the liar/misleader, deceiving the naïve or 
cautious audience is easy; deceiving the sophisticated audience is difficult. Mascaro, Morin, & 
Sperber (2017) agree, arguing that children are especially gullible, not because of an inability to 
recognize falsity and represent false beliefs but rather because of an over-adoption of the naïve 
strategy; children struggle to recognize situations in which a speaker may be deceiving them.  
Padilla Cruz (2012) advances the theoretical connection between interpretive strategy and 
utterance processing. He notes that when a shift to a more vigilant strategy is triggered, an 
audience will also shift to an accompanying more complex processing strategy. Whereas the 
naïve audience will comfortably land on the first-accessed, easiest, optimally relevant 
interpretation, the sophisticated audience will “use his metarepresentational abilities in order to 
face utterances wherewith his interlocutor only tries to communicate an interpretation that seems 
to be relevant but is not the actually intended one. Consequently, a sophisticated hearer does not 
stop his processing at the first interpretation that he finds optimally relevant, or at the 
interpretation that he considers the speaker might have expected to appear optimally relevant … 
Epistemic vigilance would be able to realise the existence of alternative parsings, 
disambiguation, reference assignment, conceptual adjustment, implicated premises or mental 
frames conducive to the interpretation that the speaker attempts to prevent the hearer from 
reaching.” (Padilla Cruz, 2012: 375). This more fully describes how epistemic vigilance can 
influence interpretations.  
In a speaker-focused account of epistemic vigilance, Ransom et al. (2017) attempt to 
computationally model how a speaker will choose between telling the truth, misleading 
(deceiving via false implicature, saying something technically true but implying something 
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false), being underinformative (avoiding the question, violating the Gricean maxim of Relation), 
and lying, importantly noting the effects of situational context on this type of choice.47 They note 
that social factors, especially the speaker-hearer relationship, affect this decision, writing: “by 
virtue of the inferential boost accorded to cooperative speakers, the receiver may be led to a false 
conclusion, terminating the search for further information. Yet if suspicion is already raised, the 
receiver is unlikely to fall for the false implicature, which relies on her assumption of 
cooperation, and may use the information to get closer to the truth” (Ransom et al., 2017: 993). 
In a situation in which the speaker wishes to deceive the hearer, the speaker will take into 
account how likely they think the hearer is to be trusting of them; this suggests epistemic 
vigilance (or some sort of metapragmatic awareness) is important for both speaker and hearer in 
deceptive situations. This requires that speakers be aware of potential biases the hearers may 
have towards them; recognizing which interpretive strategy a hearer is likely to adopt (naïve, 
cautious, or sophisticated) will inform the speaker’s own choice of deceptive strategy.  
It should be noted here that not every scholar of lying is on board with the idea of 
epistemic vigilance. Michaelson (2019)48 argues that epistemic vigilance is a flawed notion 
because the four processes that Sperber et al. (2010) list as contributing to our vigilance 
assessments (plausibility of the proposition itself, knowledge of the speaker’s (un)reliability 
based on prior experience, social assessments of the speaker’s (un)reliability), and nonverbal 
cues) presuppose other sources of background information, rendering them non-independent. 
Michaelson claims it is unlikely that we have genuine access to these necessary pieces of 
background information. He concludes that “we should consider rejecting the thought that 
listeners must live up to a certain epistemic standard in order to acquire knowledge via 
testimony. Knowledge acquired via testimony will count as non-accidental … not because of the 
proper function of some epistemic capacity of the listener, but because it is acquired on the basis 
of the sincere testimony of a knower” (Michaelson, 2019: 13). He offers no counter-proposal for 
how audiences may go about determining what is or is not sincere in testimony.  
                                                          
47 See, too, Sakamoto et al. (2013) for questionnaire data about the types of cost/benefit analyses that people may 
conduct when deciding whether to deceive or tell the truth.  
48 While this paper has “lying” in the title and appears in The Oxford Handbook of Lying, it should be noted that 
Michaelson focuses much more on the relationship between epistemology and testimony in the paper and does not 
really relate these notions back to lying.  
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At this point I will return to the important point that epistemic vigilance is not as relevant 
in the lie judgment experiments. Epistemic vigilance is employed by an audience trying to 
determine what to believe as true; the judger in these experiments already knows what is true. 
Their task is more to determine speaker commitment and match it to the known facts of the 
situation. While epistemic vigilance in terms of interpretation strategy is not relevant in these 
experiments, I will conclude this portion of the dissertation by hinting towards a way in which 
real-life deception and deception detection can be included in a conceptual umbrella that 
includes lie judgments as well.    
Building on his own prior theoretical work on language evolution, Dor (2017) argues that 
enhancing human capabilities for deception was a major propeller in the evolution of language, 
claiming that “lying and language came to be entangled in a never-ending co-evolutionary 
spiral” (44). Dor sketches the conceptual space of the “lying game” in interpersonal 
relationships: 
 
Figure 9-5 – “Lying relationships between variably-gifted liars and lie-detectors” (figure and 
caption reproduced from Dor [2017: 54]) 
In Figure 9-5, the y-axis represents Person 1’s capacity for lying and the x-axis Person 2’s 
capacity for lie-detection. The three conceptual spaces are A, in which the liar’s skill outranks 
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the lie detector’s and Person 1 can deceive Person 2 at will, C, in which the lie detector’s skill 
outranks the liar’s and Person 1 cannot effectively deceive Person 2, and B, in which “the 
struggle between equally-talented liars and lie detectors would gradually develop into a full-
fledged arms race. The liars would have to work harder, sophisticate their techniques, control 
themselves better, and develop new linguistic tools for manipulation. Lie detectors would have to 
develop into better listeners at all the relevant levels” (Dor, 2017: 54). Dor frames this discussion 
in terms of lying, but shifting the notion to deception, whether it be via lying or misleading, adds 
another level of depth to this notion. Here, the co-evolutionary spiral continues, with the need to 
deceive leading to improvements in both deceptive techniques and epistemic vigilance. It could 
be argued by extension that the need to deceive played a role in shaping our entire 
communicative system, allowing speakers to improve their deception skill (upward movement on 
the y-axis) by manipulating their deceptive language to be technically true and communicate the 
falsehood only indirectly. Reboul (2017) similarly claims implicit communication “has emerged 
in order to facilitate manipulation and argumentation, by allowing the speakers to hide their 
intentions, avoid epistemic vigilance, and bypass the egocentric bias. Similarly, Mazzarella et al. 
(2018) describe what could be seen as an evolutionary consequence of this development: they 
argue that speakers are aware of exactly what level of linguistic meaning they are committing to 
with an utterance in context and will manipulate this distinction strategically in order to manage 
their reputation and face. 
Putting this thread all together: implicit communication (i.e., ex/implicature) may have 
evolved together within language at large as a way to allow speakers to effectively deceive 
hearers, with epistemic vigilance evolving alongside it as a counter-mechanism to effectively 
detect deceivers. In that sense, that a meaning strength and speaker commitment hierarchy is 
represented in lie judgments (i.e., that which is more explicit is more of a lie) is not a pleasant 
coincidence but rather testimony of this evolutionary development. 
9.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
 Though this dissertation has made progress in the directions of understanding folk 
conceptions of lying and contextual variation therein, types of linguistic meaning, and speaker 
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commitment, there are related questions yet unanswered. This section will quickly outline a few 
of the limitations of this project as well as outline some potential future directions.  
A limitation of scope, only one item of each explicature type was tested in each 
contextual manipulation. As different types of explicatures were demonstrated to reflect different 
levels of speaker commitment/linguistic strength, it may be the case that these differentiations 
are even more finely tuned than that. The same disambiguation item (“doctor” – of medicine vs. 
philosophy) was used throughout the experiments; it may be the case, however, that ambiguous 
lexical items do not all behave the same and may be subject to variation among properties like 
the relative salience49 (Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006) or frequency of the primary and 
alternative meanings. The same thought applies to the and-enrichment types as well. For 
coactivities, for example, it may be the case that how likely the activity is to be done jointly50 can 
affect the rate and strength of inference drawing (and, in turn, lie judgments). An expansion of 
items-per-explicature type would provide more robust conclusions about the specifics of the 
explicature hierarchy and, perhaps, specific semantic/pragmatic properties that contribute to the 
observed within-category variation. Such an investigation, too, could inform discussions about 
the category makeup itself. Recent work in this direction has begun robustly exploring the notion 
of scalar diversity – the notion that not all scalar adjective inferences behave the same (e.g., 
Terkourafi et al., 2020; Van Tiel et al., 2016) and are even susceptible to compositional semantic 
differences as well (McNally, 2017). The same sort of work could be directed at studying 
“explicature diversity” as a whole in order to better understand theoretical notions underlying the 
variation.  
Another limitation is more specific to the experiment that manipulated the situational 
stakes surrounding the critical utterance. It should be noted that in this experiment, what was 
manipulated was the stakes of the entire situation, not necessarily the stakes or consequences that 
                                                          
49 Giora (e.g., 1997, 1999) proposes the Graded Salience Hypothesis of linguistic processing, which addresses the 
notion of salience specifically in the processing of figurative and nonliteral language. As such, it is tangentially but 
not immediately relevant here, but could certainly be explored more in either a processing-focused account of lie 
judgments or an investigation of lie judgments in cases of figurative and nonliteral language. 
50 Based on speculation alone, it may be the case that basketball, for example, a team sport, may cause different 
inferencing than swimming, a solo sport, or chess, a game only between two. The lie ratings for similar examples of 
“Jerry and I played basketball last Saturday” may differ from “Jerry and I went swimming last Saturday” or “Jerry 
and I played chess last Saturday” – the extent to which the lexical semantics affect the rate and strength of inference 
are yet understudied.  
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develop directly from the critical utterance itself. While the stakes of the situation overall may 
affect the uptake of the utterance as a lie or not, it may, too, be the case that the consequences of 
that utterance itself have an effect on uptake. The interaction between utterance and context is 
important – if the utterance is directly relevant to the consequences of the scenario, that utterance 
itself may have higher stakes, whereas an utterance that is less directly relevant to the 
consequences of a scenario may itself have lower stakes. That only the scenario-level stakes 
were manipulated between the two conditions and not the consequences of the utterances should 
be considered a limitation of this experiment, and future work should investigate the latter as 
well to develop a richer understanding of the extent to which perceived consequences matter in 
lie judgments.  
Another potential limitation is the interrelatedness of the contextual manipulations. It 
may be the case that, for example, the manipulations of discourse genre also include differences 
in stakes – it is reasonable to assume that a political speech and a court trial naturally involve 
higher stakes than a regular everyday conversation between friends. This precise example is not 
an immediate concern of the present study, since the likely-higher-stakes courtroom encounters 
led to lower lie ratings and the high stakes condition from the stakes experiment led to higher 
ratings. Stimuli were written to vary primarily in one aspect of context; it may well be the case 
that several secondary factors vary as well. Nonetheless, that aspects of context are intertwined 
may still be a consequence of the experimental program; such is a reality of prioritizing 
naturalness in stimuli in a laboratory/experimental setting.  
 I have argued, especially in the Stakes and Intent experiments, that ethical considerations 
were highly intertwined with lie ratings. High stakes scenarios and a high intent to deceive led to 
higher lie ratings on the exact same utterances delivered in low stakes scenarios or with low 
intent, and this may be due to ethical considerations that participants factor into making a lie 
judgment despite the fact that this scale does not explicitly target moral judgments. An 
interesting follow-up project would be to investigate the moral implications of the lying vs. 
misleading distinction. Scholars are divided (see Section 8.1.1) over whether misleading is 
morally better/equal/worse than lying; folk intuitions could provide some clarity to that debate. 
In addition, a closer look at ethical considerations of straightforward lies versus false 
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ex/implicatures (i.e., is it any morally worse to falsely explicate than falsely implicate?) could 
further clarify the notion of speaker commitment and its relationship with neighboring concepts.  
 This study explored four dimensions of contextual variation, based on discourse genre, 
speaker-related biases, speaker’s intent to deceive, and the stakes of the scenario. This is, of 
course, not an exhaustive list. There are many other dimensions that might affect lie judgments 
and PII selections in similar ways. Further research could explore these potential dimensions.  
Perhaps the most important of these factors is culture. Sweetser (1987) argues that all 
forms of verbal communication – lying included – are subject to culture-specific social 
guidelines. She holds up Grice’s notion of cooperativeness as an overarching concept, but notes 
that this will manifest itself differently in different cultures. This may play out in divergent lie 
judgments in different cultures, which may place varying value on information, politeness, and 
the balance between the two. Non-experimental empirical observations report culture-specific 
notions of lying and truthfulness that vary from the classic Western conception (e.g., Gilsenan, 
1976; Harris, 1996), and experimental investigations (e.g., Danziger, 2010; Hardin, 2010) have 
uncovered cross-cultural differences as well. Such an investigation would be a massive endeavor, 
as there may be cross-cultural and cross-linguistic differences in the considerations of lying,51 in 
the construals and relative strengths of different types of meaning, or both.  
 Perhaps the follow-up angle with the most interesting implications for human nature at 
large is the question of interindividual variation. Variation in lie judgments was observed to be 
robust in these experiments, especially for explicatures. Around half of participants considered 
false explicatures to be lies and half considered false explicatures to not be lies. While a majority 
of participants judged false implicatures to not be lies, there was still a non-trivial minority of 
participants that did judge false implicatures to be lies. I have argued that this interindividual 
variation can be explained by the selection of different PIIs in context – Person A considers the 
speaker to be committed to the entire utterance communicated and thus judges the utterance with 
a false implicature as a lie while Person B considers the speaker to be committed to only that 
which was literally said and thus judges the utterance with a false implicature as not a lie. But 
                                                          
51 Both of the aforementioned experimental studies found differences between the lie criteria ordering found by 
Coleman & Kay’s (1981) study on American participants and that of theirs on other populations 
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depending on our explanatory goals, this framework offers a power more descriptive than 
explanatory. A deeper question is to wonder what makes Person A select the enriched level and 
Person B select the minimal level. One of several possible explanations is that Person A focuses 
more on ethical considerations in the lie judgment, leading them to pinpoint moral wrongdoing; 
Person B focuses more on definitional considerations, leading them to pinpoint the technical 
sense of saying. Even so, such an explanation begs the same question: What is it that makes 
Person A focus on the ethical and Person B on the definitional? Either a rigorous qualitative 
(e.g., interview-based) or a rigorous experimental (e.g., with fMRI) approach could make 
headway in addressing this deeper question.  
 Among the most attractive trends in pragmatics is probabilistic pragmatics (e.g., Franke 
& Jäger, 2016; Goodman & Frank, 2016). These approaches aim to build computational models 
to model human pragmatic processing and account for all the information that goes into 
interpreting meaning in context. Built on principles from game theory and Bayesian probability, 
these theories move importantly towards the nuance of probabilistic likelihoods instead of 
relying on the application of rules. There could be significant overlap between probabilistic 
approaches in the direction of determining speaker commitment and lie judgments; a 
computational model that can predict likelihoods of utterance meaning may, with additional 









10  Conclusions 
This thesis set out to address a number of questions related to the relationship between lie 
judgments and linguistic meaning. This brief conclusion will summarize its contributions.  
While I have argued that a flexible theory like Ariel’s PII is well-suited to account for lie 
judgment data, it does so by way of description, not prediction. This theory offers a way to 
explain how lie judgments of utterances vary between contexts and between individuals, but it 
does not explain why these two dimensions of variation occur in the ways that they do. This 
study has offered evidence of the types of contexts that make people more or less likely to select 
minimal vs. enriched meanings as the PII in lie judgments.  
Two specific contexts were found to strongly influence lie judgments. In line with 
observations by e.g., Horn (2017), the courtroom context made participants significantly more 
likely to select the minimal linguistic meaning as the PII. Here, the legal context makes 
participants stricter in terms of what they hold the speaker accountable for, and they adopt a 
relatively unnatural notion of speaker commitment that would likely be inefficient in non-
courtroom scenarios. In the opposite direction, a high- stakes scenario makes participants more 
likely to select an enriched meaning as the PII; in these scenarios, when consequences are tall 
and the difference between what is communicated implicitly and what is communicated 
minimally is of importance, people are more likely to hold the speaker accountable for all that 
they have communicated. While these two had the strongest effects, other contexts had 
significant influences on judgments as well. Holding negative biases towards the speaker makes 
judgers more likely to select an enriched meaning as the PII; this represents a form of 
confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) whereby people are likely to search for interpretations that 
align with their preconceived notions and expectations. Lastly, knowing explicitly that the 
speaker is intending to deceive the hearer makes judgers more likely to hold that speaker 
accountable for an enriched meaning; this interpretation aligns with their understanding of the 
speaker’s goals. Continued exploration of contextual variation will bolster the theory and 
eventually lead to grounds on which concrete predictions (likely probabilistic in nature) can be 
made about utterance interpretations in context.  
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The data collected in the experiments of this study also contribute to the discussion of 
what level of linguistic meaning speakers are held accountable for in lie judgments. Considering 
the contextual and interindividual variation rampant in these judgments, it is difficult to 
generalize a tidy answer to this question. On average, false implicatures were not considered lies, 
a finding that does not support Meibauer’s (2005, 2011, 2014a) claim that false implicatures are 
lies and instead supports e.g., Horn’s (2017) and Saul’s (2012) claims that false implicatures are 
not lies. However, some participants did rate false implicature utterances to be lies; Meibauer’s 
view is still represented in the population, but it is the minority opinion. On average, explicatures 
were rated almost exactly in the middle of the scale between lie and not a lie. This average 
represents people who rated them as lies, people who rated them as not lies, and people who 
rated them in the middle – explicature items demonstrated a great amount of interindividual 
variation. Explicatures were also the group affected most strongly by contextual variation. It is 
not the case, as some have optimistically predicted (e.g., Kisielewska-Krysiuk, 2016) that the 
lying-misleading distinction sits precisely at the explicature-implicature distinction, with the 
former lies and the latter not. Instead, the category of explicatures seems to be the battleground 
for interindividual and contextual variation, featuring the most disagreement and widest 
variance.  
The experiment on lying and misleading judgments has contributed to the understanding 
of the relationship between those two terms, a relationship to this point empirically under-
examined. Findings suggested that false ex/implicatures are typically considered misleading; 
since false implicatures were not, on average, considered lies, this constitutes evidence 
supporting Saul’s claim that they are “merely misleading.” False explicatures again landed in the 
middle for lie judgments but were reliably considered misleading. Misleading judgments were 
reliably faster than lie judgments, supporting Stokke’s (2016) claim that misleading is a parent 
category that contains lying as a sub-type. The concept of lying is more complex than 
misleading, and slower response times reflect increased processing load of lie categorizations 
compared to misleading categorizations.  
These experiments also contribute to the burgeoning literature on ex/implicature types. 
The category of implicature demonstrated consistency among its members in and across all 
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experiments of this study; different explicature types, on the other hand, were judged differently. 
Default enrichment explicatures were reliably taken as the strongest explicature in terms of 
speaker accountability, and-enrichment: temporal resolution as the weakest, and other 
explicature types were intermixed in the middle. This is consistent with findings from Doran et 
al. (2012) and Sternau et al. (2015) that have also found inconsistency among these types of 
linguistic expressions, which altogether stresses the importance of lexical and syntactic 
information in inference drawing.  
The hierarchy of linguistic strength goes hand in hand with the notion of epistemic 
vigilance, the mechanisms we employ in an effort to discern what to believe as true from a 
speaker. The relationship between lie judgments and the hierarchy of linguistic meaning strength 
is taken as evidence in support of claims in the realm of language evolution that implicit meaning 
evolved over time alongside epistemic vigilance (Dor, 2017; Reboul, 2017b); deception 
detection and indirect communication are counterparts that have evolved together and because of 
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Appendix A – Materials 
 This section lists the full stimuli lists for all four experiments. All contexts are provided 
for all expressions. Control stimuli are used as well; some control contexts were used as both 
straightforward truths and straightforward lies by altering the utterance.  
A1 – Chapter 4 – Genre 
Explicatures 
and-enrichment: coactivities 
POLITICAL: There are rumors that the governor of a state has had a major argument and falling 
out with his childhood best friend, Jerry, and the two are no longer on speaking terms. Indeed, 
they haven’t spoken in over a week. The two typically golf together every Saturday. Last 
Saturday, they each went to play golf, but they played separately, at different courses. Local 
reporters, curious about the recent rumors, ask the governor about his relationship with his friend 
at an official press conference.  
 
The governor responds: "Jerry and I played golf last Saturday" 
 
COURTROOM: Jerry is on trial in court for stealing. The prosecution calls in Mark, who is 
Jerry’s friend since childhood, as a witness for questioning. Mark and Jerry typically golf 
together every Saturday, but the two recently had an argument and haven’t spoken or seen each 
other in a couple of weeks. Last Saturday, they each went to play golf, but they went separately 
and played at different courses. 
 
While under oath, Mark says: "Jerry and I played golf last Saturday" 
 
CASUAL: Jerry, Mark, and Tom have been friends since childhood. Mark and Jerry both live in 
Boston, and they typically play golf together every Saturday. Recently, they had an argument 
and haven’t spoken or seen each other in a couple of weeks. This past Saturday, they each went 
to play golf, but they went separately and didn’t play together. Mark goes to visit Tom in 
Baltimore, and the two are catching up.  
Mark tells Tom: “Jerry and I played golf last Saturday 
and-enrichment: temporal resolution 
POLITICAL: During a debate between three candidates for a US Senate race primary, the 
candidates are asked about their personal lives. Candidate McCaffrey gave birth to her first child 
last February and then got married to a different man (not the baby’s father) in July.  
 




COURTROOM: Olivia’s business partner is on trial for tax evasion. The prosecution calls in 
Olivia as a witness in the hopes she may know about the defendant’s actions. In the past year, 
Olivia gave birth to her first child in February and then got married to a different man (not the 
baby’s father) in October. While under oath as a witness, Olivia discusses her personal life: 
 
Olivia says: “Last year, I got married and had a baby”  
CASUAL: This past year, Olivia gave birth to her first child in February and then got married to 
a different man (not the baby’s father) in October. Olivia is catching up with her old friend 
Cindy, who she hasn’t seen in many years. 
Olivia says: “Last year, I got married and had a baby” 
default enrichment 
POLITICAL: A candidate running for governor was elected as governor 12 years ago, served for 
4 years, and decided to run again this year. On election day, she gets a call from the state 
officials telling her the results of the election: she has lost. The press has not been made aware of 
the results yet and they do not know who has won the election. The candidate steps up to the 
stage at her election night event and speaks to the press in attendance.  
The candidate says: “I’ve been elected governor” 
COURTROOM: James is on trial for several suspected mafia-related crimes. Sandra was present 
during a robbery allegedly orchestrated by James, so she is called in as a witness. As it turns out, 
James and Sandra went to high school together 20 years ago, and Sandra remembers an occasion 
when James threatened to get her in trouble in school. They haven’t talked since high school. 
The judge, knowing James' potential mafia ties, is concerned about witness intimidation. The 
judge questions Sandra, while she is under oath on the witness stand, to make sure she will be 
telling the truth about her observation of the robbery without fear of retribution.  
Sandra says: "The defendant has threatened me" 
CASUAL: Jane, a candidate running for governor was elected as governor 12 years ago, served 
for 4 years, and decided to run again this year. On election day, she gets a call from the state 
officials telling her the results of the election: she has lost. Nobody else has heard the results yet. 
She calls her husband privately. 
 
Jane tells him: "I've been elected governor" 
lexical ambiguity resolution 
POLITICAL: Candidates running for governor are participating in a locally-televised debate. 
Candidate Smith’s wife is a Doctor of Philosophy, having earned her Ph.D. five years ago, and 
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she has never studied medicine. The moderator asks the candidates a question about healthcare in 
the state.  
Candidate Smith begins his response: “My wife is a doctor” 
COURTROOM: Harry is testifying under oath as a witness in a trial. Harry’s one-time business 
partner, Monica, is on trial for allegedly operating a healthcare clinic without a license. In fact, 
Harry knows that Monica is a Doctor of Philosophy, having earned her Ph.D. five years ago, and 
she has never studied medicine.  
Harry begins his statement about Monica: “Monica is a doctor” 
CASUAL: Harry is on a flight from LA to Tokyo. His wife is a Doctor of Philosophy, having 
earned her Ph.D five years ago, and she has never studied medicine. During the flight, Harry 
partakes in casual conversation with the man sitting next to him. The man next to him mentions 
that he just moved to LA and needs a new healthcare provider.  
Harry responds: “My wife is a doctor” 
non-partitive some 
POLITICAL: A governor has developed a set of principles for a new state tax bill. He meets with 
the 8-person State Senate taxation committee to discuss the new bill. During the meeting, all 
eight members oppose the governor’s bill. The governor addresses the media in a press 
conference the day after the meeting, and a reporter asks him about the meeting. 
The governor says: "Some committee members disagreed with my proposal" 
 
COURTROOM: Five executives of a major company are on trial for corporate tax evasion. 
Martin, who worked for the company, is not being tried but has been called as a witness. Martin 
had sat in on meetings with the five executive committee members and discussed tax loopholes. 
Martin proposed a legal tax plan to the committee, but all eight members disagreed with his 
proposal. While Martin is on the witness stand, the prosecution asks him about that meeting with 
the executive committee. 
 
The witness says: "Some committee members disagreed with my proposal" 
 
CASUAL: Martin had a meeting today with the executive committee of his company. He made a 
new workflow proposal, but the committee didn’t seem to like his plan and all eight members of 
the committee disagree with his proposal. Martin is hanging out with his friend at a bar that 
night; his friend asks him about his meeting. 
 





POLITICAL: Citizens of a city have recently been concerned that local squirrels may have 
rabies. The city’s Department of Public Safety collected samples from 15 squirrels and all 15 
tested positive for rabies. The mayor of the city is asked about the squirrels at a press conference. 
 
The mayor says: "Some of the squirrels they tested had rabies" 
 
COURTROOM: Citizens of a city have recently been concerned that local squirrels may have 
rabies. The city’s Department of Public Safety collected samples from 15 squirrels and all 15 
tested positive for rabies. The city was later sued for mishandling of the situation. A department 
employee is called in as a witness in the trial. 
 
The witness says: "Some of the squirrels they tested had rabies" 
 
CASUAL: Citizens of a city have recently been concerned that local squirrels may have rabies. 
The city’s Department of Public Safety collected samples from 15 squirrels and all 15 tested 
positive for rabies. Jack, who works for the Department of Public Safety, is catching up with his 
friend for a drink after work. 
 
Jack says: "Some of the squirrels they tested had rabies" 
 
Implicatures 
“sick in bed” 
POLITICAL: The governor of a state recently had a meeting with the CEO of a company to 
discuss potential tax breaks. The CEO has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two 
weeks, but the Governor went to the CEO's house anyway this week to meet. A reporter at a 
press conference asks the governor if he has met with the CEO recently. 
 
The governor responds: "The CEO has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks" 
 
COURTROOM: The CEO of Company A is on trial. Scott, the CEO of another company, is 
called in as a witness and sworn in to testify. The prosecutor questions Scott if he had met with 
the CEO of Company A on January 24th. The CEO of Company A was sick in bed with 
pneumonia that entire week, but Scott went to his house anyway to meet with him. 
 
The witness responds: "The CEO of Company A was sick in bed with pneumonia that entire 
week" 
 
CASUAL: Lucy and Erika work for the same company. The CEO of that company has been in 
the hospital with pneumonia for the past two weeks, but Lucy went to the hospital anyway this 
week to meet with the CEO. Erika asks Lucy if she's met with the CEO recently. 
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Lucy responds: "The CEO has been in bed sick with pneumonia for the past two weeks" 
 
“works for the FBI” 
 
POLITICAL: Courtney Jones is a candidate running for Senate. During a live televised debate, 
the interviewer asks her about her family. Her father works as a janitor for the FBI. 
 
Courtney responds: "My father works for the FBI" 
 
COURTROOM: Courtney is called in to be a witness in a trial. While she is testifying on the 
stand, the prosecutor asks her about her family. Her father works as a janitor for the FBI. 
 
The witness responds: "My father works for the FBI" 
 
CASUAL: Hannah just started work at a new company. After work one day, she goes to grab a 
drink with her new co-worker, Lauren, who asks Hannah about her family. Hannah’s father 
works as a janitor for the FBI. 
 
Hannah responds: "My father works for the FBI" 
 
“all-natural ingredients” 
POLITICAL: Dan Walker is being introduced as the new Financial Director of a city. He used to 
work at a manufacturing company that wound up being sued for inflicting small scale 
environmental damage. While Dan was there, the company chose Product X as a new cleaning 
product to use, knowing that it contained 100% all-natural ingredients and that these ingredients 
were nonetheless bad for the environment and cause damage to the local ecosystem. At Dan’s 
inauguration as Financial Director, a local reporter asks about his past at the manufacturing 
company. 
 
Dan responds: "Product X contained 100% all-natural ingredients" 
 
COURTROOM: Dan has been called in as a witness in a court case. The manufacturing 
company Dan works for is being sued for inflicting small-scale environmental damage. The 
company chose Product X as a new cleaning product to use, knowing that it contained 100% all-
natural ingredients and that these ingredients were nonetheless bad for the environment and 
cause damage to the local ecosystem. The prosecution questions Dan while he is sworn in under 
oath as a witness.  
 
The witness says: "Product X contained 100% all-natural ingredients" 
 
CASUAL: Dan and his wife are having dinner one day, telling each other about their days. The 
manufacturing company Dan works for has been debating a new cleaning product to use. The 
company was, in the past, sued for inflicting small-scale environmental damage. Today, they 
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chose Product X – which contains 100% all-natural ingredients, although these ingredients are 
nonetheless bad for the environment and cause damage to the local ecosystem. 
 
Dan says: "Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients" 
 
“let’s just say” 
POLITICAL: A candidate for governor holds a private fundraiser for his election campaign. The 
event is lightly attended, and almost no supporters show up. The ones who do show up, however, 
must have been hungry, as all of the provided food was eaten. The next day, at a press 
conference, a reporter asks the candidate about the turnout for the event.  
The candidate responds: “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
COURTROOM: Nate is testifying under oath as a witness in a trial. A defendant is on trial for 
grand theft auto – the car belonged to a guest at a fundraising event that Nate was running that 
night. The fundraising event was very lightly attended, and almost no people showed up. The 
ones who do show up, however, bust have been hungry, as all of the provided food was eaten. 
The prosecutor is trying to figure out the whereabouts of the defendant on that night, and asks 
Nate about the turnout for the fundraising event.  
The witness responds: “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
CASUAL: Nate is hosting a gathering at his apartment and bought food for his guests, expecting 
a big crowd. Only a couple of people show up, however. The few that did show up must have 
been hungry, as they finished all the food Nate bought for the party. Nate's sister calls him 
afterwards and asks him how the turnout was. 
Nate responds: “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
 
Controls (for this and all other instances of control stimuli, participants would only see one of the 
similar types of stories – for example, a participant would see one of Genre Control 1 or 2 (about 
stealing money) and one of Genre Control 3 or 4 (about meeting a conspiracy theorist)). 
Genre Control 1 
POLITICAL: A high-ranking state government official has been accused of stealing a large sum 
of funds from taxpayer money. The governor knows, with 100% certainty, that this official has 
been stealing. The official is publicly accused of stealing, and the media begins to cover the 
story. A reporter asks the governor if the accusation is true.   
The governor responds: “The official in question did/did not steal money” 
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COURTROOM: A high-ranking state government official has been accused of stealing a large 
sum of funds from taxpayer money. An accountant in the department is called in during the 
official’s trial as a witness. This accountant knows, with 100% certainty, that this official had 
been stealing. He is asked, while testifying under oath, if he observed the government official 
stealing. 
 
The accountant responds: "The official in question did/did not not steal money" 
 
CASUAL: A high-ranking state government official has been accused of stealing a large sum of 
funds from taxpayer money. Max works as an accountant in that department; he knows, with 
100% certainty, that this official has been stealing. The official is accused publicly, so the media 
begins to cover the story. Max’s friend knows that Max works in that department, so he asks 
Max if he knows anything about the accusation.  
Max responds: “The official in question did/did not steal money” 
Genre Control 2 
POLITICAL: A high-ranking state government official has been accused of stealing a large sum 
of funds from taxpayer money. The governor knows, with 100% certainty, that this official has 
not been stealing. The official is publicly accused of stealing, and the media begins to cover the 
story. A reporter asks the governor if the accusation is true.   
The governor responds: “The official in question has/has not been stealing money” 
COURTROOM: A high-ranking state government official has been accused of stealing a large 
sum of funds from taxpayer money. An accountant in the department is called in during the 
official’s trial as a witness. This accountant knows, with 100% certainty, that this official had not 
been stealing. He is asked, while testifying under oath, if he observed the government official 
stealing. 
The witness responds: “The official in question has/has not been stealing money” 
CASUAL: A high-ranking state government official has been accused of stealing a large sum of 
funds from taxpayer money. Max works as an accountant in that department; he knows, with 
100% certainty, that this official has not been stealing money. The official is accused publicly, so 
the media begins to cover the story. Max’s friend knows that Max works in that department, so 
he asks Max if he knows anything about the accusation 
Max says: "The official in question has/has not been stealing money"  
 
Genre Control 3 
POLITICAL: There are rumors that the governor of a state has recently held a meeting with a 
noted conspiracy theorist. This shady figure alleges that he met the governor last week to discuss 
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state policy. In fact, the two did meet in private last week. A reporter asks the governor at a press 
conference if he has met with the conspiracy theorist in the past week. 
The governor responds: “We met once last week” / “I have never met him” 
COURTROOM: A noted conspiracy theorist is on trial for slander. This shady figure alleges that 
he met with the CEO of a major company last month to discuss involvement in the company. In 
fact, the two did meet once in private last month. During the trial, the CEO is called in to be a 
witness. The prosecution asks the CEO, under oath on the witness stand, if she has met with the 
defendant in the past month. 
 
The witness says: "We met once last month" / “I have never met him” 
 
CASUAL: Madison has heard rumors that her friend Vanessa has been hanging out with a noted 
conspiracy theorist. The rumor is that Vanessa has been meeting with this shady figure and 
discussing some wacky ideas. In fact, the two met once in the past month. While the two friends 
are hanging out and catching up, Madison asks Vanessa if she has met with the conspiracy 
theorist. 
Vanessa responds: “We met once last month” / “I have never met him” 
Genre Control 4 (truth only) 
POLITICAL: There are rumors that the governor of a state has recently held a meeting with a 
noted conspiracy theorist. This shady figure alleges that he met the governor last week to discuss 
state policy. In fact, the two have never met. A reporter asks the governor at a press conference if 
he has met with the conspiracy theorist in the past week. 
The governor responds: “I have never met him” 
COURTROOM: A noted conspiracy theorist is on trial for slander. This shady figure alleges that 
he met with the CEO of a major company last month to discuss involvement in the company. In 
fact, the two have never met. During the trial, the named CEO is called in to be a witness. The 
prosecution asks the CEO if he has met with the defendant in the past month. 
 
The CEO says: "I have never met the defendant" 
 
CASUAL: Madison has heard rumors that her friend Vanessa has been hanging out with a noted 
conspiracy theorist. The rumor is that Vanessa has been meeting with this shady figure and 
discussing some wacky ideas. In fact, the two have never met. While the two friends are hanging 
out and catching up, Madison asks Vanessa if she has met with the conspiracy theorist. 




A2 – Chapter 5 – Speaker-Related Biases 
Stimuli are listed here with President Trump; versions with President Obama (and other 
appropriate alterations, where necessary) were used as well.  
Explicatures 
and-enrichment: coactivities 
There are rumors that President Trump has had a major argument and falling out with Vice 
President Pence and they are no longer on speaking terms. Indeed, they haven’t spoken in over a 
week. The two typically golf together on Saturdays. This weekend, they each went to play golf 
on Saturday, but they went separately and didn’t play together. A reporter asks President Trump 
about his relationship with the VP at a press conference. 
 
President Trump responds: "VP Pence and I played golf on Saturday" 
 
and-enrichment: temporal resolution 
The company CQE had been under government sanctions for fraud for years. In September of 
2016, CQE started to turn a massive profit with no signs of fraud. Encouraged by this promising 
sign, in April of 2017, President Trump decided to remove the sanctions on CQE. President 
Trump is asked about CQE at a press briefing a few months later, in July of 2017. 
President Trump says: “I lifted their sanctions and profits increased” 
default enrichment 
President Trump and Kim Jong Un are scheduled to meet on Wednesday morning to discuss a 
peace treaty. The two presidents have met in the past to discuss a peace treaty, but not within the 
past year, so the meeting is much anticipated by the world. On Wednesday, President Truno 
canceled the meeting unexpectedly and has not told the media. He gives a press conference 
Wednesday afternoon. 
 
President Trump says: Kim Jong Un and I have met to discuss a peace treaty.  
lexical ambiguity resolution 
President Trump has selected Peter Harrison as the new US Surgeon General. Harrison is a 
Doctor of Philosophy, having earned his Ph.D. ten years ago, and he has never studied medicine. 
President Trump announces this selection at a press conference, where a reporter questions his 
choice. 
 





President Trump has established a special five-person committee to investigate corruption in 
government. Recently, separate allegations of corruption have come out against each of the five 
members of this committee. At a press conference, a reporter asks President Trump about the 
allegations. 
 




President Trump has developed a set of principles for a new healthcare bill. He meets with the 
Senate Committee on Health to discuss the new initiative. The committee consists of 10 
Democrats and 10 Republicans. During the meeting, all 10 Democrats oppose the President’s 
bill. President Trump addresses the media in a press conference the day after the meeting. A 
reporter asks him about the meeting. 
 




“sick in bed” 
President Trump was scheduled to have an important private meeting with the CEO of one of the 
largest American companies. The CEO has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two 
weeks, however, so the visit to the White House was canceled. President Trump did, however, 
visit the CEO at his home while he was sick and the two met there. A reporter asks President 
Trump if he has met with the CEO. 
President Trump says: “The CEO has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks” 
“worked for the FBI” 
President Trump announced Alex Johnson as a new national security advisor. Until this 
appointment, Johnson has worked as a janitor for the FBI for the past ten years. President Trump 
is asked about the new announcement at a press briefing.  
President Trump says: “Alex Johnson has worked for the FBI for the past ten years 
“all-natural ingredients” 
President Trump has given a government subsidy to one of the country’s biggest manufacturers. 
The subsidy was given for the company switching to a new cleaning product as part of an 
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Environment-Friendly Subsidy Program. This product has 100% all-natural ingredients, but in 
actuality these ingredients are bad for the environment, and the product causes damage to local 
ecosystems. President Trump is aware of these relevant details. President Trump is asked about 
the subsidy in a press conference. 
 
President Trump says: "They switched to a cleaning product that has 100% all-natural 
ingredients" 
 
“let’s just say” 
President Trump holds a private fundraiser. The event is lightly attended, and almost no 
supporters show up. The ones who do show up, however, must have been hungry, as all of the 
provided food was eaten. The next day, at a press conference, a reporter asks President Trump 
about the turnout for the event.  
President Trump says: “Let’s just say all the food was finished” 
 
Controls 
Control 1  
 
A high-ranking member of President Trump’s cabinet has been accused of stealing a large sum 
of funds from taxpayer money. President Trump knows that this cabinet member did indeed steal 
the money and he even observed the theft himself. The public accusation has caught the attention 
of the media; at a press conference, a reporter asks President Trump if the accusations are true.  
 




There are rumors that President Trump has recently held a meeting with a noted conspiracy 
theorist. This shady figure alleges that he met the president last week to discuss government 
policy. In fact, the two did meet once in private last week. A reporter asks President Trump at a 
press conference if he has met with the conspiracy theorist in the past week. 
 











HIGH: College friends Liza and Kelsey both pride themselves as being excellent matchmakers, 
and they’ve always been very competitive as to who is better at setting people up for dates. Liza 
has had a lot of success recently, whereas the latest couple that Kelsey set up (Shawn and Nicole) 
stopped seeing each other after one date. In fact, coincidentally, Shawn and Nicole each got 
engaged to different people. Due to their competitive nature, Kelsey doesn’t want to admit to 
Liza that her recent attempt was a failure. Liza asks Kelsey if she's had recent success making 
matches. 
 
Kelsey responds: "Shawn and Nicole just got engaged"  
 
LOW: College friends Liza and Kelsey are discussing their recent attempts to set up their other 
friends on dates. Liza has had recent success as a matchmaker, whereas the latest couple that 
Kelsey set up (Shawn and Nicole) stopped seeing each other after one date. In fact, 
coincidentally, Shawn and Nicole each recently got engaged - to different people (not to each 
other). Liza asks Kelsey if she's had recent success making matches. 
 
Kelsey responds: "Shawn and Nicole just got engaged"  
 
and-enrichment: temporal resolution 
HIGH: Olivia is catching up with her old friend Cindy, who she hasn’t seen in many years. This 
past year, Olivia gave birth to her first child in February and then got married to a different man 
(not the child’s father) in October. Olivia knows that Cindy is very religious and would not 
approve of Olivia having a child out of wedlock. 
 
Olivia says: "Last year I got married and had a baby"  
 
LOW: Olivia is catching up with her old friend Cindy, who she hasn’t seen in many years. This 
past year, Olivia gave birth to her first child in February and then got married to a different man 
(not the child’s father) in October.  
 
Olivia says: "Last year I got married and had a baby"  
 
default enrichment 
HIGH: Ryan hasn’t eaten lunch yet today, but he doesn’t like Chris and doesn’t want to go to 




Ryan responds: "I've eaten lunch" 
 
LOW: Ryan hasn’t eaten lunch yet today. Chris asks Ryan if he wants to go to lunch with him.  
Ryan responds: “I’ve eaten lunch” 
 
lexical ambiguity resolution 
HIGH: Rebecca has a Doctorate in Philosophy, having earned her Ph.D. just last year. She’s 
hanging out at the bar with her friends and sees a cute guy near her. She overhears him talking 
about how he thinks saving other people's lives is such an attractive quality in a partner. Later in 
the night, she winds up talking to the cute guy, and she wants to seem impressive to him. 
 
Rebecca tells him: "I'm a doctor" 
 
LOW: Rebecca has a Doctorate in Philosophy, having earned her Ph.D. just last year. She’s 
hanging out at the bar with her friends and sees a cute guy near her. Later in the night, she winds 
up talking to the cute guy. 
Rebecca tells him: “I’m a doctor” 
non-partitive some 
HIGH: Ethan is the director of a small summer camp. This past week, a stomach virus was going 
around camp, and every camper there caught the virus. A similar incident occurred last year 
under Ethan’s watch, and Ethan knows that more complains may lead to him losing his job. 
Ethan sends out an email to the campers’ parents. 
Ethan writes: “Some campers have caught a stomach virus” 
LOW: Ethan is the director of a small summer camp. This past week, a stomach virus was going 
around camp, and every camper there caught the virus. A similar incident happened last year. 
Ethan sends out an email to the campers’ parents. 
Ethan writes: “Some campers have caught a stomach virus” 
partitive some 
HIGH: Violet works in a laboratory. She collects a set of ten samples, but she carelessly exposes 
them to oxygen, which taints the samples and renders them unusable for the research. All ten 
samples are tainted. Her boss asks her how the experiment is going. Violet has messed up before 
and knows that her boss would not appreciate another mistake.  
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Violet responds: “Some of the samples have been tainted” 
LOW: Violet works in a laboratory. She collects a set of ten samples, but they are accidentally 
exposed to oxygen, which taints the samples and renders them unusable for the research. All ten 
samples are tainted. Her boss asks her how the experiment is going.  
Violet responds: “Some of the samples have been tainted” 
Implicatures 
“sick in bed” 
HIGH: Mary’s friend Emily has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks, and 
Mary went to visit her yesterday. Mary’s boyfriend John considers Emily to be a bad influence 
on Mary and has told Mary that he doesn’t want her seeing Emily. Mary knows that John would 
not like that she had gone to see Emily. John asks her if she's seen Emily recently. 
Mary responds: "Emily has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks" 
 
LOW: Mary’s friend Emily has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks, and 
Mary went to visit her yesterday. Mary's boyfriend John asks her if she's seen Emily recently: 
 
Mary responds: "Emily has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks" 
 
“works for the FBI” 
HIGH: Hannah just started work at a new company. After work one day, she goes to grab a drink 
with her new co-worker, Lauren. Lauren mentions that her father is a high-ranking official at the 
CIA. Hannah’s father works as a janitor for the FBI, but she wants her family to seem impressive 
to her new friend. 
 
Hannah says: "My father works for the FBI" 
 
LOW: Hannah just started work at a new company . After work one day, she goes to grab a drink 
with her new co-worker, Lauren, who asks Hannah about her family. Hannah’s father works as a 
janitor for the FBI.  
Hannah says: “My father works for the FBI.” 
“all-natural ingredients” 
HIGH: A company with several large manufacturing plants is contracting a new cleaning product 
provider. A group of managers is discussing the merits of different cleaning products, including 
how environmentally friendly they are. Mike’s wife works for the company that makes Product 
X, so he wants that product to be chosen. Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients, 
although these ingredients are nonetheless bad for the environment and cause damage to the local 
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ecosystem. Mike doesn’t want the other managers to know about the negative environmental 
impact of the product. Another manager asks Mike about Product X.  
 
Mike responds: "Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients" 
 
LOW: The managers of two manufacturing plants for the same company are discussing the 
merits of different cleaning products, as Don is looking for a new, environmentally-friendly 
product to use. Mike knows about the products, as they went through a similar search last year. 
Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients, although Mike has learned that these natural 
ingredients are still bad for the environment and cause damage to the local ecosystem. Don asks 
Mike about Product X.  
Mike responds: "Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients" 
 
“let’s just say” 
HIGH: Diana is hosting a party and bought a lot of food for her guests, hoping for a big crowd. 
She calls her sister before the party and tells her she’s worried not a lot of people will show up. 
Indeed, only a couple of people show up, but they do finish all the food Diana bought. Diana’s 
sister calls the next day to ask how it went. Diana’s sister is a social butterfly and Diana knows 
that throwing a poorly-attended party would disappoint her. 
 
Diana says: "Let's just say all the food was eaten" 
 
LOW: Diana is hosting a party and bought food for her guests. She calls her sister before the 
party and tells her she’s worried not a lot of people will show up. Only a couple of people show 
up, but they do finish all the food Diana bought. Diana’s sister calls the next day. 
Diana says: “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
 
Controls 
Intent Control 1 
HIGH LIE: Grace and Adam are on their first date. They are discussing their travel and study 
abroad experiences. Grace never studied abroad, but she wants to seem well-traveled to impress 
Adam. Adam asks Grace if she studied abroad. 
 
Grace says: "Junior year I studied abroad in Argentina and Chile" 
 
HIGH TRUTH: Adam and Grace are on their first date. They are discussing their college 
experiences. Adam mentions that he thinks study abroad is a waste of time and money. Grace did 
study abroad Junior year, in Argentina and Chile, but she wants to impress Adam. Adam asks her 
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if she ever studied abroad.  
 
Grace responds: “Junior year I studied abroad in Argentina and Chile” 
 
LOW LIE: Adam and Grace are on their first date. They are discussing their college experiences; 
neither of them ever studied abroad. Adam asks Grace if she ever studied abroad.  
 
Grace responds: "Junior year I studied abroad in Argentina and Chile" 
 
LOW TRUTH: Adam and Grace are on their first date and are discussing their college 
experiences. Grace studied abroad in Argentina and Chile during her Junior year. Adam asks 
Grace if she ever studied abroad. 
 
Grace responds: "Junior year I studied abroad in Argentina and Chile" 
 
Intent Control 2 
HIGH LIE: Amanda and Paul just met for the first time at a bar and are flirting through a 
conversation. Paul reveals that he loves dogs. Amanda wants to impress Paul, but she doesn’t 
have a dog. Paul asks Amanda if she has a dog.  
 
Amanda says: "I have a pet dog" 
 
HIGH TRUTH: Amanda and Paul just met for the first time at a bar and are flirting through a 
conversation. Paul reveals that he loves dogs. Amanda wants to impress PAUL, but she doesn’t 
have any pets. Paul asks Amanda if she has a dog. 
Amanda responds: “I don’t have any pets” 
LOW LIE: Amanda and Paul just met for the first time at a bar. The conversation turns to pets – 
Amanda doesn’t have any. Paul asks Amanda if she has any pets. 
Amanda responds: “I have a pet dog” 
LOW TRUTH: Amanda and Paul just met for the first time at a bar. The conversation turns to 
pets – Amanda doesn’t have any. Paul asks Amanda if she has any pets. 
 
Amanda responds: "I don't have any pets" 
 
Intent Control 3 
 
HIGH LIE: Anthony sneaks a quick peek down Carly’s shirt while she’s bending over. She 
seems embarrassed and asks Anthony if he was looking down her shirt. 
 




HIGH TRUTH: Anthony sneaks a quick peek down Carly’s shirt while she’s bending over. She 
seems embarrassed and asks Anthony if he was looking down her shirt. 
Anthony says: “You got me babe, I was looking down your shirt” 
LOW LIE: Anthony sneaks a quick peek down his wife’s shirt while she’s bending over. She 
catches him and is flattered. She winks at him and asks if he was looking down her shirt. 
Anthony says: “Absolutely not, I wasn’t looking down your shirt” 
LOW TRUTH: Anthony sneaks a quick peek down his wife’s shirt while she’s bending over. 
She catches him and is flattered. She winks at him and asks if he was looking down her shirt. 
Anthony says: “You got me babe, I was looking down your shirt” 
Intent Control 4 
HIGH LIE: Kyle is hanging out with his new college friends during the first week at school. 
They’re all talking about their experience playing high school sports; Kyle didn’t play a sport in 
high school, but he would like to impress his new friends. They ask him if he played any sports. 
Kyle says: “In high school I played soccer and golf” 
HIGH TRUTH: Kyle is hanging out with his new college friends during the first week at school. 
They’re all talking about their experience playing high school sports; Kyle didn’t play a sport in 
high school, but he would like to impress his new friends. 
 
Kyle says: "I didn't play any sports in high school" 
 
LOW LIE: Kyle is hanging out with his new college friends during the first week at school. 
They’re discussing whether or not they played sports in high school; Kyle didn’t play a sport in 
high school. 
 
Kyle says: "In high school I played soccer and golf" 
 
LOW TRUTH: Kyle is hanging out with his new college friends during the first week at school. 
They’re discussing whether or not they played sports in high school; Kyle didn’t play a sport in 
high school. 





A4 – Chapter 7 – Situational Stakes 
Explicatures 
and-enrichment: coactivities 
HIGH: The President of a country has had a major argument and falling out with her Vice 
President and they are no longer on speaking terms. Indeed, they haven’t spoken in over a week. 
The two typically golf together on Saturdays. Last Saturday, they each went to play golf, but 
they played separately, at different courses. The President’s best friend privately asks her about 
her relationship with the VP. 
 
The President responds: My VP and I played golf last Saturday. 
 
LOW: The President of a country typically plays golf with her childhood friend on Saturday. 
They haven’t spoken in a couple of weeks, however. Last Saturday, they each went to play golf 
on Saturday, but they went and played separately, at different courses. The Vice President asks 
the President about her relationship with her best friend. 
The President responds: My best friend and I played golf last Saturday. 
 
and-enrichment: temporal resolution 
HIGH: Child Protective Services knocks on the door to Olivia’s apartment, as they had received 
a tip about a potentially unsafe environment for a child. To investigate the situation, they look 
around and ask Olivia a series of questions. Last year, Olivia gave birth to the child in February, 
and then got married to a different man (not the child’s father) in October. 
 
Olivia says: "Last year I got married and had a baby"  
 
LOW: This past year, Olivia gave birth to her first child in February and then got married to a 
different man (not the child’s father) in October. Now Olivia is catching up with her old friend 
Cindy, who she hasn’t seen in many years. 
 




HIGH: Catherine was elected as the mayor of her city back in 2010. After serving for 4 years and 
taking some time off, she ran for mayor of her city again. At the end of election day as she’s in 
her office with campaign staff, she gets the official call that she’s lost the election. She calls her 
husband to tell him the news.  
 




LOW: Catherine and a few classmates are working together on a group project. Last time, 
Catherine was elected as group scribe – the group member to write down notes. This time, Alex 
is elected as group scribe. Catherine calls her boyfriend that night. 
Catherine says: “I’ve been elected scribe” 
lexical ambiguity resolution 
HIGH: Eric is on a flight from LA to Tokyo. He is a Doctor of Philosophy, having earned his 
Ph.D. just two years ago. From his seat, Eric sees an elderly passenger in the front of the cabin 
fall over, clutching her chest. The flight attendant rushes to the intercom and, with panic in her 
voice, calls out “Is anyone on board a doctor?”  
Eric says: “I’m a doctor” 
LOW: Eric is on a flight from LA to Tokyo. He is a Doctor of Philosophy, having earned his 
Ph.D. just two years ago. During the flight, he partakes in casual conversation with the man 
sitting next to him. The man next to him keeps twisting his wrist around, seemingly in a bit of 
pain. Eric asks him what’s wrong. The man responds, “I’m not sure why my wrist hurts; I need 
to see a doctor.”  
Eric says: “I’m a doctor” 
non-partitive some 
HIGH: Violet has run some questionable experiments as part of her research in a hospital. Word 
spreads about her unethical study and she is brought in front of the six-person Committee of 
Ethics. The committee hears the case and votes on whether or not Violet should be allowed to 
continue conducting research; all six members vote against allowing her to continue. She returns 
home that night, and her husband asks her how it went. 
 
Violet says: "Some committee members voted against me" 
 
LOW: Violet wants to join the party-planning committee at her office. She approaches the 
committee, currently made up of six members, and asks if she can join. The committee holds a 
vote, and all six members vote against including her. Later that night, Violet’s husband asks her 
how it went. 
Violet says: "Some committee members voted against me" 
 
partitive some 
HIGH: Derek thinks he may have contracted a Sexually Transmitted Disease, so he goes to the 
doctor for some tests. The doctor runs tests for 4 different STDs, and they all come back positive. 
Derek talks to his new girlfriend later that day. She asks him about the test results. 
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Derek says: “Some of the tests turned up positive” 
LOW: Derek has been having trouble reading and thinks he may be farsighted. He goes to the 
doctor for some tests. The doctor runs 4 tests, which all turn up positive for farsightedness. 
Derek talks to his new girlfriend later that day. She asks him about the test results. 
Derek says: “Some of the tests turned up positive” 
 
Implicatures 
“sick in bed” 
HIGH: John and Mary have recently started dating. Gabe is Mary’s ex-boyfriend. Gabe has been 
sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks, but he and Mary went on a date last night. 
John asks Mary if she has seen Gabe recently. 
 
Mary responds: "Gabe has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks” 
 
LOW: John and Mary have recently started dating. Mary’s friend Emily has been sick in bed 
with pneumonia for the past two weeks. Mary went to visit Emily last night to see how she was 
doing. John asks Mary if she has seen Emily recently.  
Mary responds: "Emily has been sick in bed with pneumonia for the past two weeks" 
 
“works for the FBI” 
 
HIGH: Hannah and Lauren have been kidnapped. If the kidnappers don’t get a high enough 
ransom price, they’ve threatened to kill Hannah and Lauren. Lauren and Hannah are scrambling 
to find a way to reach a high-ranking contact to save them. Hannah’s father works as a janitor for 
the FBI. 
Hannah says: “My father works for the FBI” 
LOW: After work one day, Hannah goes to grab a drink with her new co-worker, Lauren, who 
asks Hannah about her family. Hannah’s father works as a janitor for the FBI. 
Hannah: “My father works for the FBI” 
“all-natural ingredients” 
HIGH: The largest manufacturer in the country is contracting a new cleaning product provider. 
This company has one of the largest environmental footprints in the world and is looking for 
ways to reduce their contributions to climate change. A salesman for a cleaning product 
company is in a meeting with the manufacturing company executives. The salesman’s product, 
Product X, contains 100% all-natural ingredients, although he knows these ingredients are bad 
for the environment and cause damage to the local ecosystem.  
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The salesman says: "Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients" 
 
LOW: Frank is looking for a new, environmentally-friendly cleaning product to use in his house, 
so he goes to the hardware store. Frank knows his environmental footprint is tiny, but wants to 
pitch in however he can to help reduce his contributions to climate change. An employee at the 
store tells Frank about Product X, new in the store. Product X contains 100% all-natural 
ingredients, although the employee knows these ingredients are bad for the environment and 
cause damage to the local ecosystem. 
 
The employee says: "Product X contains 100% all-natural ingredients" 
 
“let’s just say” 
 
HIGH: Diana is hosting a major fundraising event for a candidate for governor. The event is a 
failure, as only a couple of people show up. The few that did show up must have been hungry, as 
they ate all of the food that Diana bought for the event. A member of the governor's campaign 
staff asks Diana about the event.  
 
Diana says: "Let's just say all the food was eaten" 
 
LOW: Diana is hosting a gathering at her apartment and bought food for her guests, expecting a 
big crowd. Only a couple of people show up, however. The few that did show up must have been 
hungry, as they finished all the food Diana bought for the party. Diana’s sister asks her about the 
party. 
 
Diana says: “Let’s just say all the food was eaten” 
 
Controls 
Stakes Control 1 
HIGH LIE: Nick stole $1000 in cash from his brother’s room to pay for a trip to Sweden. His 
brother asks Nick if he stole money from him. 
Nick responds: “I didn’t steal any money from you” 
HIGH TRUTH: Tom suspects that his brother, Nick, stole $1000 in cash from his room to pay 
for a trip to Sweden. Nick didn't steal money from Tom and he doesn't know anything about the 
$1000 in question. Tom asks Nick if he stole money from him. 
Nick responds: “I didn’t steal money from you” 
LOW LIE: Nick took a quarter from his brother’s dresser to pay for the parking meter. Nick's 
brother asks him if he took money from him. 
Nick responds: “I didn’t take any money from you” 
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LOW TRUTH: Tom suspects that his brother Nick took a quarter from his dresser to pay for the 
parking meter. Nick didn't take a quarter, nor does he know what happened to the quarter. Tom 
asks Nick if he stole the quarter. 
Nick responds: “I didn’t take any money from you” 
Stakes Control 2 
HIGH LIE: Zack is walking home when somebody pulls a gun out, points it at Zack, and 
demands all his money. Zack has $50 in cash on him. 
Zack says: “I don’t have any cash on me” 
HIGH TRUTH: Zack is walking home when somebody pulls a gun out, points it at Zack, and 
demands all his cash. Zack has no cash on him. 
Zack says: “I don’t have any cash on me” 
LOW LIE: Zack and Krissy are waiting in line to buy burritos for lunch. Zack has $5 in cash on 
him. Krissy asks Zack if she can borrow some cash for the burrito. 
Zack responds: “I don’t have any cash on me” 
LOW TRUTH: Zack and Krissy are waiting in line to buy burritos for lunch. Zack has no cash 
on him. Krissy asks Zack if she can borrow ten dollars for the burrito. 
Zack responds: “I don’t have any cash on me” 
Stakes Control 3 
 
HIGH LIE: Julia is taking her final exam in Spanish class – she just needs to pass this test and 
she’ll graduate. She looks up some answers on her phone when the professor can’t see her. One 
of her classmates claims to the professor that he saw Julia cheating, so the professor asks Julia if 
she looked up answers. 
 
Julia responds: "I promise I didn't cheat" 
 
HIGH TRUTH: Julia is taking her final exam in Spanish class – she just needs to pass this test 
and she’ll graduate. She looks up some answers on her phone when the professor can’t see her. 
One of her classmates claims to the professor that he saw Julia cheating, so the professor asks 
Julia if she looked up answers. 
Julia responds: “I used my phone to cheat” 
LOW LIE: Julia and her friends are filling out an online quiz to see who knows more about 
Harry Potter. Julia Googles some answers on the side when her friends can’t see her screen. She 
gets 100% on the quiz and her friends are shocked. They accuse her of looking up the answers. 
Julia says: “I promise I didn’t cheat” 
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LOW TRUTH: Julia and her friends are filling out an online quiz to see who knows more about 
Harry Potter. Julia Googles some answers on the side when her friends can’t see her screen. She 
gets 100% on the quiz and her friends are shocked. They accuse her of looking up the answers. 
Julia says: “I used my phone to cheat” 
Stakes Control 4 
HIGH LIE: Ashley has been sneaking into the store that she works at after hours and stealing 
from the cash register. She only takes a little bit at a time, but she’s been doing it for weeks and 
it’s adding up. People begin to suspect that the thief is Ashley. Her boss confronts her about it. 
Ashley says: “I have never stolen from the store” 
HIGH TRUTH: Ashley has been sneaking into the store that she works at after hours and 
stealing from the cash register. She only takes a little bit at a time, but she’s been doing it for 
weeks and it’s adding up. People begin to suspect that the thief is Ashley. Her boss confronts her 
about it. 
Ashley says: “How did you catch on… it was me” 
LOW LIE: Ashley has been sneaking into the office after hours to rearrange the keys on other 
peoples’ keyboards because she finds it funny. Her co-workers find it funny, but they don’t know 
who’s been doing it. Ashley’s boss knows that Ashley enjoys pulling pranks, so he begins to 
suspect Ashley as the prankster. Her boss asks her if it’s her. 
Ashley says: “I have never snuck into the office after hours” 
LOW TRUTH: Ashley has been sneaking into the office after hours to rearrange the keys on 
other peoples’ keyboards because she finds it funny. Her co-workers find it funny, but they don’t 
know who’s been doing it. Ashley’s boss knows that Ashley enjoys pulling pranks, so he begins 
to suspect Ashley as the prankster. Her boss asks her if it’s her. 










Appendix B – Residuals Histograms 
 
Figure B-1 – Histograms of residuals from linear model in each of the four Lie Rating Task 
experiments demonstrating normality 
